Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Which court paper starts my 30 days to appeal a sentence? State v. Grant

2011 UT App 158No. 20100464-CADecided May 12, 2011Criminal AppealsDismissed

Holding

The time to appeal a criminal sentence runs from entry of the signed judgment stating the charge, plea and sentence as required by Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c)(1) and (d), and a later sentencing document that makes no material change does not extend that time.

Practice areaCriminal Appeals

Key takeaways

The State won: the Court of Appeals dismissed Grant’s appeal because his notice of appeal was filed too late.

  • The 30 days to appeal a criminal sentence run from when the signed judgment containing the sentence is entered in the record, not from when the judge announces the sentence aloud.
  • A later copy of the judgment that does not change anything material does not restart the 30 days.
  • The court noted Grant may be able to ask the district court for a remedy under rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

What happened?

Trevor R. Grant pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony. On April 13, 2010, the district court announced a prison sentence of three years to life and told him he had thirty days to appeal.

The court then produced several papers stating the sentence. A signed “Sentence” was entered on April 14. A signed “Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison” was entered on April 16. A signed “Minutes–Sentence, Judgment, Commitment,” identical to an unsigned version filed April 13, was entered on May 7.

Grant filed his notice of appeal within thirty days of May 7, but more than thirty days after the April papers.

What did the State argue?

The State, which was prosecuting Grant and was the appellee (the party defending the result), asked the court to dismiss the appeal as late. It argued the clock started when the sentence was announced in court on April 13.

What did the court decide?

The court agreed the appeal was late, but not for the State’s reason. Under the appellate rules, the thirty days run from the “entry” of the judgment, meaning when the judge signs it and the clerk files it. The spoken sentence does not start the clock.

The court held the April 16 Judgment and Commitment was the final judgment. It stated the charge, the guilty plea and the sentence, which is what the criminal rules require.

The May 7 paper did not change the substance of that judgment. Under earlier cases, a later version that does not make a material change does not give a party more time to appeal. So the clock ran from April 16, and Grant’s notice was too late.

Because the notice was late, the court said it lacked jurisdiction, meaning the legal power to hear the appeal. It dismissed the appeal without ruling on Grant’s sentence.

Is there anything left for Grant?

In a footnote, the court said the practice of entering several sentencing papers over days or weeks may confuse defendants about the deadline, and should be avoided. It said Grant “may be entitled to a remedy” by asking the district court under rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a rule that can restore a lost chance to appeal in some cases. The court did not decide whether he qualifies.

What should people take from this?

When a trial court signs and files more than one version of a criminal judgment, the deadline to appeal is tied to the first signed judgment that meets the rules, unless a later version changes something material.

Bottom line

Appeal dismissed (per curiam; Orme, Roth, and Christiansen, JJ.). Grant appealed his sentence of three years to life for attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony (¶¶ 1–2). His notice was filed within 30 days of a May 7, 2010 signed Minutes–Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, but more than 30 days after the April 16, 2010 Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison. The April 16 document was the final, appealable judgment, so the court lacked jurisdiction (¶ 6).

Issue 1: Timeliness of the notice of appeal (none stated, ¶¶ 3–6): the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal granted

The notice of appeal was untimely because the time ran from the April 16 judgment, and the later document did not restart it.

Oral sentence vs. entry. The court rejected the State’s “literal” argument that the oral announcement of sentence starts the clock. Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure runs from “the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from” (¶ 3). It read State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, 57 P.3d 1065, as calculating time from entry of the signed judgment, and relied on State v. Todd, 2006 UT 7, 128 P.3d 1199, which treats imposing sentence and entering the written judgment as distinct acts (¶ 3). A judgment is entered when signed and filed, see Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c) (¶ 3).

Which document. The April 16 Judgment and Commitment stated the charge, the guilty plea and the sentence, satisfying Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c)(1) and (d) (¶¶ 4, 6). Under State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, 106 P.3d 729, a later entry that does not change “the substance or character of the judgment” relates back and does not enlarge the time for appeal (¶¶ 5–6); see also State v. Swenson, 2009 UT App 251, 220 P.3d 168 (¶ 5). The May 7 document was not a material modification (¶ 6).

Footnotes

Footnote 1 (¶ 2) notes an apparent clerical error: the court’s documents omit “attempted” from the offense, which neither party raised. Footnote 2 (¶ 6) says the practice of entering multiple sentencing documents over days or weeks may mislead defendants and “would best be avoided,” and that Grant “may be entitled to a remedy” under Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 31, 122 P.3d 628, on an appropriate rule 4(f) motion in the district court. The court did not decide that question.

Takeaways

  • In a criminal case, the 30-day period under rule 4(a) runs from entry of the signed judgment containing the sentence, not the oral pronouncement (¶ 3).
  • When several sentencing documents are entered, the first one meeting rule 22(c)(1) and (d) starts the clock unless a later one makes a material change (¶¶ 5–6).
  • Where the record contains multiple judgment-type documents, the court pointed to a possible rule 4(f) remedy in the district court (¶ 6 n.2).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
State v. Grant
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2011 UT App 158
Case no.
20100464-CA
Filed
2010
Decided
May 12, 2011
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Grant
Disposition
Dismissed
At stake
Grant's appeal of his prison sentence of three years to life for attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child

The panel

Michele M. Christiansen ForsterPer curiam
Gregory K. OrmePer curiam
Stephen L. RothPer curiam
Trial court
Second District Court, Farmington Department · Judge David M. Connors

Parties & counsel

Grant — AppellantIndividual(s)Scott L. Wiggins
State — AppelleeState of UtahMark L. ShurtleffRyan D. Tenney

Practice Tip

When a district court enters more than one sentencing document, calculate the appeal deadline from the first signed judgment that satisfies rule 22(c)(1) and (d), since a later non-material version will not extend it (¶¶ 5–6).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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