Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a doctor tell a jury my car crash was “low impact”? Holmes v. Smith

2026 UT App 89No. 20240613-CADecided Jun 4, 2026Personal Injury & TortsReversed

Holding

The trial court erred by excluding workplace accommodation evidence under a misapplied collateral source rule, admitting medical records without rule 803(6) foundation, excluding a life care planner’s alternative projections under rules 702 and 403, and admitting an orthopedic surgeon’s collision-speed opinion without a rule 702 showing, and these errors together required a new trial.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with Holmes, the injured driver who appealed, on her evidence challenges and ordered a new trial.

  • An employer providing free workplace equipment does not reduce what an injured person can recover from the driver who caused the injury.
  • Medical records offered under the business records exception need a qualified witness or a certification, and agreeing the records are genuine is not enough.
  • A doctor may not give an opinion on how fast or hard a crash was without a showing of the expertise and reliable method needed for that opinion.

What happened?

In October 2017, Emily Holmes stopped her car in a construction zone in West Point, Utah, and Catherine Smith’s car hit it from behind. Holmes was diagnosed with sprain and strain injuries to her neck and lower back. She was treated until May 2018, then went back for pain treatment in August 2018.

Holmes sued Smith for her injuries. Smith argued that the later treatment came from conditions Holmes already had, including scoliosis (a curve in the spine) she had not known about.

A jury found Smith negligent, meaning careless, and awarded Holmes more than $60,000. Holmes appealed, arguing that rulings on the evidence and the jury instructions hurt her case.

What did the court decide about the jury instructions?

It did not decide that question. Holmes argued the jury should have been told that Smith had to prove which damages came from the pre-existing conditions. But at trial, Holmes had only asked for an instruction about an accident making an old condition worse. The court said she never asked for the broader instruction she argued for on appeal, so she did not “preserve” it, meaning she did not give the trial judge a chance to rule on it.

What evidence mistakes did the court find?

Workplace equipment. The trial court kept out evidence that Holmes needed a VariDesk and an ergonomic evaluation because her employer already provided them. The Court of Appeals said this misapplied the collateral source rule, which says a person who caused an injury does not get credit for help the injured person receives from someone else.

Medical records. Records like these are hearsay, an out-of-court statement offered to prove it is true. They can come in as business records only if a qualified witness or a written certification shows how they were made. Smith used Holmes’s own medical expert, who said he did not know who made the records or when. That was not enough, and Holmes agreeing the records were genuine did not fix the problem.

The life care planner. Holmes’s life care planner, an expert who estimates future care costs, gave cost figures for more years than her estimate of how long Holmes would keep working. The court said those were alternative figures the jury could use if it found a longer working life. That went to how much weight to give her testimony, not whether the jury could hear it.

“Low speed, low impact.” Smith’s expert, Dr. Snook, an orthopedic surgeon, told the jury the crash was “very low impact” based on photos and Holmes’s description. There was no showing that he had training in crash reconstruction or used a reliable method, so this opinion should not have come in.

What happens now?

The court found these errors were reasonably likely to have affected the verdict. It reversed the judgment and sent the case back to the trial court for a new trial.

What should people take from this?

Help from an employer or other outside source does not lower what the person at fault must pay. And a party who wants to use medical records or an expert’s opinion must lay the groundwork the evidence rules require. Finally, an argument about jury instructions has to be raised clearly at trial for an appeals court to consider it.

Bottom line

Reversed and remanded for a new trial (Christiansen Forster, J., joined by Mortensen and Oliver, JJ.). Holmes won a verdict of more than $60,000 against Smith (¶ 19) but appealed. Four evidentiary errors “materially affected the presentation of both liability and damages” and were reasonably likely to have affected the verdict (¶ 52 & n.5, citing State v. Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶ 41, 417 P.3d 86). The jury instruction challenge was not preserved (¶ 24).

Issue 1: Burden-of-proof instruction on pre-existing conditions (correctness, ¶ 20): not reached

Holmes did not preserve her argument that the instructions failed to tell the jury Smith bore the burden on apportionment. The court agreed instructions must say who bears the burden on which claims and defenses (¶ 23). But the trial court refused only Holmes’s aggravation instruction for lack of evidence of aggravation, and Holmes never asked for a general burden instruction or a version without the aggravation language (¶¶ 23–24, citing Cove at Little Valley Homeowners Ass’n v. Traverse Ridge Special Service Dist., 2022 UT 23, ¶ 23, 513 P.3d 658).

