Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Should my lawyer have blacked out the protective order’s findings? State v. Collard

2026 UT App 87No. 20240532-CADecided Jun 4, 2026Criminal AppealsAffirmed/Reversed in part

Holding

Although the evidence let the jury infer the permanent protective order’s terms, trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking redaction of the temporary order’s abuse finding after the court had ruled the order’s basis irrelevant, and because the State did not contest prejudice, Collard’s prima facie showing required reversal.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals reversed Collard’s three protective-order convictions and ordered a new trial, though it rejected his challenge to the evidence on two counts.

  • The jury could infer the permanent protective order’s terms from the temporary order, the court docket and the wife’s testimony, even though the permanent order itself was not offered.
  • Collard’s trial lawyer should have asked to remove the temporary order’s finding about abuse or domestic violence, because the trial judge had already ruled the reason for the order was not relevant.
  • Because the State did not respond to Collard’s prejudice argument, he only had to show a plausible basis for reversal, and he did.

What happened?

In March 2020, a court issued a temporary protective order against Kevin Michael Collard in favor of his wife. The opinion calls her “Olivia,” a made-up name. The order told him not to contact her “directly or indirectly” and to stay away from her workplace, a Home Depot. It also stated that there was “reason to believe” he had abused or committed domestic violence against her, or was a substantial likelihood threat to her safety.

On April 7, Collard called the Home Depot and told an employee he missed Olivia and needed to talk to her. On April 9, the order was made permanent. On April 13, he called twice more. He was charged with three counts of violating a protective order.

What happened at trial?

The judge ruled that the reason for the protective order was not relevant. Even so, Olivia testified that Collard “threatened to kill me,” and the judge told the jury to disregard it. A copy of the temporary order, including the abuse finding, then came into evidence. Collard’s lawyer did not object or ask to black out that finding. The State never offered the permanent order itself. The jury convicted on all three counts.

Was there enough evidence about the permanent order?

Yes. Collard argued that without the permanent order, the jury could not know its terms. The court disagreed. Olivia testified that the temporary order was “made final” on April 9, and the court docket showed the same. From that, the jury could infer the permanent order had the same no-contact terms. Calling her workplace and telling a coworker he missed her could count as indirect contact. The court added that offering the permanent order itself would have been the better practice.

The court did not consider Collard’s argument about the “best evidence rule” (a rule that usually requires the document itself to prove what it says) because he had not raised it in the trial court.

Why were the convictions reversed?

To win an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant must show his lawyer’s work fell below a reasonable standard and that it likely affected the result. The court held that a reasonable lawyer would have asked to remove the abuse finding. It painted Collard in a bad light, and the judge had already said the reason for the order was not relevant. The court rejected the State’s suggested strategic reasons for leaving it in.

On the second part, the State made no argument at all. When that happens, the appealing party only needs to show a plausible basis for reversal. Collard argued the finding described conduct far worse than a call to a store, and the court held that was enough.

What happens now?

The convictions are reversed and the case goes back for a new trial or other proceedings. The court did not decide whether the judge should have declared a mistrial after Olivia’s testimony, since the reversal made that unnecessary.

What should people take from this?

When a judge has ruled that the reasons for a protective order are not relevant, the same reasons appearing in an exhibit can be a problem. And a party that skips an argument on appeal makes the other side’s job easier.

Bottom line

Denial of the motion to arrest judgment affirmed; convictions reversed and remanded for a new trial “or such other proceedings as may now be appropriate” (Luthy, J., joined by Christiansen Forster and Harris, JJ.) (¶ 33). Counsel performed deficiently by not seeking redaction of the temporary protective order’s finding that there was “reason to believe” Collard had abused or committed domestic violence against the protected person, and the State’s failure to respond on prejudice left Collard needing only a prima facie showing (¶¶ 24–32).

Issue 1: Motion to arrest judgment (correctness, ¶ 16): affirmed (no error)

The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the terms of the permanent protective order even though the State never offered it (¶¶ 19, 22). Olivia (a pseudonym) testified that the temporary order was “made final” on April 9, and the admitted docket showed a permanent order issued that day, so the jury could infer the permanent order carried the temporary order’s “directly or indirectly” no-contact term (¶ 19, citing State v. Law, 2020 UT App 74, ¶ 14, 464 P.3d 1192). Her answer that the final order barred phone contact did not negate that inference, and calls to her workplace could be indirect contact (¶ 21, cf. State v. Fowers, 2023 UT App 128, ¶¶ 13, 15, 538 P.3d 1274). The best evidence argument under Utah R. Evid. 1002 was not raised in the motion to arrest judgment, so the court declined to consider it (¶ 20, citing Hillam v. Hillam, 2024 UT App 102, ¶ 40, 554 P.3d 1137). The court noted the better practice is to offer the permanent order itself (¶ 19 n.4).

Issue 2: Ineffective assistance for failing to seek redaction (ineffective assistance, ¶ 17): reversed

Counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), so the convictions are reversed (¶ 32). Deficiency: the finding “clearly painted Collard in a bad light,” and the court had already ruled the basis for the order irrelevant, so a redaction motion would likely have been granted (¶ 25). The State’s tactical explanations failed: the non-specific finding did not curb jury speculation but confirmed the order did not issue for innocuous reasons (¶ 26 & n.5), and counsel could have sought redaction outside the jury’s presence (¶ 27). Prejudice: the State offered no response, so Collard needed only “a prima facie showing of a plausible basis for reversal,” under AL-IN Partners, LLC v. LifeVantage Corp., 2021 UT 42, ¶ 19, 496 P.3d 76; see also State v. Rynhart, 2025 UT App 148, ¶¶ 50–57, 585 P.3d 57, cert. denied, 585 P.3d 48 (Utah 2026) (¶ 31). His argument that the evidence of indirect contact was not overwhelming, contrasted with the much more serious conduct the finding described, met that standard (¶¶ 30–31 & n.6).

Not reached

Whether the court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial after Olivia testified Collard “threatened to kill” her; unnecessary given the reversal (¶ 17 n.3).

Takeaways

  • A jury may infer a permanent protective order’s terms from the temporary order, the docket and testimony that the order was made final, but offering the permanent order is the better practice (¶ 19 & n.4).
  • Where the court has ruled the basis for a protective order irrelevant, failing to seek redaction of that basis from the admitted order can be deficient performance (¶¶ 25–28).
  • An appellee’s silence on prejudice lowers the appellant’s burden to a prima facie showing of a plausible basis for reversal (¶ 31).
  • New sufficiency theories must be raised in the motion to arrest judgment to be preserved (¶ 20).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Collard
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 87
Case no.
20240532-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
June 4, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Collard
Disposition
Affirmed in part and Reversed in part
At stake
Three jury convictions for violating a protective order based on phone calls to the protected person's workplace

The panel

John D. LuthyAuthor
Michele M. Christiansen ForsterConcurred
Ryan M. HarrisConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Teresa L. Welch

Parties & counsel

Collard — AppellantIndividual(s)Emily AdamsMikayla Irvin
State — AppelleeState of UtahSimarjit S. GillKenneth Grigg

Practice Tip

When the court has ruled the basis for a protective order irrelevant, check the order offered as an exhibit for findings on that basis and seek redaction outside the jury's presence (¶¶ 25–27).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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