Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a parent challenge DCFS’s work in earlier, closed cases? In re B.J.

2026 UT App 144No. 20250836-CADecided Sep 24, 2026Juvenile & Child WelfareAffirmed

Holding

For Utah Code section 80-4-301(4)(a), “case” includes any past proceeding involving the same child and parent in which DCFS was ordered to provide reunification services, but Mother did not show that DCFS’s efforts were unreasonable, that the ADA was violated, or that termination was against the children’s best interests.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the juvenile court’s order ending the mother’s parental rights to three of her children.

  • When the State seeks termination, a parent may argue that DCFS failed to make reasonable reunification efforts in earlier removal proceedings involving the same child, even if those proceedings ended with the children going home.
  • Under the ADA, the parent generally has to ask DCFS for the accommodation the parent needs; DCFS does not have to come up with ones the parent never requested.
  • The court said reasonable efforts must be “a fair and serious attempt at reunification, not a perfect one.”

What happened?

The opinion refers to the mother, C.D., as “Mother” and to the children by their initials. The State’s child welfare agency, the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), removed her children three times.

The first removal, in 2022, followed reports of neglect and unsanitary living conditions. The children were placed with their father, and the case closed in February 2023. They were removed again in August 2023 after reports that they had been left unsupervised. That proceeding closed in August 2024 with B.J., C.J., and S.W. returned to Mother. Their sister H.J. was placed with an aunt, by agreement of the parties.

In September 2024 Mother was arrested for a probation violation and the children were removed a third time. The court granted DCFS’s request to stop offering reunification services, meaning help aimed at getting the family back together. After a June 2025 trial, it ended Mother’s parental rights to B.J., C.J., and S.W.

What did Mother argue?

She made three arguments. DCFS had not made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. DCFS had not accommodated her mental health condition, later diagnosed as borderline personality disorder, as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a federal law against disability discrimination, requires. And ending her rights was not in the children’s best interests.

Could she challenge DCFS’s work in the earlier proceedings?

Yes. The State and the guardian ad litem (the lawyer for the children) argued that the earlier proceedings closed without an appeal and could not be reviewed. The court disagreed. It held that the word “case” in the statute includes earlier proceedings with the same child and parent in which DCFS was ordered to provide reunification services. One reason: Mother got her children back each time, so she likely could not have appealed then.

Did DCFS make reasonable efforts?

The court held that Mother did not show it failed. DCFS could act only on what it knew, and it did not learn of the borderline personality disorder diagnosis until the third proceeding. The juvenile court acknowledged that DCFS did not always follow its own policies. But it found that Mother did not seriously take part in the services she was offered.

What about the ADA?

The court held that DCFS did not violate it. A parent has to ask for the accommodation she needs, and Mother never asked DCFS for the specialized therapy she now says she should have had. She also did not show that the accommodation would have changed the outcome.

Was ending her rights in the children’s best interests?

The court found no error. The juvenile court did not have to accept Mother’s expert’s opinions. It explained why it chose adoption over a permanent custody and guardianship, an arrangement that gives another adult custody without ending the parent’s rights. It also explained why the children did better in separate homes.

What happens now?

The order ending Mother’s parental rights to the three children stands.

What should people take from this?

A parent can raise DCFS’s failures in earlier closed proceedings when the State later asks to end parental rights. But the court will still look at whether DCFS made a fair and serious effort and whether the parent took part in the services offered.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Tenney, J., joined by Orme and Harris, JJ.). The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights to B.J., C.J., and S.W. after three removal proceedings and a three-day trial (¶¶ 1, 58). The court agreed with Mother that she could contest reasonable efforts in the two earlier, closed proceedings (¶ 75). It rejected each of her challenges on the merits (¶ 114).

Issue 1: Reasonable efforts, including the earlier proceedings (mixed, ¶ 59): affirmed (no error)

Mother did not carry her burden of showing that the reasonable-efforts findings were clearly erroneous (¶ 87).

