Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can I use a post-conviction petition to reargue my trial? Schwenke v. State

2012 UT App 18No. 20110753-CADecided Jan 20, 2012Post-Conviction ReliefAffirmed

Holding

A post-conviction petitioner has no right to effective counsel in the post-conviction proceeding, a district court may screen an amended petition for frivolousness after allowing amendment to cure a rule 65C(d)(4) defect, and claims that were or could have been raised at trial or on appeal, including ineffective-assistance claims by a petitioner who represented himself, are precluded under Utah Code section 78B-9-106.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals ruled for the State on every point and upheld the dismissal of Schwenke’s post-conviction petition.

  • A challenge raised for the first time on appeal, without having been raised in the district court, generally will not be considered.
  • Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, claims that were or could have been raised at trial or on appeal cannot be the basis for post-conviction relief.
  • A person who chose to represent himself at trial cannot later claim his own defense was ineffective.

What happened?

Alapati Paul Schwenke was convicted of a crime. He represented himself at trial and on his direct appeal. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, a separate civil case asking a court to set aside a conviction after the regular appeal is over. In Utah these cases are governed by the Post-Conviction Remedies Act.

The district court found a technical defect in his first petition: it did not say whether his conviction had been reviewed on appeal and with what result. The court let him fix that. It then reviewed the amended petition, found it frivolous on its face, and dismissed it without asking the State to respond.

How did the case get decided?

The Court of Appeals first proposed deciding the case quickly because there was no final order. Schwenke then got a final order on October 6, 2011, which gave the court power to hear the appeal. The court then decided the appeal on its own motion for summary disposition, a short-form ruling for appeals whose grounds are too weak to need full briefing and argument. The decision is “per curiam,” meaning it was issued by the three-judge panel as a whole, with no named author.

What did Schwenke argue?

He argued that part of the Act is unconstitutional, that he was denied effective counsel in the post-conviction case, that the court should not have dismissed his amended petition as frivolous after letting him amend, and that the court wrongly limited his claims. He also argued that he was not guilty, that the evidence was too thin, that witnesses lied, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

What did the court decide?

It rejected every argument. The constitutional challenge was never raised in the district court, so the appeals court would not consider it.

There is no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in a post-conviction case, so there is no right to effective counsel there. Although the record held an order granting his request for counsel, Schwenke kept filing everything himself, which meant he chose to represent himself.

Letting him fix a technical defect did not mean the court had decided his claims had merit. The court was required to screen the amended petition for frivolousness before it was served on the State.

The district court did not limit him to two grounds; it limited him to the grounds the Act allows. His claims about guilt, evidence and perjured testimony were or could have been raised at trial or on appeal, so the Act bars them. Because he represented himself at trial, he could not complain about the quality of his own defense, and any complaints about his earlier appointed attorney were known to him at trial and on appeal.

What happens now?

The dismissal of Schwenke’s petition stands. Nothing was sent back to the district court.

What should people take from this?

A post-conviction petition is not a second chance to argue the trial again. Claims that could have been made at trial or on appeal are generally barred, and new arguments must first be raised in the district court.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; McHugh, P.J., Thorne and Christiansen, JJ.). The court decided the appeal on its own motion for summary disposition, finding the grounds for review too insubstantial to merit further proceedings, together with Schwenke’s motion for summary reversal (¶ 1). Jurisdiction attached once Schwenke obtained a final order on October 6, 2011 (¶ 1 n.1). The summary dismissal of his amended PCRA petition stands (¶ 8).

Issue 1: Constitutionality of section 78B-9-104 (none stated, ¶ 2): not reached

The argument that section 78B-9-104 unconstitutionally limits relief was not preserved because Schwenke never raised it in the district court (¶ 2). See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346. No preservation exception was argued or applied.

Issue 2: Effective post-conviction counsel (none stated, ¶ 3): affirmed (no error)

Schwenke’s right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated. There is no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, see Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, ¶ 20, 84 P.3d 1150, so no right to effective appointed counsel (¶ 3). Despite an “anomalous order” appointing counsel, Schwenke kept filing pro se and so chose self-representation; there is no right to hybrid representation (¶ 3), quoting State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, ¶ 33, 143 P.3d 302.

Issue 3: Frivolousness review of the amended petition (none stated, ¶ 4): affirmed (no error)

The district court did not err by reviewing the amended petition for frivolousness. Allowing amendment to cure a rule 65C(d)(4) defect (failure to state the appellate history) was not an implicit ruling that the claims were not frivolous, and rule 65C(h)(1) requires frivolousness review before service on the State (¶ 4).

Issue 4: Limitation of claims (none stated, ¶ 5): affirmed (no error)

The court correctly limited Schwenke’s claims to those the Act allows. Section 78B-9-104(1) sets out the sole grounds for relief, see Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 62, 234 P.3d 1115 (¶ 5). The court referred only to ineffective assistance and newly discovered evidence for one claim after finding it could have been raised at trial or on appeal, and Schwenke never explained how it fit any other ground (¶ 5).

Issue 5: Preclusion of guilt, sufficiency, perjury and trial-counsel claims (none stated, ¶ 6): affirmed (no error)

The court held that the dismissal of the amended petition was correct because the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, section 78B-9-106, precludes each of these claims, which were or could have been raised at trial or on appeal (¶¶ 6-7).

Part 1: Guilt, sufficiency and perjury claims (¶ 6). These claims are precluded by section 78B-9-106. They were or could have been raised at trial or on appeal; Schwenke supported them only with record citations, so they were known to him then (¶ 6).

Part 2: Ineffective assistance at trial (¶ 7). This claim is likewise precluded. Schwenke represented himself at trial and on appeal and cannot base a claim on his own ineffectiveness, see State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987); complaints about his original appointed attorney were known at trial and on appeal and could have been raised then (¶ 7).

Takeaways

  • No statutory or constitutional right to counsel exists in a post-conviction proceeding, so no ineffective-assistance claim lies for that proceeding (¶ 3).
  • Allowing a petitioner to cure a rule 65C(d)(4) pleading defect does not foreclose later frivolousness review under rule 65C(h)(1) (¶ 4).
  • Claims supported only by citations to the underlying record are treated as known at trial and on appeal, and thus precluded under section 78B-9-106 (¶ 6).
  • A petitioner who represented himself at trial cannot claim his own defense was ineffective (¶ 7).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
Schwenke v. State
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2012 UT App 18
Case no.
20110753-CA
Filed
2011
Decided
January 20, 2012
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Schwenke
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Schwenke's amended petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction, which the district court summarily dismissed as frivolous on its face

The panel

Michele M. Christiansen ForsterPer curiam
William A. Thorne Jr.Per curiam
Carolyn B. McHughPer curiam
Trial court
Fourth District Court, Fillmore Department · Judge Donald J. Eyre, Jr.

Parties & counsel

Schwenke — AppellantIndividual(s)Self-represented
State — AppelleeState of Utah

Practice Tip

In a PCRA petition, explain how each claim fits a ground in section 78B-9-104 and why it could not have been raised at trial or on appeal; claims resting only on the underlying record were treated as known then and precluded (¶¶ 5–6).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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