Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Was there enough proof I drove without an ignition interlock? State v. Stringham

2013 UT App 15No. 20110155-CADecided Jan 25, 2013Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

Because the officer’s testimony and the defendant’s own statements reasonably supported an inference that no ignition interlock device was installed, the trial court did not plainly err in submitting the charge to the jury and counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge sufficiency.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld Stringham’s conviction for driving without an ignition interlock device.

  • The evidence was enough for a jury to find that no ignition interlock device was in Stringham’s vehicle.
  • Because the evidence was enough, the trial judge did not plainly err by letting the jury decide the charge.
  • Stringham’s lawyer was not ineffective for skipping a challenge to the evidence, because that challenge would have failed.

What happened?

Carl Dean Stringham was stopped while operating a vehicle. After a jury trial, he was convicted of operating or being in actual physical control of a vehicle without an ignition interlock system, a class B misdemeanor. He was also convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, and of being an alcohol restricted driver. An ignition interlock device must register that the driver has no alcohol in his system before the vehicle will start.

Stringham appealed only the interlock conviction. He did not challenge the other two convictions.

What did Stringham argue?

He argued the evidence did not prove there was no interlock device in the vehicle. He pointed to the officer’s testimony, which he said was unclear. The officer said he first noticed a device, but later, after checking Stringham’s license and during the impound, found there was no interlock in the vehicle.

Stringham’s trial lawyer never raised this point, so it was not “preserved,” meaning the trial court never had a chance to rule on it. To get around that, Stringham argued two things. First, the trial judge committed “plain error,” an obvious and harmful mistake the judge should have caught alone, by not dismissing the charge. Second, his lawyer was ineffective for not raising it.

What did the court decide?

The court rejected both arguments. It looked at the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. The question was not whether the judges themselves were convinced, but whether the evidence was so weak or unlikely that reasonable jurors must have doubted guilt.

The court said the jury could reasonably infer the officer was at first mistaken and later found no device was installed. Stringham told the officer he was off probation and could drink, and at trial he testified he believed he no longer needed a device. That also supported an inference that none was installed. No one disputed that he was operating the vehicle. And if a device had been properly installed, he could not have started the vehicle while intoxicated.

Because the evidence was enough, there was no obvious error for the trial judge to catch. And a lawyer is not ineffective for failing to make a motion that would have failed. The court also said Stringham could not show the outcome would have been different.

What happens now?

The conviction stands. The court affirmed, and nothing was sent back to the trial court.

What should people take from this?

When a defendant raises a weak-evidence argument for the first time on appeal, he must show the weakness was so obvious the judge should have stopped the case. Here, testimony that might seem confusing on its own still allowed a reasonable jury to convict when read with the rest of the evidence.

Bottom line

Affirmed. Per curiam (Davis, McHugh, and Voros, JJ.). Stringham challenged only his class B misdemeanor conviction for operating or being in actual physical control of a vehicle without an ignition interlock system, not his DUI or alcohol restricted driver convictions (¶ 1). His unpreserved sufficiency claim failed under both plain error and ineffective assistance (¶¶ 4–5).

Issue 1: Sufficiency of the evidence, via plain error and ineffective assistance (plain error, ¶ 2): affirmed (no error)

The evidence was sufficient, so the trial court did not plainly err in submitting the charge to the jury, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise sufficiency.

Preservation and plain error. A sufficiency challenge must be raised by motion or objection to be preserved, but a court plainly errs if it submits a case to the jury when the insufficiency “is apparent to the court” (¶ 2, quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 17, 10 P.3d 346). The defendant must show the evidence was insufficient and that the insufficiency was “so obvious and fundamental” that submitting the case was error (¶ 2).

The evidence. The officer testified that a license check showed an interlock requirement and that, despite first noticing a device, there was “no interlock in the vehicle” at impound (¶ 3). The jury could infer the officer’s first impression was mistaken. Stringham’s statements that he was off probation, and his testimony that he believed he no longer needed a device, also supported an inference that none was installed. Operation was uncontroverted, and a properly installed device would have prevented him from starting the vehicle while intoxicated (¶ 3). Stringham’s claim that the officer’s testimony was ambiguous did not make the evidence “sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable” (¶ 4).

Ineffective assistance. Under State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995), and State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ¶ 34, 989 P.2d 52 (futile motions are not ineffective assistance), counsel did not perform deficiently by not moving for a directed verdict, and Stringham could not show prejudice (¶ 5).

Takeaways

  • An officer’s testimony that first describes seeing a device and later says none was there can still support a reasonable inference that none was installed (¶ 3).
  • A defendant’s own statements that he believed he was no longer required to have the device can support an inference that it was not installed (¶ 3).
  • When the evidence is sufficient, the plain-error and ineffective-assistance routes on an unpreserved sufficiency claim fail together (¶¶ 4–5).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
State v. Stringham
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2013 UT App 15
Case no.
20110155-CA
Filed
2011
Decided
January 25, 2013
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Stringham
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Stringham's class B misdemeanor conviction for operating or being in actual physical control of a vehicle without an ignition interlock system

The panel

Trial court
Eighth District Court, Vernal Department · Judge Edwin T. Peterson

Parties & counsel

Stringham — AppellantIndividual(s)Ryan B. EvershedWilliam L. Reynolds
State — AppelleeState of UtahJohn E. SwallowMichelle M. Young

Practice Tip

An unpreserved sufficiency claim must show an insufficiency "so obvious and fundamental" that the trial court erred in sending the case to the jury; if the evidence is sufficient, the companion ineffective-assistance claim fails as a futile motion (¶¶ 2, 4–5).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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