Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Does a missing unanimity instruction mean a new trial? Miranda v. State

2026 UT App 91No. 20241305-CADecided Jun 11, 2026Post-Conviction ReliefReversed

Holding

Because prejudice is not presumed for an unpreserved unanimity claim raised through ineffective assistance, and the evidence and the prosecutor’s location-based linking of counts left confidence in the verdict intact, Miranda failed to show Strickland prejudice and his convictions were reinstated.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with the State, which appealed, and reinstated Miranda’s nine convictions.

  • When a defendant first raises a missing unanimity instruction through an ineffective-assistance claim, prejudice is not presumed; the defendant must show it.
  • Here, the prosecutor’s closing argument tied the sexual abuse counts to three locations, and the court held that was enough on these facts.
  • Miranda’s convictions were reinstated and no new trial will be held.

What happened?

A jury convicted Adolfo Miranda in 2015 of six counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and three counts of rape of a child, all first-degree felonies, for acts against his stepdaughter. The court calls her “Beth,” a made-up name. She testified that the abuse happened many times, at the family home, at a Provo mini mall, at an Orem arcade, and at a friend’s house. His direct appeal failed.

Miranda then filed for postconviction relief, a separate civil case that challenges a conviction after the regular appeal is over. He argued his trial and appellate lawyers were ineffective because they never asked for a “specific unanimity” instruction. That instruction tells jurors they must all agree on the same act for each count when the evidence describes more acts than there are charges.

What did each side argue?

The State admitted the lawyers’ work fell short. But a person claiming ineffective assistance must also show prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability the result would have been different without the mistake. The State argued Miranda could not show that.

The postconviction court disagreed with the State. It relied on State v. Chadwick, 2024 UT 34, 554 P.3d 1098, treated cases like this as ones that inherently undermine confidence in the verdict, and faulted the prosecutor’s closing argument. It vacated the convictions and ordered a new trial. The State appealed.

What did the Court of Appeals decide?

It reversed. First, it held the postconviction court wrongly presumed prejudice. Chadwick presumes prejudice only when the issue was raised at trial. When the issue was not raised at trial, as here, the defendant must prove prejudice.

On the three rape counts, the prosecutor told jurors that one rape happened at the friend’s house and the rest in the basement bedroom. Since the jury convicted on all three, every juror had to find at least two basement rapes. Beth described four or five there, and the court saw no reason any juror would believe two but not a third.

On the six sexual abuse counts, the prosecutor told jurors to consider each count separately and linked two counts each to the home, the mini mall and the arcade. The court held that link to places was enough on these facts. It noted the trial judge had called Beth’s testimony “impressive and resolute.”

The court also rejected Miranda’s claim that the missing instruction kept his lawyer from attacking specific acts. A proper instruction could have simply told jurors to agree on the same act, which would not have narrowed the case either.

What happens now?

The order for a new trial is undone and Miranda’s convictions are reinstated. Nothing goes back to the lower court.

What should people take from this?

Admitting that a lawyer made a mistake does not end the question. The person seeking relief still has to show the mistake likely changed the outcome, and the court looks closely at the evidence and the closing arguments to decide that.

Bottom line

Reversed; the postconviction court’s order is vacated and Miranda’s convictions are reinstated (Orme, J., joined by Mortensen and Oliver, JJ.). The State conceded deficient performance by trial and appellate counsel for not seeking or raising a specific unanimity instruction, so only Strickland prejudice was at issue (¶ 22). Miranda did not show a reasonable probability of a different outcome (¶¶ 23, 30).

Issue 1: Prejudice from missing specific unanimity instruction (mixed, ¶ 20): reversed

The postconviction court erred in finding prejudice, because Miranda did not show a reasonable probability that a properly instructed jury would have reached a different result.

Presumption. The court’s reliance on State v. Chadwick, 2024 UT 34, 554 P.3d 1098, was misplaced: Chadwick’s rebuttable presumption of prejudice applies to preserved unanimity issues, while for unpreserved ones the defendant bears the Strickland burden (¶ 24). See also State v. Baugh, 2024 UT 33, ¶ 42, 556 P.3d 35. Instructions must either link an act to a charge or tell jurors to agree on the same act (¶ 21, quoting State v. Mike, 2025 UT App 163, ¶ 40, 581 P.3d 590).

Rape counts. The prosecutor identified one rape at the friend’s house and the rest in the basement bedroom, so convictions on all three counts mean every juror found at least two basement rapes. With testimony of four or five there, the court saw no basis for a juror to stop at two (¶ 25). Footnote 7 rejects Miranda’s attacks on Beth’s credibility, including the hospital-birth episode and new accusations at trial (¶ 25 n.7).

Aggravated sexual abuse counts. A prosecutor may reduce unanimity prejudice by “clearly identifying for the jury which factual circumstance formed the basis for the charge” (¶ 27, quoting State v. Macleod, 2024 UT App 32, ¶ 66, 546 P.3d 366). The closing told jurors to consider each count separately and linked two counts each to the home, mini mall and arcade. “Under the facts of this case, the geographical link was sufficient” (¶¶ 27–28), especially given the trial court’s view that Beth’s testimony was detailed and credible (¶ 28).

Defense strategy. The argument that the omission kept counsel from targeting specific acts failed, because an instruction requiring agreement on the same act would have been equally restrictive (¶ 29).

Takeaways

  • An ineffective-assistance claim based on a missing unanimity instruction does not carry Chadwick’s presumption of prejudice; the petitioner must meet Strickland (¶ 24).
  • A conviction count that exceeds the acts tied to one location can show juror agreement on acts at that location (¶ 25).
  • A closing argument tying counts to locations may be enough to defeat prejudice on the facts of a given case (¶¶ 27–28).
  • A claim that the omission hampered defense strategy fails where the alternative unanimity instruction would not have narrowed the case (¶ 29).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Miranda v. State
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 91
Case no.
20241305-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
June 11, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
State
Disposition
Reversed
At stake
Whether nine first-degree felony convictions for child sexual abuse and rape of a child, vacated by the postconviction court, would be reinstated

The panel

Gregory K. OrmeAuthor
David N. MortensenConcurred
Amy J. OliverConcurred
Trial court
Fourth District Court, Provo Department · Judge Kraig J. Powell

Parties & counsel

State — AppellantState of UtahJeffrey S. GrayChristopher D. Ballard
Miranda — AppelleeIndividual(s)Ann M. TaliaferroDebra M. Nelson

Practice Tip

In a postconviction unanimity claim, do not rely on State v. Chadwick, 2024 UT 34, 554 P.3d 1098, to presume prejudice; the petitioner must show how the jury could have split on specific acts given the evidence and closing argument (¶¶ 24–28).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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