Utah Supreme Court · Published Opinion

Can a bar that settles a drunk-driving claim sue the driver? RMB v. Celotto

2026 UT 19No. 20250061Decided Jul 23, 2026Personal Injury & TortsAffirmed

Holding

Read in context, “award” in Utah Code section 32B-15-302(1)(a) does not include amounts voluntarily paid under a settlement, so a party that settles a Dramshop Act claim cannot pursue contribution under that provision.

Key takeaways

The Utah Supreme Court sided with the driver, Corbin Celotto, holding that the two bars that settled could not make him share the cost.

  • Under Utah’s Dramshop Act, a party who voluntarily settles cannot use the Act’s contribution provision to make another person share the settlement cost.
  • The court read the word “award” in context: it means something imposed on a party by someone with authority to do so, not an amount a party agrees to pay.
  • An argument raised for the first time at oral argument will not be considered.

What happened?

Corbin Celotto was in a crash with another driver. The other driver sued Celotto for negligence and recklessness, claiming Celotto was drunk. He also sued five bars under Utah’s Dramshop Act, a law that makes sellers of alcohol liable for injuries caused by overserving, claiming they overserved Celotto before the crash.

Two bars were dismissed from the case. The other driver settled with Celotto. The three remaining bars settled with him for a combined $1 million.

Why was there still a lawsuit?

Two of the settling bars, RMB, Inc. and Shaman, Inc., brought claims against Celotto for contribution. Contribution is a claim asking another person who caused the injury to share the cost. The Dramshop Act allows “a person . . . against whom an award is made” under the Act to sue for contribution.

Celotto asked the district court for summary judgment, meaning a ruling without a trial. He argued that money paid in a voluntary settlement is not an “award.” The district court agreed and dismissed the bars’ claims. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed.

How did the case reach the Utah Supreme Court?

The bars asked the Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals’ decision, and the court agreed to do so. This kind of review is called certiorari.

What did the court decide?

It affirmed. The court admitted that, standing alone, “award” could be unclear, because courts sometimes loosely call a settlement payment a “settlement award.” But the court reads words in their setting.

Read in context, the statute speaks of an award “made” against a person. A settlement is not that. The court agreed with the Court of Appeals that an award is something imposed on a party by someone with authority to do so. The bars chose to settle and agreed to pay in exchange for dismissal of the claims, so no award was made against them.

The court also noted that the bars did not engage with all of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, which meant they did not meet their burden of persuading the court.

What about the bars’ other arguments?

The bars said the Act takes in older, judge-made contribution rules. The court found they never identified which rules they meant or showed that Utah recognized their version.

At oral argument, the bars said lawmakers could not have meant to bar contribution when most dramshop cases settle. The court would not consider an argument first raised at oral argument. It added that the argument would fail anyway. A court overrides plain wording as absurd only when no rational lawmaker could have intended it. Because the Act holds alcohol sellers liable without proof of traditional negligence, a lawmaker could reasonably allow contribution only when an award is forced on a party.

What happens now?

The dismissal of the bars’ contribution claims stands. The case is over.

What should people take from this?

Under the Dramshop Act, a bar that settles cannot later use the Act’s contribution provision to make the driver share what it paid. All five justices who heard the case joined the opinion.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Pohlman, A.C.J., joined by Petersen, Nielsen, Jorgensen, and Dent, JJ.). Durrant, C.J., recused and Hagen, J., stepped down; Jorgensen and Dent, JJ., substituted after reviewing the briefs and the argument recording. Section 32B-15-302(1)(a) of the Dramshop Act does not allow contribution for amounts paid under a voluntary settlement, because a settlement is not an award “made” against a party (¶¶ 15, 18, 25).

Issue 1: Does “award” include a voluntary settlement? (correctness, ¶ 12): affirmed (no error)

Read in context, “award” in the contribution provision is unambiguous and excludes voluntary settlements (¶ 18). The court acknowledged that the dictionary definitions do not appear to capture a settlement payment, but that courts sometimes call such payments a “settlement award,” see, e.g., Latham v. Off. of Recovery Servs., 2019 UT 51, ¶¶ 8, 13, 448 P.3d 1241, so the term read in isolation “could be unclear” (¶ 16). Applying the whole-text approach (¶¶ 14, 17), it adopted the Court of Appeals’ reading that the award is “a ‘thing’ being imposed on someone by someone with the authority to do so,” RMB Inc. v. Celotto, 2024 UT App 188, ¶ 14, 562 P.3d 1198 (¶ 18). The Bars agreed to pay in exchange for dismissal and did not argue the settlement amount was made against them (¶ 19).

Burden of persuasion (n.2): the Bars treated the Court of Appeals’ holding as resting on the word “award” alone, but that court also relied on the statute’s wider context. By not engaging with all of its reasoning, the Bars failed their burden, citing In re A.B., 2022 UT 39, ¶ 43, 523 P.3d 168 (¶ 19 n.2).

Common law: the Bars did not identify which contribution principles the Act incorporated or show that their version was recognized in Utah, so the court could not conclude the interpretation displaces any common law principle (¶ 21).

Absurdity: the policy argument that most dramshop cases settle was raised first at oral argument and not properly invoked in the brief, so it was untimely, citing Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 33, 416 P.3d 487 (¶ 22). It would fail anyway under the “narrow, exacting standard” of Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 28, 387 P.3d 1000. Given the Act’s form of strict liability, see Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, ¶ 10, 996 P.2d 540, a legislator reasonably could allow contribution only when an award is forced on a party (¶ 23).

Takeaways

  • A defendant who voluntarily settles a Dramshop Act claim is not a person “against whom an award is made” and cannot sue for contribution under section 32B-15-302(1)(a) (¶¶ 19, 24–25).
  • On certiorari, a petitioner must engage with every ground of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning or risk failing its burden of persuasion (¶ 19 n.2).
  • An absurdity argument must be briefed; the court will not address one raised first at oral argument (¶ 22).
  • A claim that a statute incorporates common law must identify the specific principles and show they were recognized in Utah (¶ 21).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
RMB v. Celotto
Court
Utah Supreme Court
Citation
2026 UT 19
Case no.
20250061
Filed
2025
Decided
July 23, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Who appealed
Celotto
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Two bars' contribution crossclaims against the driver after three bars settled the injured driver's Dramshop Act claims for a combined $1 million

The panel

Jill M. PohlmanAuthor
DentConcurred
Jay T. JorgensenConcurred
NielsenConcurred
Paige PetersenConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake County · Judge Patrick W. Corum

Parties & counsel

Celotto — AppellantBusinessTrent J. Waddoups
RMB — AppelleeIndividual(s)Bryan J. StoddardJonathan P. Barnes, Jr.

Practice Tip

Bars weighing settlement of a Dramshop Act claim should account for the holding that a voluntary settlement does not give rise to a contribution claim under section 32B-15-302(1)(a) (¶¶ 19, 24–25); and any absurdity argument must be made in the opening brief, not first at oral argument (¶ 22).

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