Utah Supreme Court · Published Opinion

Can a child sex abuse conviction be undone over the word “victim”? State v. Castillo

2026 UT 26No. 20230316Decided Jul 30, 2026Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

A defendant waives rule 702(b) objections that counsel concedes at the motion hearing, and a generic directed-verdict motion asserting “not credible sufficient evidence” does not preserve a State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 210 P.3d 288, inherent-improbability claim, which must be specifically raised with evidence and authority.

Key takeaways

The Utah Supreme Court rejected every challenge Castillo raised and upheld his convictions for aggravated sexual abuse of a child and rape of a child.

  • A defense lawyer who tells the trial judge certain expert testimony is “okay” gives up the objection to that testimony.
  • General references to “victims” of abuse, not aimed at the person accusing the defendant, did not make the trial unfair here.
  • To argue that a witness’s story is too unbelievable to support a conviction, the defense must make that specific argument to the trial judge.

What happened?

Castillo’s niece (the court calls her “Niece”) said he sexually abused her when she was about nine or ten and later raped her at her family’s apartment. Her parents found texts from Castillo, including one saying he “wanted to make love to her again,” and Castillo later came to apologize. Niece did not report the abuse until she was twenty.

The State charged Castillo with four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of rape of a child, all first-degree felonies. A jury convicted him on every count.

What did Castillo argue on appeal?

He made several arguments. He said the judge should not have let a child-interview expert testify about why children delay reporting abuse. He said his trial lawyer was ineffective, meaning the lawyer’s work fell below what the Constitution requires, in several ways. And he said the niece’s testimony was so unbelievable that the judge should have thrown out the case.

What did the court decide about the expert?

Before trial, Castillo’s lawyer told the judge he was “okay” with the expert explaining reasons children delay reporting. Because of that, the court held Castillo gave up, or waived, that objection, and it would not review it. The judge had barred the expert from calling false accusations “common” or “rare,” but the expert said they were “rare” anyway. The court held the defense lawyer reasonably handled this by asking for a break, then using cross-examination and closing argument to point out that false allegations happen.

What about the word “victim”?

Witnesses and lawyers used “victim” a handful of times, but the court read none of them as calling Niece a victim. They spoke of victims of abuse in general. The court held the defense lawyer was not ineffective for not objecting, and the trial judge did not make an obvious mistake by not stepping in.

What about the self-harm testimony?

Niece testified she had thoughts of cutting herself and of suicide. The court held the defense lawyer could reasonably choose not to object, because he used her earlier, different testimony on this topic to attack her believability.

Was the niece’s testimony too unbelievable to support the verdict?

Castillo’s lawyer had moved for a directed verdict, a request that the judge end the case because the evidence was too weak. But he never argued the niece’s testimony was “inherently improbable,” meaning so unbelievable it should be ignored. The court held that a general weak-evidence motion does not raise that specific argument. It also held the lawyer was not ineffective for skipping it, because the inconsistencies in her account were the ordinary kind and the motion would have failed.

What happens now?

Nothing more in this appeal. The court found no errors to add together, so the convictions stand.

What should people take from this?

What a defense lawyer concedes before trial matters. And a claim that a witness is too unbelievable to credit must be argued specifically to the trial judge.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Pohlman, A.C.J., joined by Petersen, Jorgensen and Dent, JJ., and Judge Neider; Nielsen, J., recused). Every claim failed, mostly at the deficient-performance prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (¶¶ 54, 99). The court also clarified what it takes to preserve a Robbins claim (¶¶ 86–90).

Issue 1: Rule 702(b) admission of the expert’s testimony (mixed, ¶¶ 45–49): not reached

Castillo waived his reliability and sufficiency objections to the delayed-disclosure testimony, so the court did not review them. Counsel’s written motion attacked all three rule 702(b) requirements, but at argument he said testimony about reasons for delayed reporting was “proper and okay” (¶¶ 48–49), and an abandoned objection is waived, following State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 16 n.4, 416 P.3d 443 (¶ 46). The court did not decide whether this was invited error, since Castillo did not seek plain-error review (¶ 47 n.3). His alternative ineffective-assistance argument was inadequately briefed because he did not show the concessions were unreasonable (¶ 49 n.4).

