When does an industry safety standard qualify as a 'safety law' under MUJI CV212? Blackwell v. Holiday Oil Co. Explained

Background and facts

In April 2018, Kimberly Blackwell slipped on the corner of an unsecured entryway floor mat while exiting a Holiday Oil convenience store. The mat had been undermined by water that seeped beneath the entrance doors after a contractor pressure-washed the sidewalk the night before. Blackwell sustained a wrist injury requiring surgery and was later diagnosed with complex regional pain syndrome. She filed a negligence action, and the case proceeded to a five-day jury trial in June 2024. The jury found Holiday Oil not at fault.

Key legal issues

The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury under Model Utah Jury Instruction 2d CV212 (MUJI CV212), which provides that “[v]iolation of a safety law is evidence of negligence unless the violation is excused.” Blackwell sought to ground the instruction in standards promulgated by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), and relevant provisions of the International Building Code (IBC)—none of which had been codified into Utah law. She argued that the term “rule” in MUJI CV212’s direction to “[s]ummarize or quote the statute, ordinance or rule” was broad enough to encompass these advisory consensus standards.

Court’s analysis and holding

The Utah Court of Appeals reviewed the question for correctness, treating it as a legal question of whether Blackwell was entitled to the instruction. Applying the noscitur a sociis canon of interpretation, the court examined the term “rule” in the context of its companions “statute” and “ordinance.” Both statutes and ordinances share a unifying characteristic: they are formally codified, legally binding legislative enactments. Consistent with that common thread, the court held that “rule” as used in MUJI CV212 means an administrative rule—”an officially promulgated agency regulation that has the force of law”—not a voluntary industry consensus standard. The court reinforced this conclusion by reference to section 288B of the Second Restatement of Torts, which Utah has adopted and which expressly limits evidence-of-negligence treatment to violations of legislative enactments or administrative regulations. Because ANSI, ASTM, and the relevant IBC provisions had not been codified by the Legislature, any municipal authority, or an administrative agency, they did not satisfy MUJI CV212’s definition of “safety law.” The court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction.

Practice implications

This decision draws a clear line for Utah tort practitioners. MUJI CV212 is available only when a plaintiff can point to a formally enacted statute, municipal ordinance, or promulgated administrative rule—not merely a widely accepted industry consensus standard. Practitioners should audit their expert disclosures and trial strategy early: if the safety standards undergirding a premises liability or products liability claim are advisory in nature, the path to the jury runs through expert standard-of-care testimony rather than MUJI CV212. Additionally, the court’s application of noscitur a sociis to a jury instruction—rather than a statute—signals that Utah appellate courts will apply standard textual canons broadly when interpreting the scope of model instructions.