Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can police give sobriety tests if they find me asleep in my car? State v. Ruvalcaba

2013 UT App 35No. 20120062-CADecided Feb 14, 2013Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

An officer who found the defendant slumped over the wheel of a running car parked in the middle of a dirt road, slow to respond, groggy and red-eyed, and who heard him admit to drinking, had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for field sobriety tests under State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 13, 229 P.3d 650.

Key takeaways

The State won: the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the denial of Ruvalcaba’s motion to suppress and affirmed his convictions.

  • An officer may look into a new suspicion that comes up during a stop if it rests on specific facts.
  • Here, a running car parked in the road, a driver slumped over the wheel who was slow to respond and seemed groggy, and his statement that he had been drinking justified field sobriety tests.
  • The trial court was right to deny the motion to suppress, so the convictions stand.

What happened?

An officer saw a vehicle parked in the middle of a dirt road leading to a public campground, with its lights on and engine running. He turned on his overhead lights and got no response from anyone inside.

At the vehicle, he found Rosendo Roman Ruvalcaba slumped over the steering wheel, with a gun on the dashboard. The officer had to yell and knock on the window twice before Ruvalcaba responded. Ruvalcaba seemed disoriented and groggy, and his eyes were red and watery.

The officer asked whether he had been drinking. Ruvalcaba said he had, but “not too much.” The officer then asked him to get out and perform field sobriety tests. Ruvalcaba was later convicted of possession or use of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a restricted person.

What did Ruvalcaba argue?

Before trial, Ruvalcaba asked the court to suppress the evidence, meaning keep it out of the case. The trial court denied that motion.

On appeal, he agreed the officer had a valid reason to stop and check on the car. But he argued that once the officer learned he had just been sleeping, the officer had no reasonable suspicion of anything else. Reasonable suspicion means a belief, based on specific facts, that a crime may be happening. Without it, he said, the officer could not keep the stop going to look into impaired driving.

What did the court decide?

The court ruled against Ruvalcaba. Because the parties agreed on the facts, the court decided the legal question for itself without deferring to the trial court.

Police normally must end a stop once its original purpose is done. But if the officer develops a new, reasonable suspicion during the stop, the officer may quickly look into it, as State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 13, 229 P.3d 650, explains.

Looking at all the circumstances, the court held the officer had reasonable suspicion that Ruvalcaba had been driving while impaired. The car’s position and condition, the lack of response, the slumped posture, the knocking needed to wake him, and his groggy look and red, watery eyes justified asking about drinking. His answer that he had been drinking, added to the rest, justified asking him to step out and do the tests. The court pointed to decisions from other courts that reached similar results in similar situations.

What happens now?

Nothing further. The court affirmed, so the denial of the motion to suppress and the convictions stand.

What should people take from this?

A stop that starts for one reason can lawfully expand when the officer sees new facts pointing to another crime. Courts look at all the circumstances together, not one fact at a time.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; Davis, McHugh and Voros, JJ.). Ruvalcaba conceded the stop was lawful at its inception, so the only question was whether it was executed reasonably (¶ 3). The totality of the circumstances gave the officer reasonable suspicion of impaired driving, which justified asking Ruvalcaba to exit and perform field sobriety tests (¶ 4).

Issue 1: Extension of the stop for field sobriety tests (correctness, ¶ 2): affirmed (no error)

The trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress because the officer formed new reasonable suspicion of impaired driving during the stop. The parties stipulated to the facts, so review was for correctness only (¶ 2). A stop must be “lawful at its inception” and “executed in a reasonable manner,” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (¶ 3). Police normally must end a stop when its purpose is concluded, see State v. Hensen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 31, 63 P.3d 650, but an officer who forms new reasonable articulable suspicion “may also expediently investigate his new suspicion,” State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 13, 229 P.3d 650 (¶ 3).

Ruvalcaba argued that once the officer learned he had been sleeping, nothing justified going further (¶ 3). The court disagreed (¶ 4). The vehicle was parked in the middle of a dirt road with the engine running and lights on; no one responded to the overhead lights; Ruvalcaba was slumped over the wheel with a gun on the dashboard; the officer had to yell and knock twice; and Ruvalcaba appeared disoriented and groggy with red, watery eyes. Those facts justified asking whether he had been drinking, and his answer that he had, but “not too much,” justified the field sobriety tests (¶ 4). The court relied on see Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Wilson, 758 F.2d 304, 306 (8th Cir. 1985); York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528, 535–37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); and cf. State v. Prawitt, 2011 UT App 261, ¶ 18–19, 262 P.3d 1203 (¶ 4).

Takeaways

  • When the parties stipulate to the operative facts, review of a suppression ruling is for correctness only (¶ 2).
  • Admitting the stop was lawful at its inception narrows the appeal to whether it was executed reasonably (¶ 3).
  • The court built reasonable suspicion step by step: the initial observations justified a question about drinking, and the admission to drinking justified field sobriety tests (¶ 4).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
State v. Ruvalcaba
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2013 UT App 35
Case no.
20120062-CA
Filed
2012
Decided
February 14, 2013
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Ruvalcaba
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Convictions for possession or use of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a restricted person, challenged through the denial of a motion to suppress

The panel

Trial court
Fourth District Court, Fillmore Department · Judge M. James Brady

Parties & counsel

Ruvalcaba — AppellantIndividual(s)James K. Slavens
State — AppelleeState of UtahJohn E. SwallowMichelle M. Young

Practice Tip

In challenging an extended stop, address each step of the officer's inquiry, because the court asked whether the first observations justified the drinking question and whether the answer, added to those facts, justified the field sobriety tests (¶ 4).

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