Issue 2: Counsel’s response to “rare” testimony (ineffective assistance, ¶¶ 50–58): affirmed (no error)

Counsel was not deficient for handling the expert’s “rare” remark, which violated the pretrial order, without objecting or seeking a mistrial or curative instruction. Counsel could reasonably avoid highlighting the remark through a sidebar (¶ 57) and use cross-examination and closing to stress that false allegations occur “for a host of unknown reasons” (¶ 58).

Issue 3: Not objecting to “victim” (ineffective assistance, ¶¶ 59–72): affirmed (no error)

Counsel was not deficient, because no use of “victim” referred to Niece. The concern in State v. Vallejo, 2019 UT 38, 449 P.3d 39, is with labeling the complaining witness (¶¶ 61, 67). The prosecutor’s “pressure put on the victim” described a reason for delay (¶ 62 n.5). Even if it referred to Niece, it was a permissible deduction in closing under State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶ 56, 979 P.2d 799 (¶¶ 70–72).

Issue 4: Plain error on “victim” (plain error, ¶¶ 73–75): affirmed (no error)

No obvious error. Castillo did not explain what the court should have done or why dismissal or an instruction was warranted, and the uses were distinguishable from those the court has found concerning (¶ 75).

Issue 5: Self-harm testimony (ineffective assistance, ¶¶ 76–82): affirmed (no error)

Counsel reasonably used the testimony to impeach Niece with her preliminary hearing account (¶ 80). An objection likely would have failed under State v. Anderson, 2020 UT App 135, ¶ 26, 475 P.3d 967 (¶ 81).

Issue 6: Robbins inherent improbability (mixed, ¶¶ 83–97): affirmed (no error)

The claim was unpreserved, and counsel was not ineffective for not raising it. A Robbins challenge is a “distinct legal theory,” per State v. Stricklan, 2020 UT 65, ¶ 125, 477 P.3d 1251. The defendant generally must reference Robbins or its standard, argue the testimony meets it, and ask that it be disregarded, though no “magic words” are required (¶¶ 86–88). “[N]ot credible sufficient evidence” did not suffice (¶ 90). On the merits, the inconsistencies were common to human experience, Niece was consistent on the nature of the attacks and the attacker, and there was corroboration, so the motion would have been futile (¶¶ 93–97 & n.7).

Issue 7: Cumulative error (none stated, ¶ 98): affirmed (no error)

There were no errors to accumulate, citing State v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54, ¶ 83, 582 P.3d 772.

Takeaways

  • Conceding parts of an expert’s testimony at a motion hearing waives the objection to those parts (¶¶ 48–49).
  • Generic references to “victims” are treated differently from labeling the complaining witness a victim (¶¶ 61–63, 67).
  • A Robbins claim must be raised specifically, with evidence and authority, apart from a general sufficiency motion (¶¶ 87–90).
  • An ineffective-assistance claim based on waived objections must show the concessions themselves were unreasonable (¶ 49 n.4).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Castillo
Court
Utah Supreme Court
Citation
2026 UT 26
Case no.
20230316
Filed
2023
Decided
July 30, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Who appealed
Castillo
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Jury convictions on four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of rape of a child, all first-degree felonies.

The panel

Jill M. PohlmanAuthor
DentConcurred
Jay T. JorgensenConcurred
Camille L. NeiderConcurred
Paige PetersenConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, West Jordan Department · Judge William K. Kendall

Parties & counsel

Castillo — AppellantIndividual(s)Andrea J. Garland
State — AppelleeState of UtahDerek E. Brown, Utah Attorney General's OfficeMichael Palumbo, Utah Attorney General's Office

Practice Tip

To preserve an inherent-improbability claim, generally reference Robbins or its standard, argue the specific testimony meets it, and ask the court to disregard it before it reviews sufficiency (¶¶ 87–89).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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