Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Was my lawyer ineffective for skipping a probation statute? State v. Grant

2013 UT App 210No. 20120295-CADecided Aug 29, 2013Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

Because Utah Code section 76-5-406.5(1) does not cover an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse of a child, counsel was not deficient for failing to present evidence on its enumerated circumstances, and counsel’s sentencing advocacy was adequate and caused no shown prejudice.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and left Grant’s sentence in place.

  • The probation statute Grant relied on, Utah Code section 76-5-406.5(1), does not list an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse of a child, so his lawyer did not have to address its conditions.
  • His lawyer argued for probation and outpatient treatment, and the court held that was adequate.
  • Grant’s motion under rule 23B, which rested only on the same claim, was denied.

What happened?

Grant was first charged with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. That crime is a first degree felony that carries a minimum mandatory prison sentence, meaning the judge must impose at least a set prison term.

In a plea deal, Grant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child. That is also a first degree felony, but it has no minimum mandatory prison term. His lawyer told the court the deal would “leave sentencing up to the Court without any restrictions.”

At sentencing, Grant’s lawyer asked for probation. The State asked for prison. A presentence report, which is a background report prepared for the judge, recommended prison even though a psychosexual evaluation called Grant “a low risk to reoffend.”

What did Grant argue on appeal?

Grant said his lawyer gave ineffective assistance, meaning the lawyer’s work fell below an acceptable level and hurt him. He said the lawyer should have investigated and presented evidence on every circumstance listed in Utah Code section 76-5-406.5. That statute lists conditions a court must find before it can suspend a sentence and consider probation to a residential sexual abuse treatment center in certain child sex abuse cases.

What did the court decide?

The court ruled against Grant. The statute covers attempts to commit rape of a child, object rape of a child, and sodomy on a child. It does not list an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Two other statutes leave out that attempt in the same way.

So the judge did not need those findings before granting Grant probation. The lawyer did not fall short by failing to address them.

The court also looked at the lawyer’s work at sentencing as a whole. The lawyer gave the judge the psychosexual evaluation and a letter from Grant’s outpatient counselor. He argued that Grant was employed, supported his family, and had a wife who needed medical care. He asked for probation with outpatient treatment, an option the court noted would not even be available under section 76-5-406.5.

The sentencing judge said that “on balance” Grant had already been “given the benefit of the doubt” by the plea deal that reduced the charges. Given those remarks, the court held that Grant could not show the claimed gaps made any difference.

What about his other motion?

Grant also filed a motion under rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court said that motion rested only on the lawyer’s failure to present more evidence on the section 76-5-406.5 circumstances. Because that claim failed, the court denied the motion.

What happens now?

Nothing more. The court affirmed, so Grant’s sentence stands.

What should people take from this?

A lawyer is not ineffective for skipping requirements in a statute that does not apply to the client’s crime. When the lawyer still argues for a lighter sentence, and the judge’s own comments show why it ruled as it did, a claim that the lawyer should have done more is hard to win.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; Davis, Thorne, and Voros, JJ.). Grant pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony with no minimum mandatory term, under a deal meant to give the court sentencing discretion (¶ 2). His claim that counsel was ineffective at sentencing fails on both prongs (¶¶ 4–5), and his rule 23B motion is denied (¶ 6).

Issue 1: Ineffective assistance at sentencing (mixed, ¶¶ 3–6): affirmed (no error)

The court held that counsel was not ineffective at sentencing, and denied the rule 23B motion that rested on the same claimed failure (¶¶ 5–6).

Part 1: Ineffective assistance at sentencing (¶¶ 3–5)

Counsel was not ineffective at sentencing, either for failing to address the section 76-5-406.5 circumstances or otherwise. Section 76-5-406.5(1) covers attempts to commit rape of a child, object rape of a child, and sodomy on a child, and violations of subsections 76-5-404.1(4) and (5), but not an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse of a child (¶¶ 3–4). Section 76-3-406(14) likewise limits its attempt clause to subsections (6), (8), and (10), and section 76-4-102(1)(c)(iii) sets three years to life for this attempt (¶ 4). Because the enumerated circumstances were not needed for probation, failing to address them was not deficient performance (¶ 4).

Taking up counsel’s performance more broadly, the court noted that counsel supplied a psychosexual evaluation and a letter from Grant’s outpatient counselor, and argued Grant’s employment and family support. Counsel urged probation with outpatient treatment, “an option that would not even be available under section 76‐5‐406.5” (¶ 5). The sentencing court said that “on balance” Grant had already received “the benefit of the doubt” from the reduced charges, so Grant could not show prejudice from the claimed omissions (¶ 5).

Part 2: Rule 23B motion (no standard stated, ¶ 6)

The motion rested only on counsel’s failure to present more evidence on the section 76-5-406.5 circumstances, so it was denied once that claim failed (¶ 6).”

Takeaways

  • Section 76-5-406.5(1)’s probation prerequisites do not apply to an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse of a child (¶¶ 3–4).
  • Failing to address a statute’s requirements is not deficient performance when the statute does not govern the client’s offense (¶ 4).
  • The sentencing court’s stated reasons can defeat prejudice on a sentencing-stage ineffective-assistance claim (¶ 5).
  • A rule 23B motion built only on a legally deficient theory will be denied with it (¶ 6).

Case details

Case name
State v. Grant
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2013 UT App 210
Case no.
20120295-CA
Filed
2012
Decided
August 29, 2013
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Grant
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Grant's sentence on his guilty plea to attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child, where his counsel argued for probation and the State requested a prison term

The panel

Trial court
Second District Court, Farmington Department · Judge David M. Connors

Parties & counsel

Grant — AppellantIndividual(s)Scott L. Wiggins
State — AppelleeState of UtahJohn E. SwallowBrett J. DelPorto

Practice Tip

Before arguing that counsel should have met a statute's sentencing prerequisites, confirm that the statute's list of offenses actually includes the offense of conviction, including any attempt (¶¶ 3–4).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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