Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can I take back giving up my parental rights in court? C.P. v. State (In re E.E.P., T.J.P. and K.P.)

2011 UT App 363No. 20110689-CADecided Oct 27, 2011Juvenile & Child WelfareAffirmed

Holding

The juvenile court’s finding that Father freely and voluntarily relinquished his parental rights was not against the clear weight of the evidence, and Utah Code section 78A-6-514(5) required only the court’s own finding that relinquishment was in the children’s best interest, not the parent’s agreement.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the termination of the father’s parental rights, ruling against him on both of his arguments.

  • Under the Utah statute the court applied, giving up parental rights takes effect as soon as it is signed and ordinarily cannot be taken back.
  • The appeals court will not undo a juvenile court’s finding that a parent gave up rights voluntarily unless that finding goes against the clear weight of the evidence.
  • The juvenile court must find that ending the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest; it does not have to find that the parent believed so.

What happened?

C.P., whom the court calls “Father,” voluntarily gave up his parental rights to three children, E.E.P., T.J.P., and K.P., at a hearing in the juvenile court (the court that handles child welfare cases). The juvenile court then entered an order ending his parental rights. Father appealed.

What did Father argue?

Father made two arguments. First, he said the questions the judge asked him at the hearing were not enough to tell whether he was acting under duress, meaning pressure that made his choice less than free. He also said the questioning seemed rushed.

Second, he said there was not enough evidence that he agreed that giving up his rights was in his children’s best interests.

What does the law say about giving up parental rights?

The court explained that under Utah Code section 78A-6-514, giving up parental rights takes effect immediately when it is signed and ordinarily cannot be revoked, meaning taken back. The judge who accepts it must certify, to the best of the judge’s information and belief, that the parent read and understood it and signed it freely and voluntarily.

On appeal, the juvenile court’s finding that a parent acted voluntarily stands unless it is clearly wrong, meaning it goes against the clear weight of the evidence.

Was Father’s decision voluntary?

Yes, the court held. At the hearing, Father was asked specifically whether any person, substance, or promise had influenced his decision. He confirmed he was giving up his rights freely and voluntarily.

The court found the questioning was enough for the juvenile court to see that Father understood what he was doing and acted freely. A footnote notes that Father conceded parents giving up their rights do not get the same protections as a criminal defendant.

Did Father have to agree it was best for his children?

No. The court explained that the statute does not require the juvenile court to find that the parent believed giving up rights was in the children’s best interests. The juvenile court “need only find” that it is in the child’s best interest, and it did so here. The evidence supported that finding.

What happens now?

Nothing more. The Court of Appeals affirmed, so the order ending Father’s parental rights stands. The decision was issued “per curiam,” meaning by the three-judge panel as a whole rather than by one named judge.

What should people take from this?

A parent who gives up parental rights in court, after answering the judge’s questions about whether the decision is free and voluntary, will have a hard time undoing it on appeal. The court looks at the hearing record, and here the parent’s own answers supported the finding that he acted voluntarily.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; Orme, Thorne, and Voros, JJ.). Father relinquished his parental rights in open court and then challenged the termination order. The juvenile court’s findings that he relinquished voluntarily and that relinquishment was in the children’s best interest were supported by the clear weight of the evidence (¶¶ 3–4).

Issue 1: Termination on Father’s relinquishment (clearly erroneous, ¶ 2): affirmed (no error)

The juvenile court did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights on his relinquishment: its voluntariness and best-interest findings were supported by the clear weight of the evidence (¶¶ 3-4).

Part 1: Voluntariness of the relinquishment

The juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that Father freely and voluntarily relinquished his parental rights. Under Utah Code section 78A-6-514(4), a relinquishment is effective immediately upon signing and is not ordinarily revocable, and under section 78A-6-514(3) the accepting court must certify that the parent read, understood, and freely and voluntarily signed it (¶ 2). A voluntariness finding is overturned only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence, citing In re A.G., 2001 UT App 87, ¶ 4, 27 P.3d 562 (¶ 2). Father was specifically asked whether any person, substance, or promise had influenced his decision, and he confirmed he was acting freely and voluntarily (¶ 3). Despite his claims that the colloquy could not detect duress and seemed rushed, the record showed it was sufficient (¶ 3). Father conceded that relinquishing parents do not receive the same protections as criminal defendants, see In re A.G., 2001 UT App 87, ¶ 3, 27 P.3d 562 (¶ 3 n.1).

Part 2: Best interest

The termination did not depend on evidence that Father agreed relinquishment was in his children’s best interests. Section 78A-6-514(5) does not require the juvenile court to find that the parent believed so; the court “need only find” that relinquishment or termination is in the child’s best interest, which it did (¶ 4). That finding was supported by the clear weight of the evidence (¶ 4).

Takeaways

  • A colloquy that asks specifically whether any person, substance, or promise influenced the decision, and in which the parent confirms the decision is free and voluntary, supported a voluntariness finding here (¶ 3).
  • A claim that the colloquy “seemed rushed” did not overcome a record showing the parent understood and voluntarily relinquished (¶ 3).
  • Section 78A-6-514(5) requires the court’s best-interest finding, not the relinquishing parent’s agreement on best interest (¶ 4).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
C.P. v. State (In re E.E.P., T.J.P. and K.P.)
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2011 UT App 363
Case no.
20110689-CA
Filed
2011
Decided
October 27, 2011
Opinion type
Per curiam
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
The termination of a father's parental rights to three children after he relinquished those rights in open court

The panel

J. Frederic Voros, Jr.Per curiam
William A. Thorne Jr.Per curiam
Gregory K. OrmePer curiam
Trial court
Fifth Juvenile Court, St. George Department · Judge Karla Staheli

Parties & counsel

Appellant — AppellantIndividual(s)J. Michael Rawson
Appellee — AppelleeGovernment agencyMark L. ShurtleffJohn M. Peterson
Guardian ad litemOtherMartha Pierce

Practice Tip

When a parent relinquishes in open court, a record in which the parent is specifically asked whether any person, substance, or promise influenced the decision and confirms it is free and voluntary supported the voluntariness finding in this case (¶ 3).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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