Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can I undo my conviction because my lawyer made mistakes? Coggeshell v. State

2011 UT App 375No. 20091013-CADecided Nov 3, 2011Post-Conviction ReliefAffirmed

Holding

The district court properly dismissed Coggeshell’s post-conviction petition because his ineffective-assistance claims failed for lack of pleaded prejudice, lack of standing to challenge the search, failure to allege a prima facie fair cross-section violation or juror bias, and an unrebutted strategic stipulation, and his sufficiency claim was not preserved.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld the dismissal of Al Coggeshell’s petition for post-conviction relief.

  • A claim that a trial lawyer was ineffective failed where the petition did not explain how the lawyer’s choices changed the result.
  • A person who was only a temporary visitor at a home, with no connection to it other than criminal activity, could not challenge a police search of that home.
  • An argument not raised in the post-conviction petition itself was not considered on appeal.

What happened?

Al Coggeshell was convicted after a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals had already decided his direct appeal. He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, a separate civil case in which a convicted person asks a court to set aside a conviction. Coggeshell represented himself.

His main claim was that his trial lawyer gave him “ineffective assistance,” meaning poor representation that hurt his case. To win that kind of claim, a person must show both that the lawyer performed badly and that the poor performance likely changed the result. The State, the respondent, asked the court to dismiss, and the district court did.

What did Coggeshell say his lawyer did wrong?

He made five complaints. His lawyer did not try to keep out statements he made to police, which he said were forced by bad conditions in his jail cell. His lawyer did not try to keep out evidence from a search of the victim’s home. His lawyer did not challenge a jury with no Native Americans. His lawyer did not remove two jurors who had worked for the National Park Service. And his lawyer agreed with the State that neither side would bring up an incident between Coggeshell and the eyewitness.

What did the court decide?

It rejected every claim.

On his statements to police, Coggeshell never explained what evidence should have been kept out or how that would likely have changed the verdict. The court noted its earlier finding that the evidence of guilt was “overwhelming” and did not depend on his statements.

On the search, he had no right to challenge it. The court relied on his own trial testimony that he lived in Blanding and had never been to Moab before, so the home was not his residence.

On the jury, the Constitution guarantees a fair jury, not one with any particular makeup. He did not show that Native Americans were kept out of jury pools in a systematic way.

On the two jurors, people with law enforcement backgrounds are not automatically barred from serving. One juror was a communications manager, and the other said his background would not make him favor police witnesses.

On the agreement about the eyewitness incident, his lawyer said on the record that the agreement was “more beneficial” to Coggeshell, which was a strategy choice. In any event, Coggeshell told the jury at least twice that he believed the eyewitness was angry with him.

What about his claim that the witnesses were not believable?

The court did not decide it. Coggeshell had not raised that argument in his petition, so it was not properly before the court on appeal.

What happens now?

Nothing more in this case. The dismissal of the petition stands.

What should people take from this?

A claim that a lawyer made mistakes must explain, with specifics, how those mistakes changed the outcome. Broad statements that a person was harmed were not enough here.

Bottom line

Affirmed. Per curiam (Davis, P.J., McHugh, A.P.J., and Roth, J.). The order dismissing the petition is reviewed for correctness, and the court may affirm on “any legal ground or theory apparent on the record” (¶ 2, quoting Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, ¶ 16, 184 P.3d 1226). Claims are evaluated in light of the entire record, including the criminal record (¶ 2, citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B‐9‐105(1)). Each of Coggeshell’s ineffective-assistance claims failed (¶¶ 3–8).

Issue 1: Failure to suppress statements (correctness, ¶ 3): affirmed (no error)

The claim failed because Coggeshell did not plead prejudice. The court skipped the deficiency prong. On appeal he made only broad assertions and did not identify what evidence should have been suppressed or how suppression would create a reasonable probability of a different result (¶ 3, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984)). The evidence of guilt was overwhelming and unrelated to his statements (¶ 3, citing State v. Coggeshell, 2007 UT App 210U).

Issue 2: Failure to suppress evidence from the victim’s home (correctness, ¶ 4): affirmed (no error)

Coggeshell lacked standing to challenge the search, so the claim failed. A temporary visitor with no connection to the premises other than criminal activity has no reasonable expectation of privacy (¶ 4, citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122, n.22 (1984), and Terry v. Martin, 120 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 1997)). His trial admission that he lived in Blanding and had never been to Moab defeated his averment that he resided there. His new “invited guest” theory was not preserved below and was not addressed (¶ 4 n.2, citing State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ¶ 18, 248 P.3d 984).

Issue 3: Jury composition (correctness, ¶ 5): affirmed (no error)

The petition did not state a claim. The Constitution guarantees an impartial jury, “not a jury of a particular composition” (¶ 5, quoting Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, ¶ 15, 175 P.3d 530). Coggeshell did not allege facts meeting the three-part prima facie test for a fair cross-section violation, including systematic exclusion (¶ 5, citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575 (Utah 1987)).

Issue 4: Jurors with law enforcement backgrounds (correctness, ¶ 6): affirmed (no error)

No claim was stated because nothing showed either juror was biased. Law enforcement personnel are not automatically disqualified, and actual prejudice must be shown (¶ 6, citing State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). One juror was a communications manager. The other handled dog, permit and theft issues and said he would not favor police witnesses.

Issue 5: Stipulation excluding the eyewitness incident (correctness, ¶¶ 7–8): affirmed (no error)

Both Strickland prongs failed. Counsel said on the record that the stipulation was “more beneficial,” which was a strategic choice Coggeshell did not rebut (¶ 7, citing State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 19, 12 P.3d 92, and State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). There was no prejudice either, because Coggeshell twice testified to the eyewitness’s alleged motive to lie (¶ 8).

Issue 6: Sufficiency and witness credibility (none stated, ¶ 9): not reached

The claim was not raised in the post-conviction petition, so it was not preserved and the court did not address it (¶ 9, citing State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ¶ 18, 248 P.3d 984).

Takeaways

  • A PCRA ineffective-assistance claim may be dismissed for failure to plead how the alleged deficiency was prejudicial (¶ 3).
  • The court may rely on the petitioner’s own trial testimony from the criminal record to reject the facts alleged in the petition (¶¶ 2, 4).
  • A record statement by trial counsel explaining a stipulation supports the strategic-choice presumption (¶ 7).
  • Theories not pleaded in the petition, including a changed standing theory, will not be heard on appeal (¶ 4 n.2, ¶ 9).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
Coggeshell v. State
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2011 UT App 375
Case no.
20091013-CA
Filed
2009
Decided
November 3, 2011
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Coggeshell
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
A petition for post-conviction relief seeking to undo Coggeshell's criminal convictions based on claims that his trial counsel was ineffective

The panel

James Z. DavisPer curiam
Carolyn B. McHughPer curiam
Stephen L. RothPer curiam
Trial court
Seventh District Court, Moab Department · Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Parties & counsel

Coggeshell — AppellantIndividual(s)Self-represented
State — AppelleeState of UtahMark L. ShurtleffBrett J. DelPorto

Practice Tip

In a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance, plead specifically what evidence would have been excluded and how its exclusion creates a reasonable probability of a different result; broad assertions of prejudice did not survive dismissal here (¶ 3).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

About these Decision Summaries

Lotus Appellate Law publishes these summaries to keep practitioners informed — not as legal advice. Each case turns on its own facts. If a decision here is relevant to your matter, we’re happy to discuss it.