Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Is a state license enough to open a treatment home in a rural zone? Sidwell v. Wasatch County

2026 UT App 67No. 20240911-CADecided Apr 30, 2026Real Property & Land UseReversed & Remanded

Holding

Because a license and a contract are distinct legal concepts, Cascade’s DHHS license did not satisfy Wasatch County Code § 16.21.17(B)(3)’s requirement that a residential facility for persons with disabilities in the RA-1 zone be “operated under contract with” DHHS, so the Board’s approval of the conditional use permit was illegal.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with the three people who challenged the permit and ordered that Cascade’s conditional use permit application be denied.

  • Under the Wasatch County Code, a residential facility for persons with disabilities in the RA-1 zone must be operated by DHHS or “operated under contract with” DHHS.
  • A DHHS license alone does not meet that requirement, because a license and a contract are different things.
  • The court did not decide whether denying the permit would violate federal disability or fair housing laws; that question was not before it.

What happened?

ULA, LLC, doing business as Cascade Academy (Cascade), wants to run Cascade House, a facility for up to eight girls ages 13 to 18 with severe anxiety disorders, with specialized treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder. The property is in Wasatch County’s RA-1 zone, a residential-agricultural zone meant to keep the county’s rural character.

In that zone, a “residential facility” for persons with disabilities needs a conditional use permit, which is permission to use land in a way the zone allows only if certain requirements are met. Cascade applied. The Wasatch County Planning Commission approved the permit, and the Wasatch County Board of Adjustment upheld that approval over objections from Dustin Sidwell, Marie Shelton, and Brian Myers.

The three asked the district court to review the Board’s decision. The district court sided with the county and Cascade and dismissed their petition. They appealed.

What was the main dispute?

The county code requires a facility like this to “[b]e operated by or operated under contract with” the Utah Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Everyone agreed Cascade has a DHHS license but no other contract with DHHS. Cascade argued its license counts as a contract. The challengers said a license and a contract are different.

What did the Court of Appeals decide?

It agreed with the challengers. The court read the county code itself, without deferring to the county’s or the district court’s reading. It explained that a license is a government permission to do something otherwise not allowed, while a contract is an agreement between parties that creates obligations they can enforce.

The court also pointed out that another part of the same code already requires the facility to meet DHHS standards, which covers licensing. Reading “contract” to mean “license” would make the contract requirement repeat that part for no reason.

What about Cascade’s other arguments?

Cascade said DHHS does not offer the kind of contracts the code describes. The court said nothing in the record showed that, and the plain word “contract” controls either way. Cascade’s remedy is to ask the county to change its code.

Cascade also said state law allows facilities to operate with only a license. The court held that the county may add requirements for a particular zone as long as it does not forbid what state law allows.

Finally, Cascade pointed to federal disability and fair housing laws. The court said no one had brought a claim under those laws, so that question was not before it, and it gave no opinion on it.

What happens now?

The case goes back to the district court, which must grant the challengers’ petition and send the matter to the Board to deny Cascade’s application. The court did not decide the challengers’ separate argument that Cascade House is really a treatment facility, not a residential one.

What should people take from this?

When a local code uses a specific word like “contract,” courts will give it its ordinary legal meaning. A business that cannot meet a zoning requirement may need to ask the county to change the rule.

Bottom line

Reversed and remanded with instructions (Harris, J., joined by Orme and Luthy, JJ.). Cascade’s DHHS license does not satisfy the Wasatch County Code (WCC) requirement that a residential facility for persons with disabilities in the RA-1 zone be “operated under contract with” DHHS, so the Board’s approval was “based on an incorrect interpretation of a land use regulation” and illegal under Utah Code § 17-79-1009(3)(c)(ii) (¶¶ 32, 40). The district court must grant the petition and send the matter to the Board for an order denying the application (¶ 41).

Issue 1: License versus “contract” under WCC § 16.21.17(B)(3) (correctness, ¶¶ 20, 25): reversed

A DHHS license is not the equivalent of being “operated under contract with” DHHS (¶ 32). The facts were undisputed, so the question was purely legal, reviewed for correctness with no deference to the county or the district court (¶¶ 24–25). Dictionary definitions and case law treat license and contract as distinct terms of art (¶¶ 27–28, following Slora v. Sun ‘n Fun Fly-In, Inc., 173 So. 3d 1099, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)), and the court has held “a license is not a contract” (¶ 29, quoting Bourgeous v. Department of Com., 2002 UT App 5, ¶ 14, 41 P.3d 461). Reading “contract” as “license” would make subsection (3) duplicate subsection (2)’s conformity-with-DHHS requirement (¶ 30, citing Bountiful City v. Baize, 2021 UT 9, ¶ 42, 487 P.3d 71), and would cut against the RA-1 zone’s purpose and the code’s limits on business operation of such facilities (¶ 31).

The court rejected Cascade’s counterarguments:

  • That DHHS does not offer such contracts: no record evidence supported it, the relevant time would be the 2002 enactment or 2006 amendment, and the plain meaning controls regardless; the remedy is a code amendment (¶¶ 33–35).
  • Conflict with state licensing statutes: those statutes require licensure but say nothing about added zoning requirements; an ordinance that does not “forbid[] that which the statute permits” is consistent with state law (¶ 36, quoting Salt Lake City v. Newman, 2005 UT App 191, ¶ 11, 113 P.3d 1007, aff’d, 2006 UT 69, 148 P.3d 931; see also Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Supplemental citations did not change this (n.5).
  • ADA and FHA: no party asserted a claim under either statute, Cascade conceded “this is not an accommodation case,” and the court offered no opinion on whether a later challenge would be proper (¶¶ 37–39).

The court also held the issue preserved because it was raised before the Board (n.4, citing A1 Pioneer Moving v. Labor Comm’n, 2021 UT App 115, ¶ 12 n.6, 502 P.3d 305), and noted no party claimed DHHS itself operates the facility (n.3).

Issue 2: Residential versus treatment facility (none stated, ¶ 23 n.2): not reached

The court did not reach the challengers’ argument that Cascade House is not residential, given its ruling on the contract issue, though it noted the Board did find the primary use residential (¶ 23 n.2).

Takeaways

  • Where an ordinance uses “contract,” licensure alone does not satisfy it (¶¶ 27–32).
  • A county may impose zoning requirements beyond state licensure without conflicting with state law if it does not countermand the licensure requirement (¶ 36).
  • Claims that a land use denial violates the ADA or FHA must be raised and litigated; the court will not resolve them when the case was framed only under the local code (¶¶ 38–39).
  • Raising an issue before a board of adjustment with fact-finding authority preserved it for judicial review here (n.4).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Sidwell v. Wasatch County
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 67
Case no.
20240911-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
April 30, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Who appealed
Sidwell
Disposition
Reversed and Remanded
At stake
A conditional use permit to operate Cascade House, an eight-bed residential treatment facility for teenage girls, on property in Wasatch County's RA-1 zone

The panel

Ryan M. HarrisAuthor
John D. LuthyConcurred
Gregory K. OrmeConcurred
Trial court
Fourth District Court, Heber Department · Judge Jennifer A. Mabey

Parties & counsel

Sidwell — AppellantIndividual(s)J. Craig SmithClayton H. PreeceJay L. Springer
Wasatch County — AppelleeOtherScott H. SweatAlex D. StoedterDavid L. MortensenMelanie R. ClarkElise M. Carter

Practice Tip

When a zoning code conditions a use on operation "under contract with" a state agency, look for an actual contractual relationship beyond licensure; the court read "contract" by its plain meaning even though the county and the district court had accepted a license (¶¶ 27–32, 35).

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Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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