Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a driver who says he passed out be convicted for a fatal crash? State v. Lyman

2026 UT App 115No. 20240894-CADecided Jul 30, 2026Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

Sufficient evidence supported Lyman’s conviction for negligently operating a vehicle resulting in death whether or not he lost consciousness, the court properly refused his unforeseeable-medical-condition instruction, and any error in a “prima facie” speeding instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals ruled for the State on every issue and upheld Lyman’s conviction for negligently operating a vehicle resulting in death.

  • The State did not have to rule out every possibility that Lyman passed out; the jury decides whether that possibility left it with a reasonable doubt.
  • Even if Lyman did pass out, the jury could find that his fast, full-throttle driving before then caused the death.
  • A jury instruction calling any speed over the limit “prima facie evidence” was a problem, but here it did not affect the result.

What happened?

Asael Paul Lyman, who admitted being an alcoholic, picked up his grandson from kindergarten. On the way home he took the 9000 South off-ramp from Bangerter Highway, where the speed limit was 55 miles per hour. His truck’s data showed he was going 84 miles per hour at the top of the ramp with the accelerator fully pressed, reached 97 miles per hour, hit a concrete barrier, went over a concrete divider, ran a red light and hit another truck at 89 miles per hour. The other driver died at the scene.

Lyman’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.12 grams. Doctors found he was in atrial fibrillation, an irregular heart rhythm. He was charged with several crimes, and the jury convicted him of all of them. He appealed only the conviction for negligently operating a vehicle resulting in death.

What did Lyman argue?

His defense was that a heart problem made him lose consciousness, so his driving was not negligent. On appeal he argued that the evidence was too weak to convict, that the judge should have given his instruction about sudden medical conditions, that an instruction about speeding unfairly shifted the burden of proof to him, and that the judge wrongly kept out his son’s testimony.

Was the evidence enough?

Yes. The State’s experts said pressing the accelerator all the way down takes conscious effort, that the truck’s steering data showed Lyman straightening out after hitting the barrier, and that it is “very rare” for atrial fibrillation alone to cause fainting. The State did not have to disprove every possibility. And even if Lyman did pass out, the jury could find that his speeding at full throttle before that caused the death.

Did the judge have to give Lyman’s instruction?

No. The judge’s instruction on “intervening causes” (an unforeseeable event that completely breaks the link between someone’s fault and the harm) let Lyman argue his defense. His own instruction said a person is not negligent if a sudden medical condition strikes. The court said that was incomplete, because earlier careless driving can still be a cause even if a medical problem follows.

What about the speeding instruction?

The jury was told any speed over 55 is “prima facie evidence” (evidence that is enough on its own unless answered) that the speed is not reasonable. The court agreed this kind of wording can wrongly shift the burden to the defendant. But it held the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning it could not have changed the verdict. The State never argued that speeding alone proved negligence, and its case was strong.

Why was the son’s testimony kept out?

Lyman’s son wanted to say Lyman had made the drive hundreds of times without trouble. The court held that how well Lyman knew the road was not relevant, because neither side claimed the crash happened because he didn’t know it. Lyman had also already told the jury he knew the route.

What happens now?

The conviction stands. Because the court found at most one possible error, there were not several errors to add up into a reason for a new trial.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Christiansen Forster, J., joined by Tenney and Oliver, JJ.). Lyman crashed at 89 mph with a 0.12 blood alcohol concentration, killing another driver, and argued that atrial fibrillation caused him to lose consciousness. All four of his challenges and his cumulative-error argument failed (¶ 49).

Issue 1: Sufficiency of the evidence (correctness, ¶ 21): affirmed (no error)

The trial court correctly denied the motions for directed verdict and to arrest judgment. The State’s evidence (full throttle requiring conscious effort, steering input after hitting the barrier, and testimony that atrial fibrillation alone rarely causes fainting) supported a finding that Lyman stayed conscious (¶ 27). The State need not “rule out” the defense theory; whether it was a “real possibility” is for the jury (¶ 28, citing State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ¶ 37, 116 P.3d 305). Even if he lost consciousness, the jury could find that entering the ramp nearly 30 mph over the limit at full throttle was a but-for cause of the death (¶ 29).

Issue 2: Unforeseeable-medical-condition instruction (abuse of discretion, ¶ 22): affirmed (no error)

The court did not exceed its discretion by refusing Lyman’s instruction and giving a general intervening-cause instruction. The elements instruction required negligent operation “causing the death,” and the instructions together did not create the confusion found in State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶ 23, 285 P.3d 1183 (¶¶ 32–36). The intervening-cause instruction let Lyman argue his theory (¶ 35). His proposed instruction was incomplete, because prior negligent driving can survive a later medical event; cf. Richmond v. Bateman, 2024 UT App 103, ¶ 40, 554 P.3d 341 (¶ 36).

Issue 3: “Prima facie” speeding instruction (correctness, ¶ 23): affirmed (harmless error)

Any error in instructing that speed over 55 mph is “prima facie evidence” of unreasonable speed was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The language tracks Utah Code § 41-6a-601(3), but under State v. Crowley, 2014 UT App 33, ¶ 13, 320 P.3d 677, it can create an unconstitutional mandatory presumption, and the shared “reasonable and prudent” phrasing may have carried it into the negligence count (¶¶ 39–40). Following State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92, ¶ 32, 325 P.3d 855, the State never relied on the presumption and its case was strong (¶¶ 41–43).

Issue 4: Exclusion of the son’s testimony (abuse of discretion, ¶ 24): affirmed (no error)

Excluding testimony that Lyman had made the drive hundreds of times without incident was within the court’s discretion on relevance grounds under rules 401 and 402. The court did not reach the propensity rationale (¶ 44). Familiarity with the intersection was not a fact of consequence, since neither side attributed the crash to unfamiliarity, and the testimony was largely cumulative of Lyman’s own (¶¶ 46–47).

Issue 5: Cumulative error (none stated, ¶ 48 n.3): affirmed (no error)

With probable error on only one issue, there was nothing to cumulate (¶ 48 n.3, citing State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶ 39, 428 P.3d 1038).

Takeaways

  • The State need not disprove a defense theory outright; whether it raises reasonable doubt is for the jury (¶ 28).
  • A loss-of-consciousness defense may not defeat causation where negligent driving preceded the event (¶¶ 29, 36).
  • Instructions that repeat a statutory “prima facie” presumption can be error under Crowley, though here it was harmless (¶¶ 39–43).
  • Where the trial court gives two grounds for exclusion, the court may affirm on relevance alone (¶ 44).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Lyman
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 115
Case no.
20240894-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
July 30, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Lyman
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
A conviction for negligently operating a vehicle resulting in death after a crash that killed another driver

The panel

Michele M. Christiansen ForsterAuthor
Amy J. OliverConcurred
Ryan D. TenneyConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, West Jordan Department · Judge James D. Gardner

Parties & counsel

Lyman — AppellantIndividual(s)Nathalie S. Skibine
State — AppelleeState of UtahDerek E. BrownDaniel W. Boyer

Practice Tip

A proposed instruction that a sudden medical condition negates negligence may be refused as incomplete where the defendant's driving before the event could still be a proximate cause (¶ 36).

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