Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can I get my lawyer’s lien removed if I agreed to fee arbitration? Glenn v. Keane

2012 UT App 178No. 20120240-CADecided Jun 28, 2012Contracts & Business DisputesAffirmed

Holding

An attorney’s lien expressly authorized by Utah Code § 38-2-7 is not a wrongful lien subject to removal under § 38-9-1(6), and a party who invoked and agreed to fee arbitration cannot claim the court erred in requiring it.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with Walter T. Keane and left the $1800 fee award and the dismissal of Glenn’s wrongful lien petition in place.

  • A party who invoked a fee arbitration clause and agreed to arbitrate could not later argue that the court erred by ordering arbitration.
  • An attorney’s lien that the attorney’s lien statute expressly allows is not a “wrongful lien” that can be removed under the wrongful lien statute.
  • Glenn’s new argument that the award broke public policy had not been raised in the district court, and the court found no basis for it anyway.

What happened?

Walter T. Keane filed an attorney’s lien to secure payment of his fees. A lien is a legal claim against property that secures a debt. Endre’ Glenn filed a petition in the district court asking it to remove the lien as a “wrongful lien” under Utah’s wrongful lien statute.

At a hearing on that petition, Glenn disputed the fee Keane claimed. He also pointed out that their retainer agreement required any fee dispute to go to arbitration, a private process where a neutral panel decides the dispute instead of a judge. Glenn agreed to arbitrate.

The Utah State Bar’s fee arbitration panel awarded Keane $1800 in attorney fees. The district court denied Glenn’s motion to vacate (cancel) the award, confirmed the award, and dismissed his wrongful lien petition. Glenn appealed and represented himself.

What did Glenn argue?

He made two arguments. First, he said the court was wrong to send the dispute to arbitration, because that denied him the statutory remedy of asking the court to remove a wrongful lien. Second, he said the award should be thrown out because it went against public policy.

What did the court decide about the arbitration and the lien?

The Court of Appeals rejected the first argument. The retainer agreement required arbitration, Glenn himself raised that requirement, and he agreed to arbitrate. So he could not now complain that the court made the parties arbitrate.

The court also said arbitration did not stop Glenn from seeking removal of the lien. The problem was that only a lien found to be wrongful can be removed. Under the statute, a lien is wrongful if, when recorded, it was not expressly allowed by a statute, a court order or judgment, or a document the property owner signed. Keane’s lien was expressly allowed by the attorney’s lien statute, and the arbitration award supported his $1800 fee claim. Glenn had the chance to pursue removal but lost on the merits.

What about the public policy argument?

Glenn admitted he raised this argument for the first time on appeal. Courts usually will not consider an issue that was not first presented to the trial court unless there was plain error (an obvious and harmful mistake) or exceptional circumstances.

The court added that even if it did consider the argument, Glenn showed no reason to think the award violated a “well-defined and dominant public policy” of Utah. That is the test for setting aside an award on public policy grounds under Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996).

What happens now?

Nothing more happens in the case. The court affirmed the judgment, so the $1800 award stands and the dismissal of the wrongful lien petition stands.

What should people take from this?

A party who asks for arbitration and agrees to it will have a hard time later claiming the court erred by ordering it. And a lien that a statute expressly allows does not count as a “wrongful lien” under the wrongful lien statute.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; Davis, Thorne, and Christiansen, JJ.), decided on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition (¶¶ 1, 4). Glenn, pro se, appealed a judgment that denied his motion to vacate a Utah State Bar fee arbitration award, confirmed the panel’s $1800 award to Walter T. Keane, and dismissed Glenn’s petition for a wrongful lien injunction (¶ 1). Keane’s attorney’s lien was expressly authorized by statute, so it was not wrongful (¶ 2).

Issue 1: Fee arbitration and the wrongful lien petition (none stated, ¶ 2): affirmed (no error)

The district court did not err by requiring fee arbitration or by dismissing the wrongful lien petition. Glenn raised the retainer agreement’s fee-arbitration requirement himself at the hearing on his petition and agreed to arbitrate, so he “cannot now argue” that ordering arbitration was error (¶ 2). Arbitration also did not bar the statutory remedy under Utah Code § 38-9-7; only a lien determined to be wrongful can be removed, and under § 38-9-1(6) a lien is not wrongful if it is expressly authorized by statute. Keane’s notice of lien was expressly authorized by the attorney’s lien statute, § 38-2-7, and the award supported his $1800 claim. Glenn could pursue removal but “failed to prevail on the merits” (¶ 2).

Issue 2: Public policy challenge to the award (none stated, ¶ 3): affirmed (no error)

The court rejected Glenn’s request to vacate the award under the public policy exception. Glenn conceded the claim was raised for the first time on appeal and was unpreserved (¶ 3). The court restated the preservation rule from State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶ 16, 94 P.3d 186, and 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801. It did not apply plain error or exceptional circumstances. It held instead that even if it considered the claim, Glenn showed no basis that the award violated “a well-defined and dominant public policy,” the standard under Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996) (¶ 3).

Takeaways

  • A party who invoked a contractual fee-arbitration clause and agreed to arbitrate could not challenge the order requiring arbitration (¶ 2).
  • An attorney’s lien expressly authorized by Utah Code § 38-2-7 is not a wrongful lien under § 38-9-1(6), and a petition to remove it fails on the merits (¶ 2).
  • A public policy challenge to an arbitration award raised for the first time on appeal faces the preservation bar, and it still requires a showing that the award violates a well-defined and dominant Utah public policy (¶ 3).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
Glenn v. Keane
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2012 UT App 178
Case no.
20120240-CA
Filed
2012
Decided
June 28, 2012
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Glenn
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
A fee arbitration panel's $1800 attorney fee award to Walter T. Keane and Glenn's petition to remove Keane's attorney's lien as wrongful

The panel

James Z. DavisPer curiam
Michele M. Christiansen ForsterPer curiam
William A. