Does settling a dramshop claim eliminate your right to contribution under the Utah Alcoholic Product Liability Act? RMB v. Celotto Explained

Background and facts

After a motor-vehicle crash involving an allegedly intoxicated driver, Corbin Celotto, an injured motorist sued both Celotto and five bars under Utah’s Alcoholic Product Liability Act (commonly called the Dramshop Act), Utah Code sections 32B-15-101 to -302. Two bars were dismissed on summary judgment for lack of evidence of over-service. The remaining three bars — including RMB, Inc. and Shaman, Inc. — settled the injured driver’s claims for a combined $1 million. After the settlement, RMB and Shaman filed crossclaims against Celotto for contribution under section 32B-15-302(1)(a), which authorizes contribution by “a person . . . against whom an award is made under this chapter.” Celotto moved for summary judgment, arguing that a voluntary settlement is not an “award” within the meaning of the statute. The district court agreed and dismissed the crossclaims. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Key legal issues

The central question was whether the term “award” in section 32B-15-302(1)(a) encompasses amounts voluntarily paid pursuant to a settlement agreement, or is limited to adjudicated judgments imposed by a court, jury, or arbitrator. The bars also pressed arguments grounded in common law contribution principles and policy — specifically invoking the absurdity doctrine to argue that limiting contribution to litigated awards would gut the provision given that most cases settle.

Court’s analysis and holding

Reviewing the court of appeals’ decision for correctness, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The court applied the plain language of the contribution provision read in context, invoking the whole-text canon and emphasizing that “context is a primary determinant of meaning.” The court observed that a settlement is not an award made against a party — it is a payment a party voluntarily agrees to make. Even assuming the word “award” could colloquially encompass a settlement amount in other contexts, the phrase “against whom an award is made” cannot logically describe a party who voluntarily entered into a settlement. The court rejected the common law contribution argument because the bars failed to identify with precision what common law principles they claimed the legislature had incorporated. The court also declined to apply the absurdity doctrine, finding both that the policy argument was raised for the first time at oral argument and that a rational legislature could have deliberately limited contribution to adjudicated awards under the Dramshop Act’s strict-liability framework.

Practice implications

This decision has significant strategic consequences for bars and other distributors of alcoholic products facing dramshop liability. Under RMB v. Celotto, the statutory right of contribution under section 32B-15-302(1)(a) is triggered only by an adjudicated award — not a negotiated settlement. Practitioners advising clients in this context must evaluate at the outset whether preserving a contribution claim against an intoxicated patron outweighs the benefits of settlement. Once a client settles, that avenue closes. The decision also reinforces that arguments based on the absurdity doctrine must be fully briefed; raising them for the first time at oral argument will result in waiver. Finally, practitioners seeking to invoke common law principles to supplement or modify a statutory scheme must ground those arguments in specific, Utah-recognized common law rules and demonstrate how the statute incorporated them.