Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can police stop my car based on what other troopers told them? State of Utah v. Humphrey

937 P.2d 137No. 960069-CADecided Apr 10, 1997Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

Reliable information from fellow troopers about a car occupant’s ongoing drug use and past drug transport, together with the passenger’s nervousness, his anger at a requested search, and travel from a known drug area, gave reasonable articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop, and the brief detention and weapons pat-down of a jacket handed to the trooper were reasonably related in scope under the Fourth Amendment.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld the denial of Humphrey’s motion to suppress the evidence found after the stop.

  • A trooper may rely on reliable information from fellow officers when deciding whether to stop a car.
  • Factors that are each not enough on their own, such as nervousness or past drug activity, may together support a stop, as they did on these facts.
  • One judge disagreed, finding the information too weak to show drug activity at the time of the stop.

What happened?

Trooper Collier stopped a red Pontiac Fiero near Monticello because it had no front license plate. The driver was Nicki Peterson, daughter of Trooper Peterson. Her passenger, Brian Humphrey, seemed “very, very nervous and scared.” Nicki agreed to a search, but Humphrey yelled at her not to consent, and she withdrew her consent. The trooper gave a warning and let them go.

Later, Trooper Peterson told Trooper Eldredge that Nicki had been using methamphetamine heavily and had admitted transporting drugs from Arizona to Colorado in the past. Trooper Eldredge had seen the Fiero heading south toward Arizona two or three days earlier.

What did the second stop turn up?

Trooper Eldredge found the Fiero, now driven by Humphrey, and stopped it because he suspected drug transport. About seven minutes in, Nicki said she was cold. Humphrey handed his jacket to the trooper to pass to her. The trooper patted it down, felt a bulky item he thought could be a revolver, and found a bottle of injectable xylocaine, a controlled substance. Officers later found nearly a pound of methamphetamine, a pistol and other items in the car.

How did the case reach the appeals court?

Humphrey asked the trial court to suppress the evidence, meaning to keep it out of the case because it was found unlawfully. The court refused. He then entered conditional guilty pleas, which let him plead guilty but still appeal that ruling. He was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years and zero-to-five years, to run at the same time.

What did the court decide?

It affirmed. Police may briefly stop a car if they have “reasonable articulable suspicion,” a reasonable belief based on specific facts that a crime is happening. The court said Trooper Eldredge could rely on the other troopers. Trooper Collier saw Humphrey’s behavior himself, and Trooper Peterson was an experienced officer who knew his own daughter’s drug use firsthand.

Each factor alone, such as nervousness, anger about a search, past drug activity, or travel from a known drug area, would not be enough. But together, on these facts, they justified the stop. Because the court found the stop justified on drug suspicion, it did not decide whether the traffic violations also justified it.

The court also held the detention stayed within proper limits. The trooper moved quickly, and the pat-down of the jacket was a lawful check for weapons.

The court did not separately analyze Humphrey’s claim under the Utah Constitution, because he did not explain how it should differ from the federal analysis.

Did all the judges agree?

No. Judge Greenwood dissented. She agreed the traffic violations justified stopping the car, but found no reasonable suspicion of drug activity at the time of the stop. In her view, once the routine traffic checks were done, the pair should have been allowed to leave.

What should people take from this?

Officers can share what they know, and reliable information from fellow officers can count toward reasonable suspicion. Facts that seem innocent one by one may be weighed together.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Wilkins, Associate Presiding Judge, joined by Bench, J.; Greenwood, J., dissenting). Humphrey entered conditional guilty pleas to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, reserving his challenge to the denial of his suppression motion. The majority held Trooper Eldredge had reasonable articulable suspicion of drug transport to stop the car and that the detention was reasonably related in scope (Parts I and II). The opinion has no paragraph numbers.

Issue 1: Denial of the motion to suppress (mixed): affirmed (no error)

The stop was justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion, and the detention through discovery of the xylocaine was reasonably related in scope, so the evidence need not be excluded.

Standard. Reasonable suspicion is a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness, with “a measure of discretion” to the trial judge in applying it; findings are reviewed for clear error.

Utah Constitution. The court declined to separately address the state claim because Humphrey did not explain how the analysis should differ, citing State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App.1992).

The stop. Applying the dual inquiry of State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994), the court looked at the totality of the circumstances, weighing both content and reliability under Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). An officer may rely on information from other law enforcement sources, State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah.Ct.App. 1994). Trooper Collier’s observations were reliable, and Trooper Peterson was a known source of known reliability whose basis of knowledge, as Nicki’s father, was “well established.” Past criminal activity is not part of a probable cause determination under State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah Ct.App.1993), but past and ongoing criminal activity can be a factor in reasonable suspicion, see United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.1980). Each factor alone was insufficient, but combined they justified the stop. Having so held, the court did not address whether the traffic violations justified the stop.

Scope. Within seven or eight minutes the trooper questioned Nicki, ran the checks and returned to question Humphrey, who voluntarily handed over his jacket. Suspecting a serious crime, the trooper lawfully patted it down for weapons under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), and found the xylocaine, providing probable cause to arrest.

Challenged findings. Humphrey’s challenges to the speeding and obscured-taillight findings did not affect the result because those findings related only to the traffic stop (n.2).

Separate opinion

Judge Greenwood dissented. She agreed the traffic violations justified the initial stop, but would hold there was no reasonable suspicion of present drug activity: the information about Nicki was vague and dated, and the remaining factors were consistent with innocent behavior. She would have held the detention was unlawfully extended after the routine checks were completed, reversed the suppression ruling, and reversed the conviction.

Takeaways

  • Information from a fellow officer with firsthand knowledge can be treated as a reliable, known source rather than an anonymous tip (Part I).
  • Past and ongoing criminal activity may be weighed in reasonable suspicion even though it is not part of probable cause under State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (Part I).
  • A state constitutional search claim needs its own developed analysis or the court will decline to address it separately (Issues and Standard of Review).
Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State of Utah v. Humphrey
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
937 P.2d 137
Case no.
960069-CA
Filed
1996
Decided
April 10, 1997
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Humphrey
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Convictions, entered on conditional guilty pleas, for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, resting on evidence found after a highway stop

The panel

Michael J. WilkinsAuthor
Pamela T. GreenwoodDissented
Russell W. BenchConcurred

Parties & counsel

Humphrey — AppellantIndividual(s)Bradley P. RichHakeem Ishola
State of Utah — AppelleeState of UtahJan GrahamKenneth A. Bronston

Practice Tip

When challenging a stop built on information from other officers, test the source's basis of knowledge and the timing of the information, since the majority treated a fellow trooper's firsthand knowledge as reliable while the dissent stressed its vagueness (Part I; dissent).

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