Does Utah's incorporation code violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause by denying opt-out rights to some landowners? McCaffrey v. Anderson Explained

Background and facts

Derek Anderson sought to incorporate a new town called West Hills along Highway 248 in Summit County, navigating Utah’s multi-step municipal incorporation process under Utah Code §§ 10-2a-201 to -220 (2022). The code permits specified landowners—those owning property valued above 1% of assessed value or holding 10% of the private land area—to request exclusion from a proposed municipality during two defined windows: within thirty days of initial notice, and again after the first public hearing. After numerous boundary modifications triggered by exclusion requests, Anderson’s final map added several landowners after both opt-out windows had closed. Those landowners sued to enjoin certification of the incorporation question, arguing the code’s unequal treatment violated article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution—the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the landowners, finding the classification arbitrary and not reasonably related to any legitimate legislative purpose.

Key legal issues

The central question was whether the incorporation code’s differential treatment of specified landowners—granting exclusion rights to those added before the first public hearing but not to those added afterward—violated the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause. A secondary question was whether the Court should affirm on the alternative ground that the code violates the original meaning of that clause, an argument the landowners raised for the first time on appeal.

Court’s analysis and holding

The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the summary judgment ruling for correctness. Applying the modern three-part uniform operation test from State v. Outzen, 2017 UT 30, the Court agreed with the district court that the code creates classifications and treats similarly situated landowners disparately. But it disagreed on the third prong. Because no suspect class or fundamental right was implicated, the Court applied rational basis review—a standard it described as a low bar under which any rational or reasonable basis for a legislative classification suffices. The Court held that cutting off exclusion rights after the first public hearing is a reasonable time-based line that locks boundaries, provides certainty to sponsors and opponents, and prevents endless boundary modifications before the incorporation election. The Court also rejected the gamesmanship concern, noting that population, density, and contiguity requirements constrain the sponsor’s discretion, and that the incorporation election itself serves as the ultimate safeguard. The Court declined to reach the landowners’ originalist argument, exercising its discretion to withhold review because the district court never addressed it, full briefing was lacking, and the original meaning of the Uniform Operation Clause remains an unsettled area of Utah law.

Practice implications

This decision reinforces that rational basis review under Utah’s Uniform Operation of Laws Clause is highly deferential—any conceivable reasonable basis sustains a legislative classification, and perfection is not required. Practitioners challenging statutory classifications should focus early litigation efforts on establishing that a suspect class or fundamental right is implicated to trigger heightened scrutiny; absent that showing, the challenge faces a steep uphill climb. The opinion also signals the Court’s reluctance to decide unsettled constitutional questions—particularly originalist ones—for the first time on appeal without a district court ruling and full adversarial briefing. Counsel seeking to raise novel constitutional theories should develop them thoroughly at the trial court level to preserve and advance them on appeal.