Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can parents attack a termination order they never objected to? In re J.G. . . . (J.G. and C.B. v. State)

2012 UT App 301No. 20120587-CADecided Oct 25, 2012Juvenile & Child WelfareAffirmed

Holding

By not objecting to the form of the termination order, the parents waived their claim that it failed to state a ground under Utah Code section 78A-6-507(1), which also failed because the findings tracked the statute’s language; their unpreserved due process challenge to the expert’s changed diagnosis was not reached.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and left the termination of both parents’ rights in place.

  • A parent who thinks a written termination order is missing something should object to the form of the order in the juvenile court; here the failure to object waived the challenge.
  • Findings that track the language of the termination statute can be enough, even if they do not cite the statute.
  • Questioning an expert’s credibility on cross-examination did not preserve a due process claim about that expert’s testimony.

What happened?

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of J.G. (Father) and C.B. (Mother) to their children. Each parent filed a separate appeal. Because the two appeals raised identical legal issues, the Court of Appeals combined them and decided them together.

The State of Utah was the other side on appeal, and a guardian ad litem, a lawyer appointed to represent the children’s interests, also took part.

What did the parents argue?

They made two arguments. First, they said the juvenile court ended their rights based only on the children’s best interests, without first finding a ground listed in Utah Code section 78A-6-507(1), the statute that lists the reasons a court may terminate parental rights. They did not challenge the evidence itself, only how the order was written.

Second, they said their due process rights, meaning their right to fair procedures and fair treatment by the government, were violated when the court let the State’s expert witness change her diagnosis in the middle of trial and testify differently from her report.

What did the court decide about the order?

The court held that the parents waived this argument. To argue on appeal that a written order does not match what happened in court, a party first has to object to the form of the order in the trial court. Neither parent did.

The court added that the argument would fail even if it had been raised. The juvenile court’s findings discussed grounds such as unfitness, abuse and neglect, and failure of parental adjustment. Those findings did not cite the statute by number, but they tracked its language, which was enough to tell everyone why the court ruled as it did.

What about the expert’s changed diagnosis?

The court did not decide this argument, because the parents never raised it in the juvenile court. They said cross-examining the expert was enough. But during cross-examination they only attacked the expert’s believability and how much weight her testimony deserved. They never asked to strike her testimony and never argued due process, so the juvenile court never had a chance to rule on it.

The juvenile court had described the new diagnosis as “more of an update than a change.”

What happens now?

Nothing more happens in this case. The termination order stands for both parents.

What should people take from this?

An appeals court usually will not consider an argument the trial court was never asked to decide. In this case, objections to how the written order was drafted, and to the fairness of the expert’s testimony, had to be made in the juvenile court first. Raising doubts about a witness during questioning is not the same as asking the court to rule that the testimony was unfair or should be thrown out.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; Orme, Thorne, and Roth, JJ.). Father and Mother appealed separately from the order terminating their parental rights; the court consolidated the appeals because they raised identical issues (¶ 1 n.1). Both challenges failed on preservation, and the first also failed on the merits (¶¶ 2–4).

Issue 1: Statutory grounds in the termination order (none stated, ¶¶ 2–3): affirmed (no error)

The parents waived their challenge to the sufficiency of the order, and it would fail even if preserved. They did not contest the evidence, only whether the order set out the statutory grounds under Utah Code section 78A-6-507(1) (¶ 2). To preserve a claim that a written order does not conform to the record, a party must object to the form of the order, see Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah 1998), and an issue must be presented so the trial court can rule on it, 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (¶ 2). Neither parent objected (¶ 2).

Assuming preservation, Findings of Fact 2(j) through 2(t) discussed grounds for termination in language tracking section 78A-6-507(1), including unfitness, abuse and neglect, and failure of parental adjustment, which was “sufficient to alert all parties” to the basis of the decision (¶ 3). See In re J.B., 2002 UT App 267, ¶ 23, 53 P.3d 958 (express reference to the statute unnecessary where detailed findings show the court considered its requirements) (¶ 3).

Issue 2: Due process and the expert’s changed diagnosis (none stated, ¶ 4): not reached

The court did not reach the substantive and procedural due process claim because it was not preserved. The parents argued that cross-examination preserved it, but they never moved to strike the expert’s testimony or made any due process argument; they attacked only the credibility and weight of the “change in diagnosis” (¶ 4, citing 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801). The juvenile court had called the rediagnosis “more of an update than a change” (¶ 4 n.2). No preservation exception was argued or applied.

Takeaways

  • A challenge to whether a written termination order states its statutory basis requires an objection to the form of the order below (¶ 2).
  • Findings that track the language of section 78A-6-507(1) can support termination without citing the statute (¶ 3).
  • Impeaching an expert on cross-examination does not preserve a due process objection to that expert’s testimony (¶ 4).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
In re J.G. . . . (J.G. and C.B. v. State)
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2012 UT App 301
Case no.
20120587-CA
Filed
2012
Decided
October 25, 2012
Opinion type
Per curiam
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
The juvenile court's order terminating Father's and Mother's parental rights to J.G., A.M.G., T.G., and K.G.

The panel

William A. Thorne Jr.Per curiam
Gregory K. OrmePer curiam
Stephen L. RothPer curiam
Trial court
Fifth Juvenile Court, Cedar City Department · Judge Thomas M. Higbee

Parties & counsel

Appellant — AppellantIndividual(s)William H. Leigh
Appellee — AppelleeGovernment agencyMark L. ShurtleffJohn M. Peterson
Guardian ad litemOtherMartha Pierce

Practice Tip

If a termination order does not clearly state its statutory basis, object to the form of the order in the juvenile court; failing to do so waived the challenge here (¶ 2). Likewise, a due process objection to an expert's shifting testimony needs its own motion or argument, not just cross-examination (¶ 4).

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