Utah Supreme Court · Published Opinion

Can Utah make initiatives get signatures in 20 counties? Gallivan, et al, v. Walker

2002 UT 73No. 20020545Decided Jul 26, 2002Administrative & GovernmentPetition Granted

Holding

Utah Code section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii), requiring initiative signatures equal to 10 percent of the gubernatorial vote in at least 20 of 29 counties, violates the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution and the federal Equal Protection Clause and is severable from the rest of the initiative statute.

Key takeaways

The Utah Supreme Court sided with the initiative sponsors and ordered the lieutenant governor to put their initiative on the 2002 ballot.

  • The court struck down Utah’s requirement that initiative signatures come from at least 20 of the state’s 29 counties.
  • The court treated the right to legislate by initiative as a fundamental right under the Utah Constitution, so limits on it get closer review.
  • The rest of the initiative law, including the statewide 10 percent signature requirement, stays in place.

What happened?

Sponsors of a proposed law called the Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act wanted it on Utah’s 2002 general election ballot. Utah law required two things: signatures equal to 10 percent of the last governor’s race statewide (76,180 here), and signatures equal to 10 percent of that county’s vote for governor in each of at least 20 of Utah’s 29 counties.

The sponsors gathered over 130,000 signatures. After they turned them in, opponents, including Utahns Against Unfair Taxes, asked signers in rural counties to remove their names. About 3,000 did. The sponsors still had 95,974 certified signatures statewide, but met the county requirement in only 14 counties. The lieutenant governor, Olene Walker, declared the petition insufficient.

What did each side argue?

Gallivan and the other sponsors (called “Gallivan” by the court) asked the Utah Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ, an order from the court directing a public official to act. They argued the county rule gave rural voters far more power than urban voters. The lieutenant governor, a group of intervenors (people allowed to join the case), and the Utah Legislature argued the rule was valid and, if not, could not be cut out of the statute alone.

What did the court decide?

The court held the county rule violates the Utah Constitution’s guarantee that laws “shall have uniform operation.” Because initiatives are a fundamental right tied to the right to vote, the court applied closer review than usual. Since more than three-fourths of Utahns live in four Wasatch Front counties, the rule let a small number of rural voters keep an initiative off the ballot. The court gave the example that a Daggett County signature is worth 1,000 times one from Salt Lake County.

The court rejected each reason offered for the rule, including ensuring statewide support, making initiatives harder to qualify, and acting as a check on the majority. It held that making initiatives harder simply for its own sake is not a legitimate purpose.

The court also held the rule violates the federal Equal Protection Clause, relying on Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), which struck down a similar Illinois county signature rule for candidates.

What happens now?

The court cut the county rule out of the statute and left the rest working. It ordered the lieutenant governor to place the initiative on the November 5, 2002 ballot. It did not decide the free speech claims.

Did all the justices agree?

No. Justice Russon wrote for the court, joined by Justice Howe. Chief Justice Durham agreed except for the federal equal protection part, saying the court should not have reached it once the state constitution decided the case. Court of Appeals Judge Thorne, joined by Judge Davis, dissented. The dissent would not treat the initiative as a fundamental right, would have upheld the county rule as reasonable, and would not have cut it from the statute.

What should people take from this?

Under this decision, laws setting up the initiative process cannot weigh signatures differently based on the county where a voter lives. The court noted that a fairer way to show statewide support might be designed.

Bottom line

Petition for extraordinary writ granted (Russon, J., joined by Howe, J.; Durham, C.J., concurring except as to Part I.B; Thorne, J., joined by Davis, J., dissenting; Durrant, A.C.J., and Wilkins, J., not participating). The 20-of-29-county signature requirement is unconstitutional under the uniform operation of laws provision, “first, and independent,” and under the Equal Protection Clause; it is severable, and the lieutenant governor must place the initiative on the 2002 general election ballot (¶ 95).

Issue 1: Constitutionality of the multi-county signature requirement (none stated, ¶¶ 21-83): the sponsors’ petition for extraordinary writ granted

The court held that the multi-county signature requirement, § 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii), is unconstitutional under both the Utah uniform operation of laws provision (an independent ground) and the federal Equal Protection Clause.

