When does garnishment moot a contempt appeal in Utah divorce enforcement proceedings? Duffin v. Duffin Explained

Background and facts

James and Brandy Duffin divorced in 2020 after contentious proceedings that have generated multiple subsequent appeals. A $30,299.83 attorney fees judgment entered in June 2020 remained entirely unpaid through 2023, when the district court held James in contempt, imposed thirty days in jail and a $1,000 fine, and suspended both sanctions to allow him to purge the contempt. The court’s August 2023 order stated that James could satisfy his obligations voluntarily or Brandy could “issue a garnishment to have these amounts paid to purge [James’s] contempt.” A September 2024 order established payment percentages, and a November 2024 order denied James’s motion to set aside and awarded Brandy an additional $6,422.50 in attorney fees incurred during enforcement. While the appeal was pending, Brandy obtained a writ of continuing garnishment in February 2026 to collect both judgments.

Key legal issues

The court addressed four issues: (1) whether entry of the garnishment rendered James’s contempt challenge moot; (2) whether the November 2024 attorney fees award was statutorily authorized, supported by evidence, and reasonable; (3) whether the district court erred by not addressing James’s rule 60(b)(5) argument that the attorney fees judgment had been satisfied; and (4) whether the court could order repayment of a daycare arrearage without first quantifying a sum certain.

Court’s analysis and holding

The court dismissed the contempt challenge as moot. Because the district court’s own order specified that garnishment would purge the contempt, entry of the writ eliminated any live controversy—reversing the contempt finding would not alter James’s payment obligation or Brandy’s collection rights. The court emphasized that this ruling was case-specific: in cases where no such purge language exists, garnishment would not automatically moot a contempt order.

On the attorney fees award, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard and affirmed. Utah Code section 81-1-203(2) authorized fees where Brandy substantially prevailed on her motions to enforce custody, parent-time, and child support provisions. The district court carefully reviewed counsel’s fee declaration, excluded insufficiently explained entries, and apportioned trial-preparation time by thirds—all within its broad discretion. The court rejected James’s argument that fees were unreasonable because Brandy prevailed on only some allegations, noting that the number of successful claims is merely one permissible factor, not a mandatory one.

The rule 60(b)(5) argument failed because James offered no admissible evidence that the judgment had been satisfied—only a footnote asserting Brandy’s father may have paid her attorney bills. The court noted that payment to Brandy’s attorney by a third party would not satisfy a judgment debt running from James to Brandy.

The court remanded the daycare arrearage issue because no order in the record identified a quantified balance. A repayment order must specify a sum certain to be enforceable and permit meaningful appellate review.

Practice implications

Practitioners should pay close attention to the precise language of contempt purge conditions. Where the order ties purge to a specific collection mechanism, that language may be dispositive on mootness if the creditor later employs that mechanism. Conversely, attorneys seeking to preserve contempt challenges on appeal should argue that the purge language is ambiguous or does not encompass the collection method used. When submitting fee declarations in enforcement proceedings, ensure every billing entry clearly identifies the task performed and its connection to the enforcement motion—vague entries risk reduction. Finally, before seeking repayment orders for arrearages, always establish a documented sum certain in the record to avoid remand.