Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a court enter a restitution judgment 20 years later as a “clerical” fix? State v. Gonzalez

2026 UT App 146No. 20250365-CADecided Oct 1, 2026Criminal AppealsReversed

Holding

A district court could not deny rule 60(b) relief from a 2024 restitution judgment on the theory that it corrected a clerical failure to act on an unsigned 2004 Board of Pardons and Parole order, and the denial could not be affirmed on the State’s alternative grounds because neither a jurisdictional defect, a rule 60(b)(3)-only motion, nor a clerical (rather than judicial) error at the 2001 sentencing was apparent on the record.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with Gonzalez and told the district court to grant his motion for relief from the 2024 restitution judgment.

  • The district court’s reason for the 2024 judgment, an unsigned 2004 restitution order from the Board of Pardons and Parole, did not support it, and the State did not defend that reason on appeal.
  • A self-represented person’s motion is judged by what it argues, not only by its title.
  • A court can fix a clerical error at any time, but not a mistake in its own reasoning or decision, and the record did not show any clerical error at the 2001 sentencing.

What happened?

In 2001, Damon Russell Gonzalez pled guilty to absconding while on parole, a third-degree felony. The district court sentenced him to prison and ordered him to pay $5,500 in restitution (money paid to make up for a loss) “as a condition of parole.” He paid $2,145 while on parole. When his sentence ended in June 2006, $3,355 was still unpaid.

Nothing happened for nearly eighteen years. In April 2024, the Office of State Debt Collection took his tax refund, claiming he owed $9,857.53. Gonzalez wrote back that no civil judgment had ever been entered against him.

How did a judgment appear?

The debt collection office then sent the court documents from 2004, including letters and an order of restitution from the Board of Pardons and Parole (the Board). None of them were signed. In June and August 2024, the court clerk made docket entries recording a $3,355 judgment. No judge signed a separate judgment.

Gonzalez, without a lawyer at first, asked the court to undo the judgment under rule 60(b), the rule that lets a court relieve a party from a judgment for listed reasons. The court refused. It ruled that it had meant to enter a judgment in 2004, and that the failure to do so was a clerical error, a recordkeeping slip that a court can fix at any time.

What did the Court of Appeals decide?

It reversed. Gonzalez pointed out, and the court agreed, that the Board’s order did not count because it was never signed and the time to sign it had long passed. The State did not defend the district court’s reasoning.

Instead, the State offered three other reasons to keep the judgment. The court rejected all three:

  • Jurisdiction (the court’s power to decide). Both sides accepted that the 2024 docket entries were a final judgment, and no lack of power to decide showed up in the record.
  • The motion’s title. Gonzalez’s motion named only the part of rule 60(b) about fraud and misconduct. But courts look at what a motion actually argues, and are lenient with people who represent themselves. His motion also argued the order was unsigned and that there was no clerical error, and everyone, including the judge, treated those arguments as part of the case.
  • A 2001 clerical error. The record did not show the court made any error at sentencing. The plea agreement was not in the record, the sentence tied restitution to parole, and the statutes then could plausibly be read to let the Board handle restitution. Even if the court read the law wrong, that would be a judicial error, a mistake in reasoning, which cannot be fixed as clerical.

What happens now?

The case goes back to the district court with instructions to grant Gonzalez’s motion for relief from the judgment.

What should people take from this?

A court may correct a true recordkeeping slip at any time, but it cannot use that power to change a decision it made on purpose. And a self-represented person’s filing is read for what it argues, not just for its label.

Bottom line

Reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the motion (Harris, J., joined by Orme and Tenney, JJ.) (¶ 38). The district court treated clerk’s docket entries in 2024 as a civil judgment for $3,355 in unpaid restitution and denied relief on the theory that it had intended to enter judgment in 2004 on an unsigned Board of Pardons and Parole order (¶¶ 8–9, 13). That basis is “infirm,” and none of the State’s three alternative grounds for affirmance is apparent on the record (¶¶ 15–16, 38).

Issue 1: Denial of rule 60(b) relief from the 2024 restitution judgment (mixed, ¶ 14): reversed

The district court erred in denying the motion, and the court declined each alternative ground the State offered for affirmance. Review of a rule 60(b) denial is generally for abuse of discretion, with findings reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions for correctness (¶ 14).

