Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can a court toss my post-conviction petition as late without a hearing? Esparza-Recendez v. State

2012 UT App 344No. 20120653-CADecided Dec 6, 2012Post-Conviction ReliefReversed & Remanded

Holding

Under Utah Code section 78B-9-106(2)(b), a district court may not dismiss a post-conviction petition on a statute-of-limitations bar raised on its own motion without first giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to be heard; and a rule 65C(h) dismissal entered before service is final for appeal.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with Esparza-Recendez, who appealed, and sent his post-conviction case back to the district court.

  • A court that raises a time bar against a post-conviction petition on its own must first give notice and a chance to be heard.
  • The dismissal was reversed, and the district court must now give Esparza-Recendez that notice and chance to respond.
  • An order dismissing a post-conviction petition as frivolous under rule 65C(h) before the State is served is final and can be appealed, even without the usual “final order” language.

What happened?

Inocencio Esparza-Recendez pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors in 2009 and was sentenced. Later he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which is a request to undo a conviction after the regular appeal stage is over. He argued that his trial lawyer was ineffective because the lawyer did not tell him about the immigration consequences of his plea.

The district court dismissed the petition before it was served on the State. It ruled the petition was untimely, meaning filed too late under the one-year deadline in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. The court never told Esparza-Recendez beforehand that it was thinking of dismissing on that ground.

How did the case get decided on appeal?

The Court of Appeals raised the matter itself, on its own motion for summary disposition, which is a quick ruling without full proceedings, because it saw a “manifest error,” an obvious mistake.

Could he even appeal this kind of order?

Yes. Normally an order ending a post-conviction case must either be prepared by a party or say that it is the court’s final order and no further order is needed. The court said that rule still applies once the State has been served.

But when a court dismisses a petition under rule 65C(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous on its face, before the State is served, the rule itself tells the court to issue the order. So that order is final and can be appealed even without the special language.

What did the court decide?

The district court made a mistake. A Utah statute says any court “may raise a procedural or time bar on its own motion,” but only if it gives the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. A deadline (statute of limitations) problem counts as one of those bars.

Because the district court dismissed the petition as late without first warning Esparza-Recendez and letting him respond, the court reversed. It noted in a footnote that confusion may come from the fact that the notice requirement in the statute is not repeated in rule 65C(h).

What happens now?

The case goes back to the district court, which must give Esparza-Recendez notice and a chance to be heard on whether his petition is barred as untimely. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the petition was actually late or whether his ineffective-assistance claim has merit.

What should people take from this?

When a court on its own raises a time limit or similar bar against a post-conviction petition, the statute requires a warning and a chance to argue first. A dismissal without that step can be reversed.

Bottom line

Reversed and remanded, per curiam (Thorne, McHugh, and Roth, JJ.), on the court’s own motion for summary disposition for manifest error (¶ 1). The district court dismissed a PCRA petition as time-barred before service on the State and without notice to the petitioner. Section 78B-9-106(2)(b) requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court raises a procedural or time bar on its own (¶¶ 4–6).

Threshold: finality of a rule 65C(h) dismissal

The court first clarified how rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966, apply in PCRA cases (¶ 2). Once the responding party has been served under rule 65C(i), a dismissal order must still comply with rule 7(f)(2) and prior case law (¶ 2). But rule 65C(h) directs the court itself to “forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim” if a claim was adjudicated before or appears frivolous on its face. So an order dismissing under subsection (h) before service “inherently complies” with rule 7(f)(2) and Giusti and is final for purposes of appeal (¶ 3).

Issue 1: Sua sponte time-bar dismissal without notice (none stated, ¶¶ 4–6): reversed

The district court erred by dismissing the petition as untimely without first giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to be heard. Esparza-Recendez claimed counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his 2009 misdemeanor pleas, see Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010), and the court dismissed under the one-year limitation in section 78B-9-107(1) (¶ 4). Section 78B-9-106(2)(b) lets a court raise a procedural or time bar on its own motion only if it “gives the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard,” and that covers a limitations bar under section 78B-9-106(1)(e) (¶ 5). The court noted that confusion may arise because rule 65C(h) does not repeat the statute’s notice requirement (¶ 5 n.1).

Disposition

The dismissal is reversed and the case remanded so the district court can give notice and an opportunity to be heard under section 78B-9-106(2)(b) (¶ 6). The court did not decide whether the petition is in fact untimely.

Takeaways

  • A rule 65C(h) dismissal entered before service on the State is final and appealable without rule 7(f)(2) “final order” language (¶ 3).
  • After service under rule 65C(i), a dismissal order must still comply with rule 7(f)(2) and Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966 (¶ 2).
  • A court raising a statute-of-limitations bar on its own must give notice and an opportunity to be heard first, even though rule 65C(h) does not say so (¶ 5 & n.1).

Case details

Case name
Esparza-Recendez v. State
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2012 UT App 344
Case no.
20120653-CA
Filed
2012
Decided
December 6, 2012
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Esparza-Recendez
Disposition
Reversed and Remanded
At stake
A petition for post-conviction relief challenging 2009 guilty pleas to two misdemeanors, dismissed as untimely before the State was served

The panel

William A. Thorne Jr.Per curiam
Carolyn B. McHughPer curiam
Stephen L. RothPer curiam
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Denise P. Lindberg

Parties & counsel

Esparza-Recendez — AppellantIndividual(s)Edward L. Carter
State — AppelleeState of Utah

Practice Tip

If a district court dismisses a PCRA petition on a time or procedural bar it raised itself without notice, an appeal can rest on section 78B-9-106(2)(b), and a pre-service rule 65C(h) dismissal is final for appeal without rule 7(f)(2) language (¶¶ 3, 5).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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