Issue 2: Collateral source rule (correctness, ¶ 21): reversed

Excluding workplace accommodation evidence because the employer already supplied a VariDesk misapplied the collateral source rule. The rule applies even when it gives the plaintiff a windfall (¶¶ 26–27, citing Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, ¶ 37, 96 P.3d 893, and Gardner v. Norman, 2025 UT 47, ¶ 34, 582 P.3d 717). Smith’s alternative grounds failed: replacement-interval and warranty discrepancies go to weight, not admissibility (¶ 29), and any rule 9(h) special-damages pleading gap was no basis to affirm where the damages were disclosed, Smith deposed Layton on them, and rule 15 permits amendment (¶¶ 30–31; see also Cohn v. J. C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306, 311 (Utah 1975)).

Issue 3: Medical records under rule 803(6) (abuse of discretion, ¶ 21): reversed

Admitting Holmes’s medical records through Dr. Sonnenberg exceeded the court’s discretion because no qualified witness or certification established rule 803(6)’s conditions. He did not know who made the entries, when, or how they were kept (¶ 34). Apparent regularity and an expert’s reliance are not foundation (¶ 35, citing Belnap v. Graham, 2016 UT App 14, ¶ 24, 366 P.3d 852). A stipulation to authenticity is distinct from hearsay admissibility (¶ 36, citing Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 981 (Utah 1993), superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized in Lancer Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc., 2017 UT 8, 391 P.3d 218). Holmes did not raise a double-hearsay argument (¶ 32 n.3).

Issue 4: Life care planner’s opinions (abuse of discretion, ¶ 21): reversed

Excluding Layton’s opinions on workplace accommodations, vocational rehabilitation and work-life expectancy under rules 702 and 403 exceeded the court’s discretion. The court identified no flaw in her methods or data; projections beyond her fourteen-year work-life estimate were alternative calculations for the jury (¶¶ 39–40). Alternative damages scenarios do not create a substantial risk of confusion under rule 403 (¶ 41). Holmes did not waive the vocational rehabilitation point, since the court later barred the work-life testimony on which that testimony was conditioned (¶ 42).

Issue 5: Dr. Snook’s “low speed, low impact” opinion (abuse of discretion, ¶ 21): reversed

The orthopedic surgeon’s collision-speed opinion was admitted without the threshold showing rule 702 requires. Because it was expert testimony, rule 702 governed (¶¶ 45–46, citing State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶ 11, 147 P.3d 1176). The trial court asked only whether it was a general characterization with a factual basis, not whether it rested on reliable principles or methods; there was no showing of expertise in accident reconstruction or biomechanics (¶¶ 47–49). Smith’s reliance on the lack of acute injury indicators was not the trial court’s stated basis, and the questions at trial sought opinions on the collision itself (¶ 50).

Takeaways

  • An employer’s free accommodations do not reduce recoverable damages, even if a windfall results (¶¶ 26–27).
  • A stipulation to authenticity does not supply rule 803(6) foundation (¶ 36).
  • A treating or retained physician’s crash-severity opinion still needs a rule 702 reliability showing (¶¶ 47–49).
  • To preserve an instruction challenge, ask for the specific instruction or modification argued on appeal (¶ 24).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Holmes v. Smith
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 89
Case no.
20240613-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
June 4, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Holmes
Disposition
Reversed
At stake
A jury award of economic and noneconomic damages totaling more than $60,000 for injuries from a rear-end car accident, which the injured driver challenged as tainted by evidentiary errors

The panel

Michele M. Christiansen ForsterAuthor
David N. MortensenConcurred
Amy J. OliverConcurred
Trial court
Second District Court, Farmington Department · Judge Jennifer L. Valencia

Parties & counsel

Holmes — AppellantIndividual(s)Shaun L PeckLoren K. Peck
Smith — AppelleeIndividual(s)Kumen L. TaylorJeffery J. OwensEmily L. Rutter

Practice Tip

When offering medical records as business records, bring a certification or a witness who knows how the records were made; the treating expert's reliance on them and a stipulation to authenticity will not do (¶¶ 34–36).

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