Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a judge decide what an unclear lease means without a trial? Burlington Coat v. Newgate Mall

2026 UT App 112No. 20250149-CADecided Jul 30, 2026Contracts & Business DisputesAffirmed

Holding

When a lease is ambiguous but the extrinsic evidence of the drafting parties’ intent is so one-sided that a reasonable factfinder could reach only one conclusion, the district court may resolve the ambiguity on summary judgment, as it properly did here for Burlington.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with Burlington, the tenant, and upheld its $4,717,312 judgment against Newgate, the mall’s landlord.

  • When a contract is unclear, what the parties meant is usually a question of fact, but a judge may decide it without a trial if the outside evidence points only one way.
  • Here, the only evidence of the original parties’ intent supported the tenant, Burlington, and the landlord offered none of its own.
  • Calling the tenant’s witness statement “self-serving” did not create a dispute that required a trial.

What happened?

In 2013, the companies that came before Burlington and Newgate signed a lease for store space at the Newgate Mall in Ogden. Newgate later became the landlord and Burlington the tenant. Dillard’s and Sears were two of the mall’s “anchor tenants,” the large stores that draw shoppers.

The lease had a “co-tenancy” clause, which ties a store’s rent to whether other stores stay open. It said Burlington could pay a reduced rent of 2% of net sales if “Dillard’s and Sears are not open and operating.” Another part let the landlord fix the problem if “Dillard’s and/or Sears” closed by bringing in a similar replacement store.

Sears left the mall in April 2018. In January 2023, Burlington sued, asking the court to declare that it could pay the reduced rent and to repay it for rent it had overpaid.

What did each side argue?

Burlington argued that if either store closed, then “Dillard’s and Sears” were not both open, so the reduced rent applied. Newgate argued that both stores had to close.

Burlington also offered a sworn statement from a lawyer who helped negotiate the lease for Burlington’s predecessor. He said the intent at the time was that the rent cut would apply when either store left. Newgate’s predecessor had dissolved, so Newgate had no evidence of what that company intended, and it did not question the lawyer under oath before trial.

What did the trial court do?

It ruled that the lease was ambiguous, meaning both sides’ readings were reasonable. It then looked at “extrinsic evidence,” which is evidence outside the contract itself, like drafts and witness statements. It found the lawyer’s statement undisputed and found that an earlier letter of intent backed it up. It granted “summary judgment,” a ruling without a trial, for Burlington. After a separate trial on damages, it entered judgment for $4,717,312.

What did the Court of Appeals decide?

It affirmed. When a contract is ambiguous, what the parties meant is a question of fact. But a judge can still decide it without a trial if the outside evidence is so one-sided that a reasonable person could reach only one conclusion.

Newgate did not dispute on appeal that the lease was ambiguous or that the evidence favored only Burlington. Instead, it attacked the lawyer’s statement as “self-serving” and contrary to the lease’s words. The court disagreed: since the lease could reasonably be read Burlington’s way, the statement was not contrary to the lease. The court also rejected Newgate’s argument that the letter of intent created a factual dispute, because that argument simply repeated the lease’s ambiguity.

Because the evidence resolved the question, there was no need to fall back on the rule that unclear wording is read against the party who wrote it.

What happens now?

Nothing goes back to the trial court. The judgment for Burlington stands.

What should people take from this?

A party who says a contract is unclear generally needs evidence of what the parties meant. Without it, the other side’s evidence may decide the case without a trial.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Orme, J., joined by Mortensen and Harris, JJ.). Article 1.25 of a mall lease let the tenant pay alternate rent if “Dillard’s and Sears are not open and operating” (¶ 3). After Sears closed, the district court found the provision ambiguous, resolved it for Burlington on the extrinsic evidence, and, after a bench trial on damages, entered judgment for $4,717,312 (¶¶ 10–13). Because the limited extrinsic evidence “one-sidedly supported” Burlington, summary judgment was proper (¶ 23).

Issue 1: Resolving an ambiguous lease on summary judgment with extrinsic evidence (correctness, ¶ 14): affirmed (no error)

The district court did not err in resolving Article 1.25’s ambiguity in Burlington’s favor on summary judgment. Where a contract is facially ambiguous, intent is a question of fact, but it may be decided on summary judgment “so long as the parol evidence submitted by the parties is so one-sided that a reasonable factfinder could reach but one conclusion” (¶¶ 17, 21, quoting Ocean 18 LLC v. Overage Refund Specialists LLC (In re Excess Proceeds from Foreclosure of 1107 Snowberry St.), 2020 UT App 54, ¶ 29, 474 P.3d 481; see also Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ¶ 24, 48 P.3d 918).

Newgate did not challenge the ambiguity ruling (¶ 15 n.5) or the conclusion that the extrinsic evidence supported only Burlington; its predecessor’s evidence was unavailable (¶ 18). Its attack on the attorney’s declaration as “self-serving” and contrary to the “and” in the text failed, because the court had already found Burlington’s reading reasonable, so the declaration could not be discredited as contrary to the plain language (¶ 19). The court read the declaration as stating both parties’ intent, and although Tangren Family Trust ex rel. Tangren v. Tangren, 2006 UT App 515, ¶ 9, 154 P.3d 180, aff’d, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326, prefers written documents to self-serving testimony, the documents here were “scant” and none contradicted the declaration (¶ 18 n.6). Newgate’s Letter of Intent argument only restated the textual ambiguity the extrinsic evidence resolved (¶¶ 20–21). Because the evidence resolved the ambiguity, there was no occasion to construe the provision against the drafter (¶ 21 n.7).

Takeaways

  • Intent under an ambiguous contract can be decided on summary judgment when the extrinsic evidence is one-sided (¶¶ 17, 21).
  • Once a reading is found reasonable, a declaration supporting it cannot be discredited as contrary to the text (¶ 19).
  • Re-arguing the contract’s language does not create a fact dispute about intent; the court described it as “the same ambiguity” the extrinsic evidence resolved (¶ 21).
  • Construction against the drafter was not reached because the extrinsic evidence resolved the ambiguity (¶ 21 n.7).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Burlington Coat v. Newgate Mall
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 112
Case no.
20250149-CA
Filed
2025
Decided
July 30, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Newgate Mall
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
A $4,717,312 judgment for a retail tenant that claimed reduced rent under a mall lease's co-tenancy provision after Sears closed

The panel

Gregory K. OrmeAuthor
Ryan M. HarrisConcurred
David N. MortensenConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Kara L. Pettit

Parties & counsel

Newgate Mall — AppellantBusinessRobert L. JanickiMichael L. Ford
Burlington Coat — AppelleeBusinessGeorge W. PrattJack L. Darrington

Practice Tip

A party opposing summary judgment on an ambiguous contract should offer its own evidence of intent rather than only attacking the other side's declaration or re-arguing the text; here that approach failed (¶¶ 18–22).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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