Part 1: Uniform operation of laws, Utah Const. art. I, § 24 (¶¶ 34-64): requirement unconstitutional

The requirement violates Utah Const. art. I, § 24. The initiative right under article VI, section 1 is a fundamental right tied to the right to vote and includes signing petitions (¶¶ 24-27), so the court applied the heightened test of Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993): the classification must be reasonable, actually and substantially further a valid purpose, and be reasonably necessary to a legitimate goal (¶¶ 41-42). The statute operates to create rural and urban subclasses of registered voters and dilutes urban signatures (¶¶ 44-45). Each proffered purpose failed: statewide support (¶¶ 48-50), making initiatives “not so easy” to qualify, which is not legitimate (¶¶ 51-54), grassroots legislation (¶¶ 55-56), countering localized legislation (¶¶ 57-58), checks on the majority (¶¶ 59-61, n.11), and an informed electorate (¶¶ 62-63). The state holding is an independent ground, cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (¶ 64).

Part 2: Federal equal protection, Fourteenth Amendment (¶¶ 65-83): requirement unconstitutional

The requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Under Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), petition procedures integral to elections must satisfy one person, one vote; the court saw no relevant difference between candidate and initiative petitions (¶¶ 73-77) and found Utah’s rule worse than the Idaho rule struck in Idaho Coalition United for Bears v. Cenarrusa, Civ. No. 00-0668-S-BLW, slip op. at 9-10 (D. Idaho Nov. 30, 2001) (¶ 78). Alternatively, under Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), the discriminatory burden triggers strict scrutiny, which the justifications fail (¶¶ 81-83, n.14).

Issue 2: Severability (none stated, ¶¶ 85-94): the sponsors’ petition for extraordinary writ granted

Subsection (2)(a)(ii) is severable. With no express legislative statement, the court asked whether the remainder is operable and still furthers the legislative purpose, following State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 19, 980 P.2d 191 (¶¶ 88-89). The remaining statute works and still enables the initiative right (¶¶ 90-92), and because article VI, section 1 compels enabling legislation, the Legislature would have enacted it without the provision (¶ 93).

Separate opinions

Chief Justice Durham concurred except for Part I.B, calling the federal analysis advisory once the state ground decided the case (¶ 97). Judge Thorne, joined by Judge Davis, dissented: the initiative is not a fundamental right, the requirement is a reasonable regulation under rational-basis review and Burdick, and it is not severable (¶¶ 98-174).

Takeaways

  • The majority treats signing an initiative petition as part of the fundamental initiative and voting right under the Utah Constitution (¶¶ 24-27).
  • Making initiatives harder to qualify for its own sake is not a legitimate legislative purpose; restrictions must serve aims such as deterring fraud or ensuring numerical support (¶¶ 52-53).
  • The court left open that a less restrictive, nondiscriminatory geographic distribution mechanism could be crafted (¶ 49).
  • Free speech claims under the First Amendment and article I, section 15 were not decided (¶ 84).

Utah cases relied on

  • Shriver v. Bench6 Utah 2d 329, 313 P.2d 475
  • Cope v. Toronto8 Utah 2d 255, 332 P.2d 977
  • State v. Lopes1999 UT 24
  • Union Trust Co. v. Simmons116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190
Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Gallivan, et al, v. Walker
Court
Utah Supreme Court
Citation
2002 UT 73
Case no.
20020545
Filed
2002
Decided
July 26, 2002
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Disposition
Petition Granted
At stake
Whether the Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act initiative would be placed on the 2002 general election ballot after the lieutenant governor declared the petition insufficient under the multi-county signature requirement.

The panel

Leonard H. RussonAuthor
Christine M. DurhamConcurring opinion
Matthew B. DurrantDid not participate
Michael J. WilkinsDid not participate
James Z. DavisDissented
Richard C. HoweConcurred
William A. ThorneDissented

Parties & counsel

Appellant — AppellantIndividual(s)Lisa Watts BaskinDeno G. HimonasJohn A. Pearce
Appellee — AppelleeGovernment agencyMark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General's OfficeThomas D. Roberts, Utah Attorney General's Office

Practice Tip

In challenging a restriction on the initiative process under article I, section 24, frame the initiative right as fundamental so heightened scrutiny under Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 582-83 (Utah 1993) applies, and test each stated legislative purpose for legitimacy, actual furtherance and reasonable necessity (¶¶ 41-43).

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