Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can I appeal attorney fees I never opposed in court? Ninow v. Copier (Estate of Gary G. Pahl)

2011 UT App 392No. 20110524-CADecided Nov 17, 2011Probate, Trusts & EstatesAffirmed

Holding

Because the November 9, 2009 judgment expressly provided for fees incurred in collecting it, the district court retained jurisdiction to add $28,750.00 in collection fees; Copier could not collaterally attack awards affirmed in Ninow v. Copier, 2011 UT App 56, 252 P.3d 865, and did not preserve a challenge to the new fees because he never opposed the motion.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with KaLynn Ninow and upheld the added $28,750.00 attorney fee award against Robert Henry Copier.

  • Fee awards already upheld in an earlier appeal could not be challenged again in this appeal.
  • Because the 2009 judgment expressly allowed collection fees, the district court kept the power to add them later.
  • Copier did not oppose the fee motion in the district court, so he could not challenge the new fees on appeal.

What happened?

This dispute arose in the probate case for the estate of Gary G. Pahl. Probate is the court process for handling a person’s estate after death. KaLynn Ninow was the petitioner, the person who started the case, and Robert Henry Copier was the respondent.

A November 9, 2009 Order and Judgment entitled Ninow to collect $18,826.50, plus interest, costs and “attorney fees incurred in the collection of this judgment.” The Court of Appeals upheld the earlier fee awards in a prior appeal, Ninow v. Copier, 2011 UT App 56, 252 P.3d 865.

Ninow then asked the district court for more fees, covering her lawyer’s work to collect from Copier. Her lawyer filed a sworn statement listing those fees. Copier did not respond. On May 25, 2011, the court added $28,750.00 in fees to the earlier awards.

What did Copier argue?

Copier, representing himself, described the May 2011 order as a judgment for $47,576.50. He argued the district court had no jurisdiction, meaning no legal power, over him or the case on May 25, 2011, because the case had been fully closed on September 10, 2010.

He also said a September 2010 order barred him from filing anything “without leave of court,” so he could not respond to Ninow’s motion.

What did the court decide?

The court affirmed on every point.

First, most of the $47,576.50 had been awarded in 2009 and was already upheld in the earlier appeal. Copier could not attack those awards again.

Second, the jurisdiction argument failed. The 2009 judgment itself said Ninow could recover fees spent collecting it. So the district court kept the power to add those fees later.

Third, Copier never opposed Ninow’s request in the district court. Because of that, he did not preserve, or properly raise below, any challenge to whether the new fees were reasonable or were actually spent on collection. As for the filing ban, the court noted that the record showed Copier never asked for permission to respond, even though he had asked for it several times before.

What happens now?

Nothing goes back to the district court. The May 25, 2011 Order and Judgment, including the extra $28,750.00, stands.

What should people take from this?

An issue decided in an earlier appeal generally cannot be argued again by attacking a later order. And objections to a request in the trial court need to be made there. Here, the court would not consider fee objections Copier never raised below, even though he was under an order requiring permission to file, because he never asked for that permission.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; Davis, McHugh and Roth, JJ.). The appeal was decided on the court’s sua sponte motion for summary affirmance and Copier’s motion for summary reversal (¶ 1). The May 25, 2011 Order and Judgment added $28,750.00 in collection fees to earlier awards affirmed in Ninow v. Copier, 2011 UT App 56, 252 P.3d 865 (per curiam) (¶¶ 1–2). The court held that Copier could not relitigate the earlier awards, that the district court had jurisdiction, and that his fee challenges were unpreserved (¶¶ 3, 5).

Issue 1: Collateral challenge to prior awards (none stated, ¶¶ 3, 5): not reached

Copier’s challenge is barred to the extent it attacks the November 9, 2009 Order and Judgment or the September 10, 2010 Minute Entry and Order. Those awards were affirmed in his last appeal. Copier’s description of the May 2011 judgment as a $47,576.50 judgment ignored that all but $28,750.00 was awarded earlier (¶¶ 3, 5).

Issue 2: May 25, 2011 additional collection-fee award (mixed, ¶ 3): affirmed (no error)

The court of appeals affirmed the May 25, 2011 Order and Judgment, which added $28,750.00 in collection attorney fees: the jurisdiction challenge was “without merit” and Copier did not preserve any challenge to the fee findings (¶¶ 3–5).

Part 1: Jurisdiction (none stated, ¶¶ 3–5): affirmed (no error)

Copier argued that the court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction because the probate case ended on September 10, 2010, and the court called that claim “without merit” (¶ 3). The 2009 judgment entitled Ninow to “attorney fees incurred in the collection of this judgment,” so the court retained jurisdiction to add those fees (¶¶ 4–5).

Part 2: Additional collection fees (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 3, 5): not reached

Copier failed to preserve any challenge to the $28,750.00 award. Ninow supported her motion with counsel’s affidavit, and Copier did not oppose it (¶ 4). So he could not contest the findings that the fees were reasonable and incurred in collection (¶ 5, see Chang v. Soldier Summit Dev., 2003 UT App 415, ¶ 23, 82 P.3d 203). Copier claimed a September 2010 order barred filings “without leave of court.” The court rejected that excuse because he never sought leave, though he had done so several times before (¶ 3 n.1).

Takeaways

  • A party cannot use an appeal from a later order to attack earlier awards affirmed in a prior appeal (¶¶ 3, 5).
  • A judgment that expressly provides for collection fees lets the district court add those fees later (¶ 5).
  • A party under a leave-of-court filing restriction who never asks for leave cannot rely on the restriction to excuse a failure to preserve (¶ 3 n.1).

Utah cases relied on

  • Ninow v. Copier2011 UT App 56

Case details

Case name
Ninow v. Copier (Estate of Gary G. Pahl)
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2011 UT App 392
Case no.
20110524-CA
Filed
2011
Decided
November 17, 2011
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Copier (Estate of Gary G. Pahl)
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
An additional $28,750.00 attorney fee award for the petitioner's costs of collecting an earlier probate judgment against the respondent

The panel

James Z. DavisPer curiam
Carolyn B. McHughPer curiam
Stephen L. RothPer curiam
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge John Paul Kennedy

Parties & counsel

Copier (Estate of Gary G. Pahl) — AppellantIndividual(s)Self-represented
Ninow — AppelleeIndividual(s)Daniel F. Van Woerkom

Practice Tip

A client under a leave-of-court filing restriction should still ask for leave to oppose a motion; the court rejected Copier's reliance on the restriction because he never sought leave (¶ 3 n.1).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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