Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Do industry safety standards count as “safety law” in a slip case? Blackwell v. Holiday Oil Co.

2026 UT App 99No. 20240994-CADecided Jul 2, 2026Personal Injury & TortsAffirmed

Holding

Because “rule” in MUJI CV212’s phrase “statute, ordinance or rule” means an officially promulgated agency regulation with the force of law, uncodified advisory ANSI, ASTM and IBC standards are not a “safety law,” and the trial court correctly refused the instruction.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with Holiday Oil and left the jury’s verdict in its favor in place.

  • The jury’s verdict for Holiday Oil stands.
  • The model jury instruction on violating a “safety law” covers statutes, ordinances and officially adopted agency rules, not advisory industry standards that no Utah government body has adopted.
  • The court held only that the instruction did not apply to these standards; it did not say such standards are irrelevant to whether a business acted with reasonable care.

What happened?

In April 2018, Kimberly Blackwell was leaving a Holiday Oil convenience store when she stepped to the side to make room for a child. She stepped on the corner of an entryway floor mat that was not secured to the floor. The mat curled under her foot and she fell onto her right hand.

She needed wrist surgery and was later diagnosed with complex regional pain syndrome, a chronic pain disorder. The night before, a contractor had pressure washed the sidewalk, and water was found under the mat after her fall.

What happened at trial?

Blackwell sued Holiday Oil for negligence, meaning a failure to use reasonable care. At a five-day jury trial, one of her experts testified that the mat broke safety standards set by the International Building Code (IBC), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). He admitted that Utah has not put the ANSI or ASTM standards into statute. Holiday Oil’s expert called them “consensus standards,” or best practices, and said the mat met them.

Blackwell asked the judge to give the jury a model instruction, known as MUJI CV212. It says that breaking a “safety law” is evidence of negligence unless the violation is excused. The judge refused, saying he did not see how Holiday Oil could be held to a law that does not apply in Utah. The jury found Holiday Oil was not at fault.

What did Blackwell argue on appeal?

She pointed out that the model instruction tells the court to summarize the “statute, ordinance or rule” at issue. She argued that “rule” has a broad everyday meaning that covers accepted industry standards. Holiday Oil argued that the instruction uses the word “law” throughout and means a binding, codified rule.

What did the court decide?

The Court of Appeals agreed with Holiday Oil. It read “rule” in light of the words next to it. Statutes and ordinances are both formal, legally binding laws, so “rule” means an agency rule that has the force of law.

The court said this matches a section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a legal treatise Utah has adopted on this point, which speaks of laws passed by a legislature and agency regulations. None of the standards Blackwell relied on had been adopted by the Legislature, a city or an agency. So they were not a “safety law,” and the judge was right to refuse the instruction.

The court also rejected Blackwell’s reliance on an earlier case, saying it did not decide this question.

What happens now?

Nothing further. The verdict for Holiday Oil stands, and the case is over at this level.

What should people take from this?

In Utah, the “safety law” jury instruction is tied to laws and officially adopted agency rules. Industry best practices, however widely accepted, do not qualify under that instruction unless a government body has adopted them.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Orme, J., joined by Christiansen Forster and Tenney, JJ.). Blackwell slipped on an unsecured entry mat at a Holiday Oil store, and a jury found Holiday Oil not at fault (¶¶ 2, 12). The trial court correctly declined to give MUJI CV212 because the advisory ANSI, ASTM and IBC standards Blackwell relied on are not a “safety law” (¶¶ 21–22).

Issue 1: Refusal of the MUJI CV212 “safety law” instruction (correctness, ¶ 14): affirmed (no error)

Uncodified advisory safety standards do not satisfy MUJI CV212’s term “rule,” or “safety law” more broadly, so the trial court did not err in refusing the instruction (¶ 21).

Standard. Because the claim is that the court denied an instruction to which the party was legally entitled, review is for correctness, not abuse of discretion (¶ 14).

Noscitur a sociis. Applying the canon as stated in Armenta v. Unified Fire Auth., 2025 UT 26, ¶ 29, 573 P.3d 1283, the court read “rule” in “statute, ordinance or rule” by reference to its neighbors (¶¶ 18–19). Statutes and ordinances share the trait of being “formally codified, legally binding legislative enactments,” so “rule” means an administrative rule: “[a]n officially promulgated agency regulation that has the force of law” (¶ 19). The court rejected Blackwell’s dictionary definition of “rule” as a guide for conduct or accepted custom (¶¶ 16, 19).

Restatement § 288B. This reading matches Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B, which Utah has adopted, see Colosimo v. Gateway Cmty. Church, 2018 UT 26, ¶ 45 n.82, 424 P.3d 866, and which limits its reach to legislative enactments and administrative regulations (¶ 20). MUJI CV212 tracks § 288B(2), and Blackwell’s broader reading would conflict with it (¶ 20).

Side arguments. Blackwell’s description of MUJI CV212 as a prima facie evidence instruction was incorrect; it says only that an unexcused violation “may” be considered as evidence of negligence (¶ 20 n.6, citing State v. Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 33, 546 P.3d 963). Paulos v. Covenant Transp., Inc., 2004 UT App 35, 86 P.3d 752, did not decide whether an industry handbook was a “safety law,” because no party challenged that point there (¶ 16 n.5).

Application. Neither the ANSI nor ASTM standards nor the relevant IBC provisions have been codified by the Legislature, the governing municipal authority, or an administrative agency (¶ 21). Utah has codified certain IBC provisions, but it was uncontested that those sections were not relevant (¶ 6 n.3).

Takeaways

  • For MUJI CV212, “rule” means an officially promulgated agency regulation with the force of law (¶ 19).
  • Expert testimony that an industry standard is reliable and accepted does not make it a “safety law” under the instruction (¶¶ 11, 21).
  • MUJI CV212 reflects Restatement § 288B(2) and states only that an unexcused violation may be considered as evidence of negligence, not prima facie evidence (¶ 20 n.6).
  • A challenge to the denial of an instruction a party claims it was legally entitled to is reviewed for correctness (¶ 14).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Blackwell v. Holiday Oil Co.
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 99
Case no.
20240994-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
July 2, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Blackwell
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
A negligence claim for a wrist injury from a slip on a convenience store floor mat, which a jury rejected by finding Holiday Oil not at fault

The panel

Gregory K. OrmeAuthor
Michele M. Christiansen ForsterConcurred
Ryan D. TenneyConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Mark S. Kouris

Parties & counsel

Blackwell — AppellantIndividual(s)Lynn C. HarrisLeah J. Aston
Holiday Oil Co. — AppelleeBusinessPatrick C. BurtWilliam G. Wilson

Practice Tip

Before requesting MUJI CV212, confirm that the standard was codified by the Legislature, a municipality or an administrative agency; uncodified industry standards will not support the instruction (¶¶ 19, 21).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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