Scope. The State and the GAL argued that the closed proceedings were unreviewable. The court found “case” in Utah Code § 80-4-301(4)(a) ambiguous (¶ 68) and adopted Mother’s broader reading (¶ 75). Its reasons were the totality-of-the-circumstances focus of § 80-4-301(1) and § 80-4-104(12)(b) (¶¶ 69, 72), single-docket juvenile practice (¶ 70), and the link § 80-3-406(5)(h) draws to prior removals (¶ 71). It also noted that a reunified parent likely could not have appealed, citing Phillips v. Henderson, 2024 UT 19, ¶ 10, 552 P.3d 195 (¶¶ 73–74).

Merits. DCFS is judged on what it knew or reasonably should have known at the time, not by hindsight (¶ 82). It ordered treatment consistent with the 2022 diagnoses, and it did not learn of the borderline personality disorder diagnosis until the third proceeding (¶¶ 80–82). The other alleged failures, such as discovery, policy lapses and the UFACET tool, did not establish a lack of reasonable efforts, alone or together (¶¶ 83–85). The court noted that “a reasonable effort is a fair and serious attempt at reunification, not a perfect one” (¶ 85, quoting In re L.J., 2026 UT App 14, ¶ 18, 586 P.3d 531). Reunification is a “two way street,” and Mother did not engage with the services provided (¶¶ 86–87). The legislative audit was outside the record and was not considered (¶ 87 n.13).

Issue 2: ADA accommodations (clearly erroneous, ¶ 60): affirmed (no error)

Mother did not show that DCFS violated the ADA (¶¶ 91, 101). First, the agency has no affirmative duty to identify accommodations the parent did not request, under In re D.R., 2022 UT App 124, ¶ 13, 521 P.3d 545, and Mother never asked DCFS for DBT (¶¶ 92–94). Second, she did not show that any lack of accommodation affected her engagement. The testimony linked DBT to the CBT she had already been prescribed and gave a poor prognosis given her “sporadic treatment interventions” (¶¶ 95–99). The court deferred to the juvenile court’s credibility finding on her promise to take treatment seriously (¶ 100). It did not decide whether her diagnoses qualify as a disability (¶ 91 n.15).

Issue 3: Best interests (clearly erroneous, ¶ 61): affirmed (no error)

The best-interest determination was not against the clear weight of the evidence (¶ 103). The court was free to reject Expert’s views, and its detailed findings rested on other testimony (¶¶ 104–107). It considered permanent custody and guardianship on the record, as In re K.Y., 2022 UT App 149, ¶ 37, 523 P.3d 1159 requires, and explained why it chose termination (¶¶ 108–110). H.J.’s stipulated guardianship did not bind the court as to the other children (¶ 110 n.17). The findings on sibling relationships and separate placements supported the ruling (¶¶ 111–113).

Takeaways

  • In a termination case, a parent may argue that DCFS failed to make reasonable efforts in prior removal proceedings with the same child in which services were ordered (¶ 75).
  • Reasonable efforts are measured by what DCFS knew or reasonably should have known at the time (¶ 82).
  • Make ADA accommodation requests to DCFS specifically and on the record (¶¶ 92–94).
  • Material outside the record, such as a legislative audit, will not be considered on appeal (¶ 87 n.13).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
In re B.J.
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 144
Case no.
20250836-CA
Filed
2025
Decided
September 24, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Termination of Mother's parental rights to three of her children, B.J., C.J., and S.W.

The panel

Ryan D. TenneyAuthor
Ryan M. HarrisConcurred
Gregory K. OrmeConcurred
Trial court
First Juvenile Court, Logan Department · Judge Bryan P. Galloway

Parties & counsel

Appellant — AppellantIndividual(s)Alexandra MareschalKirstin NormanJason B. Richards
Appellee — AppelleeGovernment agencyDerek E. BrownDeborah A. WoodJohn M. Peterson
Guardian ad litemOtherMartha PierceAlisha GilesHeath Haacke

Practice Tip

When DCFS relies on earlier removals to seek termination, a parent may challenge the reasonable efforts made in those earlier proceedings (¶ 75). Any ADA accommodation, though, must be specifically requested from DCFS, because the agency need not identify accommodations the parent never asked for (¶¶ 92–94).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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