The court’s stated basis. Gonzalez “correctly” argued the Board’s order was ineffective because it was unsigned and the statutory period to sign it had passed, following Simper v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 2024 UT App 122, ¶¶ 12, 17, 557 P.3d 240. The State did not defend the ruling on this basis (¶ 15). An appellate court may affirm on any ground apparent on the record, Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (¶ 16).

Jurisdiction. The State argued that “under Gonzalez’s theory” the judgment was not final until 150 days after the docket entries under rule 58A(e)(2), so the motion was premature (¶ 17). Neither party challenged the district court’s conclusion that the docket entries were a judgment, so the court presumed it correct, Williamson v. Farrell, 2019 UT App 123, ¶ 12, 447 P.3d 131. No jurisdictional defect was apparent and no party actually argued one (¶¶ 19–21).

Scope of the motion. The pro se motion’s caption cited only rule 60(b)(3), but substance controls, Bishop v. GenTec Inc., 2002 UT 36, ¶ 28, 48 P.3d 218, especially for self-represented litigants, Noor v. State, 2019 UT 3, ¶ 57, 435 P.3d 221 (¶ 23). The body argued the unsigned order and the absence of clerical error, which invoke rule 60(b)(4) and (6); the reply named those subsections, the State responded on the merits, and the court called the clerical-error question “dispositive” (¶¶ 24–26).

Clerical error in 2001. Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reaches clerical errors, not judicial ones, State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ¶ 14, 218 P.3d 610; State v. Wynn, 2017 UT App 211, ¶ 28, 407 P.3d 1113 (¶ 29). The record lacked the plea agreement, the sentence imposed restitution “as a condition of parole,” and the Board took over supervision of payments (¶¶ 31, 33). The 2001 statutes, Utah Code § 76-3-201(4) and § 77-27-6(1), could plausibly be read to allow Board-ordered restitution, as the State itself once argued in State v. Grant, 2021 UT App 104, 499 P.3d 176 (¶ 36). A misreading of those statutes would be judicial error (¶ 35). So neither an error nor a clerical one was apparent (¶ 37).

Disposition

The denial is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to grant Gonzalez’s motion (¶ 38).

Takeaways

  • Rule 30(b) and rule 60(a) cannot repair an intentional choice made after interpreting the governing statutes, “correctly or not” (¶ 35).
  • An alternative ground for affirmance must be apparent on the record; gaps such as a missing plea agreement cut against it (¶¶ 31, 37).
  • A pro se rule 60(b) motion is read by its substance, particularly where the parties and court litigated the uncaptioned subsections (¶¶ 23–25).
  • An unchallenged determination below is presumed correct, which can defeat a jurisdictional argument framed only “under” the opponent’s theory (¶¶ 19–21).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Gonzalez
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 146
Case no.
20250365-CA
Filed
2025
Decided
October 1, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Gonzalez
Disposition
Reversed
At stake
A 2024 civil judgment for $3,355 in unpaid restitution, plus interest, entered against Gonzalez as a supposed correction of a clerical error from years earlier

The panel

Ryan M. HarrisAuthor
Gregory K. OrmeConcurred
Ryan D. TenneyConcurred
Trial court
Second District Court, Ogden Department · Judge Reuben J. Renstrom

Parties & counsel

Gonzalez — AppellantIndividual(s)Troy L. BooherJ. Frederic Voros Jr.LaShel ShawRichard G. HampDavid A. FergusonNeal G. Hamilton
State — AppelleeState of UtahDerek E. BrownAndrew DymekJacob D. Mortensen

Practice Tip

When the other side relies on rule 30(b) to enter a long-delayed judgment, test whether any omission could have been a deliberate choice under the statutes then in force, because a choice made after interpreting the law, "correctly or not," is judicial error that rule 30(b) cannot fix (¶ 35).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

About these Decision Summaries

Lotus Appellate Law publishes these summaries to keep practitioners informed — not as legal advice. Each case turns on its own facts. If a decision here is relevant to your matter, we’re happy to discuss it.