Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

If the prosecutor agreed to reduce my felony, can the judge refuse? State v. D.B.

2020 UT App 97No. 20190262-CADecided Jun 18, 2020Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

The district court did not exceed its discretion under Utah Code section 76-3-402 in denying stipulated reductions as not in the interest of justice, and a plea agreement requiring the State to stipulate to the reductions did not bar the State from defending the denial on appeal.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and left D.B.’s felony convictions in place.

  • A judge does not have to grant a reduction of a conviction just because the prosecutor agreed to it in a plea deal.
  • A judge who weighs all the circumstances and explains the decision in detail gets wide room on appeal.
  • In this case, the plea deal did not stop the State from defending the judge’s refusal on appeal, because nothing in it said the State could not.

What happened?

In 2016 the State charged D.B. with burglary, rape, and forcible sexual abuse. He agreed to plead guilty to burglary, a second-degree felony, and aggravated assault, a third-degree felony. In return, the prosecutor agreed to recommend probation and to agree to lowering both convictions to class A misdemeanors once D.B. successfully finished probation.

The plea’s facts said D.B. returned to the victim’s home, went into her bedroom without her consent, and engaged in sexual activity that he believed she consented to. D.B. gave a different version to a doctor who did a psychosexual evaluation, saying the victim invited him in.

The court gave D.B. a suspended prison sentence and 36 months of probation, with one year in jail as a condition. He was released after about eight months, passed a polygraph, and finished treatment quickly. The court later ended his probation as successfully completed.

What did D.B. ask for?

D.B. asked the court to lower both convictions to class A misdemeanors under Utah Code section 76-3-402, which lets a judge do this after probation if it is “in the interest of justice.” The prosecutor agreed, as promised. The victim, who was not bound by the deal, opposed it.

The judge refused. He found the conduct more serious than the crimes D.B. pleaded to, the harm to the victim “real, palpable, and long-lasting,” and D.B. still downplaying what he did.

What did the Court of Appeals decide about the reduction?

It upheld the judge’s decision. The question was whether the judge “abused his discretion,” meaning whether he ignored something he had to consider or reached a view no reasonable person would take.

D.B. argued the judge treated him as if he had been convicted of rape. The court disagreed. The judge said he “largely ignored” the rape allegations in the charging papers and focused on what D.B. admitted: an unwanted entry into the home and unwanted sexual behavior. The judge also weighed good things about D.B., such as letters of support, his job, and how quickly he finished his probation tasks. D.B. did not point to anything the judge failed to consider.

The appeals court noted it might have expected the reduction to be granted, and might have reversed a denial with no explanation. But the judge saw D.B. in person several times and wrote a careful, detailed ruling, so the decision stood.

Did the State break the plea deal by defending the judge on appeal?

No. D.B. argued that the State had to keep supporting the reduction through the appeal. The court read the plea deal like a contract. It required the prosecutor to agree to the reductions after probation, and the prosecutor did. Nothing in the deal stopped the State from defending the judge’s ruling on appeal. The court said that if the deal had included such a promise, D.B. “would have a compelling argument.”

What happens now?

Nothing more. The felony convictions stay as they are.

What should people take from this?

A prosecutor’s agreement to a reduction binds the prosecutor, not the judge. And a plea deal covers only what it says. If a defendant wants the State’s support to continue on appeal, that has to be in the agreement.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Orme, J., joined by Appleby and Mortensen, JJ.). After D.B. completed probation, the prosecutor stipulated, as the plea agreement required, to reducing his second-degree felony burglary and third-degree felony aggravated assault convictions to class A misdemeanors. The district court denied the reductions as not in the interest of justice. That ruling was within the court’s discretion (¶ 28), and the State did not breach the plea agreement by defending it on appeal (¶¶ 30–32).

Issue 1: Denial of the 402 reductions (abuse of discretion, ¶ 20): affirmed (no error)

The district court did not exceed its discretion in finding that the reductions were not in the interest of justice under Utah Code section 76-3-402. A 402 decision “is one of judgment and discretion,” State v. Salt, 2015 UT App 72, ¶ 26, 347 P.3d 414 (¶ 22), and the court affirms unless the trial court failed to consider all legally relevant factors or no reasonable person would take its view, State v. Cochran, 2019 UT App 92, ¶ 7, 443 P.3d 1269 (¶¶ 20, 23). The ruling did not treat D.B. as convicted of rape. The court “largely ignored” the probable cause allegations and relied mainly on the admitted conduct and D.B.’s attempts to minimize it (¶¶ 24–26). Taking reliable statements the State made at the plea colloquy into account, with no objection from D.B., was not an abuse of discretion where the court did not rely on them unduly (¶ 24 n.4). The court also weighed the favorable factors, and D.B. identified no factor it missed (¶¶ 27–28).

Side points: the panel did not decide whether a LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, 337 P.3d 254, style analysis was proper, because the ruling stands under the statute alone (¶ 22 n.2). Preservation rules ordinarily do not apply to an appellee’s arguments for affirmance, under Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (¶ 23 n.3). The panel said a denial without explanation might well have been reversed, but the thorough written ruling and the court’s in-person observation of D.B. supported deference (¶ 28 n.6).

Issue 2: Breach of the plea agreement (correctness, ¶ 21): affirmed (no error)

The State did not breach the plea agreement by defending the denial on appeal. D.B. first raised the claim in his reply brief, and the court asked for supplemental briefing (¶ 21). Applying contract principles, the court found the agreement unambiguous: it bound the State to stipulate to the reductions after successful probation, and the State did (¶¶ 30–31, following Hattrich v. State, 2019 UT App 142, ¶ 19, 449 P.3d 929). The court’s rejection of the stipulation did not bear on the State’s performance, see State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶ 14, 17 P.3d 1153, and nothing in the agreement barred the State from taking a different position on appeal (¶ 32). With an express no-opposition provision, D.B. “would have a compelling argument” (¶ 32).

Takeaways

  • A ruling that relies mainly on admitted conduct, weighs the favorable factors, and explains itself in writing is hard to overturn under section 76-3-402, even when the State stipulates (¶¶ 26–28 & n.6).
  • A trial court may consider reliable record statements beyond the plea’s factual basis, such as unobjected-to statements at the plea colloquy, if it does not rely on them solely or primarily (¶ 24 n.4).
  • A promise to stipulate to a 402 reduction does not stop the State from defending a denial on appeal unless the agreement says so (¶¶ 31–32).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. D.B.
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2020 UT App 97
Case no.
20190262-CA
Filed
2019
Decided
June 18, 2020
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
D.B.
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Whether D.B.'s felony convictions for burglary and aggravated assault would be reduced to class A misdemeanors after he completed probation

The panel

Gregory K. OrmeAuthor
Kate A. ApplebyConcurred
David N. MortensenConcurred
Trial court
Fourth District Court, Provo Department · Judge James R. Taylor

Parties & counsel

D.B. — AppellantIndividual(s)Earl G. Xaiz
State — AppelleeState of UtahSean D. ReyesKris C. Leonard

Practice Tip

A promise to stipulate to a 402 reduction binds the prosecutor only in the trial court unless the plea agreement says more; to keep the State from opposing an appeal of a denial, put that term in the agreement (¶ 32).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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