Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can a parent’s drug relapse end their parental rights? In re K.S. and J.S. (M.C. v. State)

2011 UT App 394No. 20110693-CADecided Nov 17, 2011Juvenile & Child WelfareAffirmed

Holding

Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings that Mother was unfit due to habitual methamphetamine use, that DCFS made reasonable reunification efforts despite her noncompliance with the service plan, and that termination was in the children’s best interests.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

  • A juvenile court needs only one legal ground to end parental rights, so the appeals court checked only the finding that the mother was unfit.
  • The agency’s efforts to reunite the family counted as reasonable when the mother did not follow her service plan and earlier help had not changed her behavior.
  • The children’s bond with foster parents who wanted to adopt them supported the finding that ending the mother’s rights was best for them.

What happened?

M.C., whom the court calls Mother, has two children, K.S. and J.S. The court says she has a long history with the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), the state child welfare agency, much of it tied to drug use. Before these two children were born, her rights to two other children were ended, and a third child was placed for adoption with a relative.

K.S. was removed from her care in 2007 and J.S. in 2008, shortly after birth. Both children were later returned to her. In May 2010 she was charged with driving while intoxicated on methamphetamine. In February 2011 the children were removed again after police reported they believed she was “high,” and she later admitted she had relapsed.

The juvenile court approved a plan to reunite the family on April 12, 2011. Two days later, police found Mother and the children walking down the middle of a street at 3:00 a.m. Mother was impaired, and the children wore pajamas with no shoes or socks. About a month later the court stopped reunification services, and after a trial it ended her parental rights.

What did Mother argue?

She argued the evidence was not enough to support three things: any legal ground for ending her rights, the finding that DCFS made reasonable efforts to reunite her with the children, and the finding that ending her rights was in the children’s best interests.

What did the court decide?

The Court of Appeals upheld all three findings. It explained that it will not reweigh the evidence, and it reverses only if a finding is against the clear weight of the evidence.

On the legal ground: the juvenile court found several grounds, but the law needs only one. The evidence supported the finding that Mother was unfit, especially because her habitual drug use left her unable to care for the children. She also did not seek the drug treatment her plan required.

On reasonable efforts: DCFS had given Mother reunification services at least twice before, and the court set up a new plan this time. She did not start drug treatment or regularly appear for drug tests. Because she did not follow the plan and the help she got over the years never changed her behavior, the evidence supported the finding that DCFS’s efforts were reasonable.

On best interests: Mother did not challenge the finding that her addiction kept her from giving the children stability and protection. The children had bonded with their foster parents, who wanted to adopt them, and were doing well with improved behavior.

What happens now?

The order ending Mother’s parental rights stands. Nothing was sent back to the juvenile court.

What should people take from this?

In this case, a relapse right after a reunification plan began, failure to start required treatment, and a long history of earlier services that did not change the parent’s behavior together supported ending parental rights. The appeals court gave weight to the juvenile court’s view of the evidence and did not weigh it again.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; Orme, Voros, and Roth, JJ.). Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on grounds, reasonable efforts, and best interests. The court rejected all three, declining to reweigh the evidence where “a foundation for the court’s decision exists” (¶ 2, quoting In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435).

Issue 1: Grounds for termination (clearly erroneous, ¶¶ 3–5): affirmed (no error)

Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that Mother was unfit. Because any one ground under Utah Code section 78A-6-507(1) suffices, the court reviewed only unfitness and did not address neglect or failure of parental adjustment (¶ 3, citing In re D.B., 2002 UT App 314, ¶ 13 n.4, 57 P.3d 1102). The record showed earlier terminations, two prior removals of these children, a methamphetamine DUI charge, an admitted relapse, the 3:00 a.m. street incident two days after the service plan was approved, and failure to seek treatment (¶¶ 4–5). Under the totality of the circumstances, habitual drug use made her unable to care for the children (¶ 5).

Issue 2: Reasonable efforts (clearly erroneous, ¶¶ 6–7): affirmed (no error)

The evidence supported the determination that DCFS made reasonable efforts to reunify. Reasonable efforts means “a fair and serious attempt to reunify” (¶ 6, quoting In re A.C., 2004 UT App 255, ¶ 14, 97 P.3d 706), measured objectively on each case’s facts (¶ 6, quoting In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 51, 201 P.3d 985). Mother had received services at least twice before, a new plan was initiated, and she did not begin required treatment or regularly test (¶ 7). Relying on In re C.Y., 765 P.2d 251, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the court held that because she did not comply and “never internalized the assistance,” the finding stands (¶ 7).

Issue 3: Best interests (abuse of discretion, ¶ 8): affirmed (no error)

The best-interests determination was supported by the evidence. Mother did not challenge the finding that her addiction left her unable to provide stability and protection; the children were in a “legal risk” home, bonded with foster parents who wished to adopt, and doing well with improved behavior (¶ 8).

Takeaways

  • On appeal, sustaining one statutory ground ends the grounds inquiry; the court need not review the others (¶ 3).
  • A parent’s noncompliance with the plan and failure to internalize prior services supported a reasonable-efforts finding (¶ 7).
  • An unchallenged finding on the parent’s inability to provide stability weighed in the best-interests review (¶ 8).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
In re K.S. and J.S. (M.C. v. State)
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2011 UT App 394
Case no.
20110693-CA
Filed
2011
Decided
November 17, 2011
Opinion type
Per curiam
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Termination of a mother's parental rights to her two children, K.S. and J.S.

The panel

J. Frederic Voros, Jr.Per curiam
Gregory K. OrmePer curiam
Stephen L. RothPer curiam
Trial court
Third Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Kimberly K. Hornak

Parties & counsel

Appellant — AppellantIndividual(s)Richard K. Clark
Appellee — AppelleeGovernment agencyMark L. ShurtleffJohn M. Peterson
Guardian ad litemOtherMartha Pierce

Practice Tip

When the juvenile court relies on several statutory grounds, the appellate court needs to find only one supported, so a sufficiency challenge must address each ground found (¶ 3).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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