Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can a court review the parole board’s choice of my parole date? Quas v. Utah Board of Pardons

2011 UT App 301No. 20110500-CADecided Sep 1, 2011Post-Conviction ReliefAffirmed

Holding

Because Board of Pardons parole decisions are not subject to judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3), a rule 65B(b)(5) petition alleging that the Board extended a parole date in retaliation, without alleging a denial of notice, an opportunity to be heard, or disclosure of the Board’s information, was properly dismissed.

Key takeaways

The Utah Board of Pardons won, and the inmate’s challenge to his later parole date stays dismissed.

  • Utah law says the Board of Pardons’ parole decisions “are final and are not subject to judicial review.”
  • A court may still review a claim that the Board denied an inmate fair procedures, such as notice, a chance to be heard, and a summary of the Board’s information.
  • A claim raised for the first time on appeal was not considered.

What happened?

John Quas is an inmate. The Utah Board of Pardons, the state board that decides parole, had given him a parole date of October 15, 2013. On March 31, 2006, the Board rescinded that date and scheduled a rehearing for October 2010.

After the rehearing, the Board’s October 11, 2010 decision granted him parole effective October 23, 2018. The Board’s file included one major and one minor disciplinary item, twenty-six negative notes, and one positive note.

What did Quas ask for?

Quas filed a petition for extraordinary relief in district court. That is a request for a court order in a situation where an ordinary appeal is not available. He claimed the Board pushed back his date only to retaliate against him for asking for a rehearing, and not because of any new information.

The district court dismissed the petition. Quas appealed, representing himself. The Court of Appeals decided the case on its own motion for summary disposition, a short-form ruling without full proceedings.

What did the court decide?

It affirmed the dismissal. A Utah statute says the Board’s decisions on parole “are final and are not subject to judicial review.” Courts may step in only when an inmate claims he was denied procedural due process, meaning fair procedures, in the Board’s proceedings.

Fair procedures here mean adequate notice before the hearing, a chance to be heard, and copies or a summary of the information the Board will rely on. The district court found Quas got all three. His petition attacked the Board’s decision itself, through the retaliation claim, rather than the fairness of the process. So there was nothing a court could review.

Quas also relied on a case about how appeals courts review a judge’s criminal sentence. The court said that case did not apply, because this was a parole decision by the Board, not a sentence by a court.

What about his claim that he lacked legal help?

For the first time on appeal, Quas argued that he was denied meaningful access to the courts because the prison’s contract attorneys did not make sure his petition was properly written. The court did not consider this claim because he had not raised it in the district court and it was outside the scope of the appeal. In a footnote, the court added that nothing showed he received less help than the federal cases he cited describe.

What happens now?

The dismissal stands. The October 23, 2018 parole date set by the Board was not disturbed.

What should people take from this?

In Utah, a court will not second-guess the Board’s parole decision itself. A court will review a parole challenge only when it claims the Board denied fair procedures, and the petition must actually make that claim.

Bottom line

Affirmed, per curiam (McHugh, Orme, and Thorne, JJ.), on the court’s own motion for summary disposition (¶ 1). Board decisions on parole “are final and are not subject to judicial review” under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3). Extraordinary relief is available only for procedural due process claims about the Board’s proceedings. Quas’s petition alleged retaliation, which goes to substance, so it stated no reviewable claim (¶¶ 2–6).

Issue 1: Dismissal of the petition for extraordinary relief (none stated, ¶¶ 2–6): affirmed (no error)

The district court correctly dismissed the petition because it challenged the substance of the Board’s parole decision and did not plead a procedural due process claim. Judicial review on a petition for extraordinary relief is limited to procedural due process claims, citing Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909 (Utah 1993) (¶ 2). Procedural due process requires adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, and “copies or a summary of the information in the Board’s file” the Board will rely on, quoting Peterson v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 931 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (¶ 2). The district court found from the petition and attachments that Quas received all three (¶ 3). His claimed due process denial rested on the alleged retaliatory rescission and extension of his parole date, which is not a procedural due process claim (¶ 4). His reliance on State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), a standard-of-review case for district court sentencing, failed because this was not review of a court’s sentence (¶ 5).

Issue 2: Access-to-courts claim (none stated, ¶ 5, n.2): not reached

The court did not consider Quas’s claim that prison contract attorneys denied him meaningful access to the courts by failing to ensure his petition was adequately pleaded. The claim was not presented to the district court and “exceeds the scope of our review” of the dismissal (¶ 5). In footnote 2, the court noted that the cases Quas relied on, Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397, 399 (10th Cir. 1987), and Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 855 (10th Cir. 1985), hold that the prison’s legal assistance program assisted with initial filings and that legal assistance is not constitutionally required beyond that point. There was no indication Quas received less help here (¶ 5 n.2).

Takeaways

  • A petition challenging a Board of Pardons decision must plead a defect in notice, the opportunity to be heard, or disclosure of the Board’s information. Allegations of retaliatory motive go to substance and are not reviewable (¶¶ 2–4).
  • Sentencing standard-of-review cases do not carry over to Board parole decisions (¶ 5).
  • New theories raised for the first time on appeal from a rule 65B dismissal will not be considered (¶ 5).

Case details

Case name
Quas v. Utah Board of Pardons
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2011 UT App 301
Case no.
20110500-CA
Filed
2011
Decided
September 1, 2011
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Quas
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
An inmate's challenge to the Board of Pardons' decision setting his parole date at October 23, 2018, after it rescinded an earlier October 15, 2013 parole date

The panel

William A. Thorne Jr.Per curiam
Carolyn B. McHughPer curiam
Gregory K. OrmePer curiam
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Sandra N. Peuler

Parties & counsel

Quas — AppellantIndividual(s)Self-represented
Utah Board of Pardons — AppelleeGovernment agency

Practice Tip

When challenging a Board of Pardons decision by extraordinary writ, plead a specific procedural defect (notice, opportunity to be heard, or disclosure of the Board's file); a claim about the Board's motive or the length of the parole date goes to substance and will not be reviewed (¶¶ 2–4).

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Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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