Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can Utah end the parental rights of a parent who never lived here? Stateof Utah, in the interest of W.A.

2002 UT App 72No. 20000461-CADecided Mar 7, 2002Juvenile & Child WelfareReversed

Holding

Although the nonresident father had minimum contacts with Utah, the juvenile court lacked personal jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights because Utah’s long-arm statute, Utah Code § 78-27-24, did not provide for service on him and the “status” exception to personal jurisdiction does not extend to termination proceedings.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the father, E.A., and reversed the juvenile court order ending his parental rights.

  • A Utah court needs personal jurisdiction over a parent before ending that parent’s rights, and the “status” exception does not remove that requirement.
  • Utah’s long-arm statute, as written when this case was decided, did not reach this out-of-state father, even though he had enough contact with Utah to satisfy due process.
  • One of the three judges dissented and would have upheld the termination.

What happened?

W.A. was born in 1989 to E.A., his father, and D.A., his mother. E.A. is in prison in Oklahoma for sexual abuse of a child and lewd molestation of a child. In 1995 a Kentucky court placed W.A. with his sister, D.D., who later moved with him to Utah.

In February 1998, D.D. told the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) that she could no longer care for W.A. The juvenile court found W.A. to be a dependent child and gave DCFS custody. DCFS and the guardian ad litem (a lawyer appointed to represent the child’s interests) then asked the court to end E.A.’s parental rights.

What did the father argue?

E.A. asked the court to dismiss the case because Utah had no personal jurisdiction over him. Personal jurisdiction is a court’s power to make binding decisions about a particular person. The juvenile court disagreed on two grounds: it said his ongoing abandonment of W.A. brought him under Utah’s long-arm statute (the law letting Utah courts reach people outside the state), and, alternatively, that a “status” exception let it decide the parent-child relationship without personal jurisdiction. It then ended his rights.

What did the Court of Appeals decide?

It reversed. The court agreed that E.A. had enough contact with Utah to meet due process, because he knowingly let Utah care for W.A. after learning DCFS had custody (¶¶ 12-13).

But that was not enough. Utah’s long-arm statute lists specific acts, and the record did not show E.A. had ever been in Utah, done business here, caused an injury here, or owned property here (¶ 16). The juvenile court itself said the statute “appears ill-fit” for these cases (¶ 15).

The court also rejected the “status” exception. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s description of parental rights as a “fundamental liberty interest” in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982), it held the exception does not extend to termination cases (¶¶ 19, 38-39). It noted that ending rights in Utah requires a finding of parental misconduct, and making that finding without personal jurisdiction would violate due process (¶ 37).

Did all the judges agree?

No. Judge Bench dissented. Judge Bench would have applied the status exception, as courts in several other states have, and stressed the child’s interests and the protections in Utah’s Termination of Parental Rights Act. The dissent also said that if Utah could not decide the case, no state could.

What happens now?

The termination order is reversed. The court did not address E.A.’s other complaints about the hearing because the jurisdiction ruling decided the appeal. It said the Legislature, not the courts, could extend the long-arm statute to cases like this one (¶ 39).

What should people take from this?

Even where the court said the facts “clearly show E.A. to be an unfit parent” (¶ 24), Utah could not end his rights without the power to bind him personally.

Bottom line

Reversed (Thorne, J., joined by Billings, A.P.J.; Bench, J., dissenting). The juvenile court lacked personal jurisdiction over E.A., an Oklahoma prisoner, when it terminated his parental rights to W.A., because the long-arm statute did not provide for service on him and the “status” exception does not apply to termination proceedings (¶¶ 16, 38-39). Because the jurisdictional ruling decided the appeal, the court did not address E.A.’s other claims of error (n.2).

Issue 1: Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent (correctness, ¶ 6): reversed

The juvenile court lacked personal jurisdiction over E.A. Applying the two-prong test of Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, ¶6, 980 P.2d 204, the court took the prongs in reverse order (¶ 8).

Minimum contacts (¶¶ 9-13). Satisfied. Unlike the father in Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 94, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 1698 (1978), E.A. purposefully availed himself of Utah’s laws by knowingly letting the State provide for W.A. once he knew DCFS had custody, so he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court here (¶¶ 12-13).

Long-arm statute (¶¶ 14-16). Not satisfied. The record did not show E.A. had been in Utah, done business here, committed a tortious injury here, or owned or used Utah real property, so Utah Code § 78-27-24 did not provide for out-of-state service (¶ 16). The juvenile court’s continuing-tort theory under subsection (3) failed (¶¶ 15-16).

Status exception (¶¶ 17-39). Not available. The Supreme Court mentioned the exception in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2582 n.30 (1977), but has never applied it to termination, and parental rights are a “fundamental liberty interest” under Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982) (¶¶ 18-19). The court found the cases from other jurisdictions applying the exception unpersuasive (¶¶ 20-23, n.14) and followed In re Doe, 926 P.2d 1290 (Haw. 1996), Phillips v. Thornerfelt, Nos. 85-CA-1075-S, 85-CA-1372-S, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1116 (Ky. Ct. App. April 25, 1986), and In re Vernon R., 991 P.2d 986 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (¶¶ 25-36). Because termination under In re C.K., 2000 UT App 11, ¶18, 996 P.2d 1059, requires a finding of parental unfitness, making that finding without personal jurisdiction would violate due process, especially where the misconduct occurred outside Utah (¶ 37). Utah being the “center of gravity” does not supply jurisdiction (n.16). The court said extending the long-arm statute is for the Legislature (¶ 39).

Separate opinion

Judge Bench dissented (¶¶ 42-56). Judge Bench faulted the majority for rejecting long-arm jurisdiction without analysis and called the minimum-contacts discussion dicta (¶¶ 43-44). Judge Bench would apply the status exception, reading the Traynor article cited in Shaffer and the out-of-state cases to cover termination, and viewed the Termination of Parental Rights Act as supplying “particularized rules” (¶¶ 46-53). The dissent noted no other state was likely to take the case (¶ 55).

Takeaways

  • Minimum contacts alone did not support jurisdiction; the long-arm statute had to reach the nonresident parent’s conduct too (¶¶ 13-16).
  • The court held the “status” exception does not extend to termination of parental rights proceedings (¶¶ 38-39).
  • The court reasoned that the unfitness finding required for termination cannot be made without personal jurisdiction over the parent (¶ 37).
  • The court left any extension of long-arm reach to the Legislature (¶ 39).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Stateof Utah, in the interest of W.A.
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2002 UT App 72
Case no.
20000461-CA
Filed
2000
Decided
March 7, 2002
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Disposition
Reversed
At stake
A juvenile court order terminating an out-of-state, incarcerated father's parental rights to his son W.A.

The panel

William A. Thorne Jr.Author
Russell W. BenchDissented
Judith M. BillingsConcurred
Trial court
Third District Juvenile, Sandy Department · Judge Olof A. Johansson

Parties & counsel

Appellant — AppellantIndividual(s)Scott L. Wiggins
Appellee — AppelleeGovernment agencyMark L. ShurtleffCarol L. Verdoia
Guardian ad litemOtherMartha Pierce

Practice Tip

In a termination case against a parent outside Utah, check both prongs: minimum contacts were enough for due process here, but the petition still failed because the long-arm statute did not reach the parent's conduct (¶¶ 13-16).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

About these Decision Summaries

Lotus Appellate Law publishes these summaries to keep practitioners informed — not as legal advice. Each case turns on its own facts. If a decision here is relevant to your matter, we’re happy to discuss it.