Utah Supreme Court · Published Opinion

Can a juror’s incomplete answers get a conviction a new trial? State v. Bowcut

2026 UT 34No. 20230609Decided Nov 19, 2026Criminal AppealsReversed

Holding

The district court clearly erred in finding a juror’s accurate, general answers to general voir dire questions false for omitting unrequested details, and correct answers on the two points she misstated (the board’s name and her length of service) would not have provided a valid basis to strike her for cause, so the new-trial order was reversed.

Key takeaways

The Utah Supreme Court sided with the State, which appealed, and reinstated Bowcut’s rape conviction.

  • A juror is not dishonest for leaving out details that the questions asked during jury selection never called for.
  • A new trial for a juror’s false answer also requires that a correct answer would have been a valid reason to remove the juror.
  • Bowcut’s rape conviction was reinstated.

What happened?

Alexander Bowcut was charged with one count of rape and two counts of forcible sodomy. The jury acquitted him of forcible sodomy and convicted him of rape. Juror 21 served as the jury’s foreperson.

During jury selection (called “voir dire,” the questioning of possible jurors), Juror 21 said she was on a “Victims’ Rights Community Group” that approved payments to crime victims, that she had served “not quite a year,” and that she was president of an association that worked with community groups, law enforcement and legislators on legislation. She also said she worked with attorneys through that association. Neither side asked to remove her.

Why did the district court order a new trial?

After the verdict, Bowcut showed that the board was actually the Crime Victim Reparations and Assistance Board of the Utah Office for Victims of Crime, that she had served more than two years, and that she had advocated for victims’ rights legislation. He also offered social media posts showing her at events with Salt Lake County District Attorney Sim Gill and Attorney General Sean Reyes.

The district court found her answers false because she left these things out. It said it would have removed her “for cause,” meaning for a reason showing she could not be fair, and it granted a new trial. The State appealed.

What did the Supreme Court decide about her answers?

A party seeking a new trial on this ground must show two things: the juror gave a false answer to an important question, and a correct answer would have been a valid reason to remove the juror.

The court looked closely at the questions actually asked. Juror 21 was asked general questions and gave general answers that were accurate. She was not dishonest for leaving out specifics no one asked for. The court also found that the posts showed, at most, that she was acquainted with Gill and Reyes, not that they were relatives, close friends, or people she worked with on cases.

Only two answers were wrong: the board’s name and how long she had served on it.

Would correct answers have mattered?

No. Bowcut’s lawyer had already figured out from her description that the board related to the Crime Victims Reparations Fund. The difference between under one year and over two years was, in the court’s words, “substantively de minimis,” meaning too small to matter. Correct answers would not have been a reason to remove her.

Did all the justices agree?

All five agreed on the result. Justice Nielsen wrote separately. He would have overruled an earlier Utah case that treats a juror’s honest mistake the same as a lie, and would require that the juror knowingly answered falsely. The majority left that question for another day.

What happens now?

The order granting a new trial is reversed and the jury’s verdict is reinstated. The court said there was no need to send the case back for a hearing on this issue.

What should people take from this?

Whether a juror’s answer was false depends on the question asked. Lawyers who want details during jury selection need to ask for them.

Bottom line

Reversed; jury verdict reinstated (Petersen, J., joined by Pohlman, I.C.J., Luthy, J., and Mabey, J.; Nielsen, J., concurring in the judgment). A movant must show that a juror “failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire” and that a correct response would have supported a for-cause challenge, under McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984); both elements are required, State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 104, 299 P.3d 892 (¶¶ 2, 31). Juror 21 gave only two inaccurate answers, and correcting them would not have supported a strike for cause (¶ 75).

Issue 1: False answers to material questions (clearly erroneous, ¶ 28): reversed

The district court clearly erred in finding most of Juror 21’s answers false; only her misstatements of the board’s name and her length of service were inaccurate (¶¶ 58, 69).

The court held that a voir dire question is material “if a response to it would tend to influence” the decision whether to remove a juror for cause, following Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 165 (1st Cir. 2013) (¶¶ 35–36). Falsity remains objective under State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah 1992), and omissions can be false, but an answer is not false where it omits subject matter not asked about (¶¶ 37–39). Courts must look closely at the question and ask whether it “should have made [the juror] aware” of the need to disclose (¶ 55). Juror 21’s general answers about the board and the Association were accurate responses to general questions (¶¶ 56–57, 62–63). The social media evidence showed at most acquaintance with Gill and Reyes, not a relative, close friend, or attorney she worked with on cases (¶¶ 67–68); Reyes’s post calling her a friend was a “social nicety” (¶ 68 n.10).

Issue 2: Valid basis for a for-cause challenge (abuse of discretion, ¶ 28): reversed

Correct answers on the board’s name and tenure would not have provided a valid basis to strike Juror 21 under Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e) (¶¶ 73–74).

The district court relied on her relationship with Gill and her legislative advocacy, but those factual predicates “did not derive from a false answer” (¶ 72). Defense counsel had already deduced the connection to the Crime Victims Reparations Fund, and the tenure difference was “substantively de minimis” (¶ 73). Because the answer is the same as a matter of law, no evidentiary hearing on remand was needed (¶ 74 n.11).

Not reached

The State’s request to overrule the objective falsity standard of State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah 1992) was left “for another day” because the case did not turn on it (¶ 38 n.7).

Separate opinion

Justice Nielsen concurred in the judgment. He would hold that McDonough rests on the Fourteenth Amendment, binds Utah courts, and requires subjective dishonesty, so Thomas should be overruled; Bowcut’s claim fails under either standard (¶¶ 76–96).

Takeaways

  • Falsity turns on the question actually asked; a general question answered accurately in general terms is not false for omitting specifics (¶¶ 55–56).
  • A material voir dire question is one whose answer would tend to influence the for-cause decision, not the use of peremptory challenges (¶ 36).
  • At step two, only the facts a correct answer would have revealed count, not other undisclosed information (¶ 72).
  • Whether Thomas’s objective standard survives remains open (¶ 38 n.7).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Bowcut
Court
Utah Supreme Court
Citation
2026 UT 34
Case no.
20230609
Filed
2023
Decided
November 19, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Who appealed
State
Disposition
Reversed
At stake
Bowcut's rape conviction, which the district court set aside by granting a new trial for juror dishonesty during voir dire

The panel

Paige PetersenAuthor
NielsenConcurred in the result
DentDid not participate
Matthew B. DurrantDid not participate
Diana HagenDid not participate
Jay T. JorgensenDid not participate
John A. PearceDid not participate
John D. LuthyConcurred
Jennifer A. MabeyConcurred
Jill M. PohlmanConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake County · Judge Kara L. Pettit

Parties & counsel

State — AppellantState of UtahDerek E. Brown, Utah Attorney General's OfficeDavid A. Simpson, Utah Attorney General's OfficeWilliam M. Hains, Utah Attorney General's Office
Bowcut — AppelleeIndividual(s)Michael D. ZimmermanLaShel Shaw

Practice Tip

When a prospective juror gives a general answer during voir dire, ask specific follow-up questions; the court held the juror was not dishonest for failing to provide specifics that were never requested, and the falsity analysis turns on the questions asked (¶¶ 55–57).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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