Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can new evidence save a late post-conviction petition? Wamsley v. State

2012 UT App 57No. 20100617-CADecided Feb 24, 2012Post-Conviction ReliefAffirmed

Holding

A postconviction petition filed more than a year after the appeal deadline was time barred because the petitioner did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the newly discovered evidence on which his reliance on Utah Code sections 78B-9-107(2)(e), 78B-9-107(3), and 78B-9-402 depended.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld the dismissal of Wamsley’s late petition for postconviction relief.

  • Wamsley’s petition was filed more than a year after his time to appeal ran out, so it was late unless an exception applied.
  • The three exceptions he relied on each depended on proving newly discovered evidence.
  • Vague allegations that did not say when or how the evidence was found, or why it could not have been found earlier, were not enough.

What happened?

Korte H. Wamsley Jr. pleaded guilty to reduced charges and was sentenced in October 2007. He did not appeal. In June 2009 he filed a petition for postconviction relief, a separate case that asks a court to undo a conviction after the regular appeal is over.

The trial court raised on its own the question of whether the petition was filed too late. After briefing and a hearing, it found the petition untimely and dismissed it. Wamsley appealed.

Was the petition late?

Under Utah’s Postconviction Remedies Act, a petition generally must be filed within one year after the last day to file an appeal. Any appeal was due in November 2007. Wamsley admitted his June 2009 petition was late measured from that date.

What did Wamsley argue?

He relied on three other parts of the Act. First, a petition can be filed within one year of when the person knew, or should have known with reasonable effort, of the facts the petition rests on. Second, the deadline pauses if the State, by acting unconstitutionally, kept the person from filing. He said the State failed to disclose the new evidence. Third, he said the new evidence brought him under the law’s factual innocence provisions.

His claimed new evidence was that his former wife had forged witness statements and that one of his daughters had made unfounded abuse allegations against other people.

What did the court decide?

The Court of Appeals affirmed. It said that in this case, all three provisions depended on one thing: Wamsley proving that newly discovered evidence actually existed. A person seeking postconviction relief must prove the needed facts by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning more likely than not.

Wamsley did not do that. The court called his allegations “too vague and incomplete.” He did not show the evidence was credible rather than just his suspicion. He did not show when he found it or why he could not have found it during his criminal case. The court added that the record showed he knew or should have known of the information well before he pleaded guilty.

Without new evidence, the deadline ran from November 2007, and the petition was late.

Did the court decide the factual innocence question?

Not fully. In a footnote, the court said it did not need to decide whether the petition was good enough as a factual innocence petition. It noted that the law has since been amended to make clear that a postconviction petition and a factual innocence petition are two separate proceedings.

What happens now?

The dismissal stands. The opinion does not send anything back to the trial court.

What should people take from this?

A late postconviction petition cannot be saved just by saying new evidence exists. In this case, the petitioner needed specifics: what the evidence was, why it was credible, when he found it, and why he could not have found it sooner.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; Orme, Thorne, and Christiansen, JJ.). Wamsley conceded his June 2009 petition was untimely under Utah Code section 78B-9-107(2)(a), measured from his October 2007 sentencing (¶ 3). Each of the three timeliness routes he invoked required proof of newly discovered evidence, and he did not establish any (¶¶ 5–7).

Issue 1: Timeliness of the postconviction petition (none stated, ¶¶ 2–7): affirmed (no error)

The trial court did not err in finding the petition time barred, because Wamsley did not establish newly discovered evidence that would extend the filing period. The petitioner bears the burden of proving the facts entitling him to relief by a preponderance of the evidence, and must disprove a preclusion ground once it is raised (¶ 2, citing Utah Code section 78B-9-105(1)–(2)). The court may raise a time bar on its own if it gives the parties a chance to respond (¶ 2, citing section 78B-9-106); here the trial court did so and held a hearing (¶ 3).

Wamsley relied on section 78B-9-107(2)(e) (discovery of evidentiary facts), section 78B-9-107(3) (tolling for unconstitutional state action, here the State’s alleged nondisclosure), and section 78B-9-402 (factual innocence) (¶ 4). “Under the circumstances of this case,” each depended on establishing newly discovered evidence (¶ 5). His allegations that his former wife forged witness statements and that a daughter made unfounded abuse allegations against others were “too vague and incomplete” (¶ 6). He did not show the evidence was credible rather than suspicion, when he discovered it, or why he could not have discovered it during the criminal case, and the record showed he knew or should have known of it before pleading guilty to reduced charges (¶ 6). The limitations period therefore ran from November 2007, when any appeal was due (¶ 7).

In a footnote, the court did not address whether the filing was sufficient as a factual innocence petition, because the lack of new evidence decided the case. It noted that Utah Code section 78B-9-104(3) (Supp. 2011) now makes clear that postconviction and factual innocence petitions are separate proceedings (¶ 8 n.3).

Takeaways

  • A petitioner invoking section 78B-9-107(2)(e), the tolling provision in section 78B-9-107(3), or section 78B-9-402 on the basis of new evidence must first prove the evidence exists, with specifics (¶¶ 5–6).
  • The showing should cover credibility, the date of discovery, and why the evidence could not have been found during the criminal case (¶ 6).
  • A trial court may raise the time bar on its own if the parties get an opportunity to respond (¶ 2).
  • Postconviction and factual innocence petitions are now separate proceedings under section 78B-9-104(3) (¶ 8 n.3).

Case details

Case name
Wamsley v. State
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2012 UT App 57
Case no.
20100617-CA
Filed
2010
Decided
February 24, 2012
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Wamsley
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Whether Wamsley's petition for postconviction relief, filed in June 2009 after an October 2007 sentencing on a guilty plea to reduced charges, was time barred

The panel

Michele M. Christiansen ForsterPer curiam
William A. Thorne Jr.Per curiam
Gregory K. OrmePer curiam
Trial court
Third District Court, West Jordan Department · Judge Robert W. Adkins

Parties & counsel

Wamsley — AppellantIndividual(s)Randall W. Richards
State — AppelleeState of UtahMark L. ShurtleffRyan D. Tenney

Practice Tip

When relying on newly discovered evidence to make a postconviction petition timely, plead and prove what the evidence is, why it is credible, when it was discovered, and why it could not have been found during the criminal case (¶ 6).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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