Does Utah's Adoption Act require a 'strictly necessary' finding before terminating parental rights? Ross v. Kracht Explained

Background and facts

Julie and Gerald Ross, the maternal grandparents of R.K. and J.K., petitioned a Duchesne County district court to adopt their grandchildren and terminate the parental rights of Denielle and Steven Kracht. The children’s lives had been marked by parental substance abuse, domestic violence, and prolonged instability. After gaining full-time custody in July 2020 through Colorado child protective services, Grandparents sought termination in June 2022. Following a one-day bench trial, the district court entered a detailed termination order in March 2023 finding statutory grounds including abandonment, neglect, abuse, and unfitness — but without conducting a strictly necessary analysis or considering alternatives short of termination.

Key legal issues

The central question, certified to the Utah Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals, was whether a termination of parental rights proceeding brought under Utah Code subsection 81-13-205(5)(e) of the Utah Adoption Act requires the same strictly necessary analysis mandated by the Termination and Restoration of Parental Rights Act (Termination Act). Grandparents argued that the Adoption Act’s reference to grounds in the Termination Act incorporated only the enumerated grounds themselves, not the qualifying language requiring the strictly necessary finding. Parents argued the reference incorporated the entire grounds statute, including its threshold requirement.

Court’s analysis and holding

The Court reviewed the question of statutory interpretation for correctness. Applying plain language analysis, the majority held that the Adoption Act’s use of the phrase “grounds described in” Title 80, Chapter 4 is a broad cross-reference that encompasses not just the enumerated grounds but the conditions and limitations defining when those grounds apply — including the strictly necessary requirement at the outset of section 80-4-301(1). The Court further grounded its interpretation in harmony with the Termination Act, reasoning that a parent contesting adoption under the Adoption Act stands in essentially the same position as a parent facing termination under the Termination Act: both face loss of a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their child, and both proceedings may be initiated by a private party. Subjecting similarly situated parents to different standards based solely on which court hears the petition would do “substantial violence” to the statutory scheme.

Nevertheless, the Court affirmed. The district court’s unchallenged factual findings — that Parents constituted a danger to the children’s health and safety and that there was “no benefit and only potential danger” in further parental contact — effectively precluded feasible alternatives such as permanent guardianship. Because Parents could not show a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had the strictly necessary analysis been conducted, the error was harmless.

Practice implications

Practitioners handling adoption-related termination proceedings in district court must now explicitly frame both the petition and proposed findings to address the strictly necessary standard. The district court must make on-the-record findings explaining why alternatives — particularly permanent guardianship — cannot equally protect the child. Conversely, parents opposing termination under the Adoption Act should argue the strictly necessary framework at the trial level and preserve the issue for appeal. Harmless error review can swallow the protection where factual findings are unchallenged, so counsel for parents should contest findings on dangerousness and the availability of less restrictive alternatives with specific evidentiary support.