Can a prior untimely notice of appeal bar jurisdiction in a later child welfare appeal? In re J.A.C. Explained

Background and facts

C.T.M. (Mother) is the parent of two children, J.A.C. and A.E.C., who were removed from parental custody in 2019 following a history of neglect dating to 2015. After a first termination trial in 2021, Mother’s counsel filed the notice of appeal in the wrong court and then refiled it in the juvenile court beyond the fifteen-day deadline under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 52(a). The court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Mother obtained a rule 60(b)(1) order from the juvenile court resetting the appeal window, refiled, and the State raised a new jurisdictional challenge. Before the jurisdictional question was resolved, the parties stipulated to a reversal and remand for additional best-interest findings. No party sought certiorari. On remand, the juvenile court held a second trial and again terminated Mother’s parental rights in its December 17, 2023 order. Mother appealed, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Utah Supreme Court.

Key legal issues

The court confronted two distinct jurisdictional questions: (1) whether the pre-remand jurisdictional defect — an untimely notice of appeal — deprived the court of jurisdiction over the second appeal entirely; and (2) whether Mother could use the second appeal to raise errors predating the first appeal, including alleged due process violations from 2019 and challenges to DCFS reunification efforts. On the merits, the court addressed whether the juvenile court’s post-remand best-interest determination, including its strictly necessary finding under Utah Code section 80-4-301(1), was against the clear weight of the evidence.

Court’s analysis and holding

Relying on A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77, the court held that the ability to raise questions of jurisdiction expires after the last available opportunity to challenge a prior appellate order has passed. Because no party sought certiorari on the court of appeals’ stipulated reversal, that order became final and the jurisdictional challenge was foreclosed — as to both the GAL’s attempt to dismiss the entire appeal and Mother’s attempt to relitigate pre-remand errors. The court thus exercised jurisdiction over the December 17 order but limited review to errors arising after remand. On the merits, the court affirmed, holding that Mother failed to show the juvenile court’s findings — including its rejection of permanent custody and guardianship as an equally protective alternative — were against the clear weight of the evidence. Justice Nielsen concurred separately to explore the distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction (categorical, rendering judgments void) and case-specific jurisdictional defects such as untimely notices of appeal (rendering judgments merely voidable and subject to finality principles).

Practice implications

This decision carries significant implications for Utah appellate practitioners in child welfare matters. First, jurisdictional defects in a prior appeal are not infinitely available: once the certiorari window closes, the prior order is treated as final and no party — appellant or appellee — can resurrect the defect in a later appeal. Second, practitioners must understand that a stipulated reversal and remand does not preserve issues for a future appeal; issues not raised in the original petition on appeal under Rule 55(d)(5)–(6) will be deemed waived. Third, when representing a parent whose appeal faces a timeliness problem, counsel should immediately seek an express ruling on jurisdiction rather than allowing the court to proceed to the merits by implication. Finally, Justice Nielsen’s concurrence signals that the court may eventually draw a sharper line between true subject-matter jurisdiction and procedural claims-processing rules — a distinction that could affect the collateral-attack vulnerability of termination orders in future cases.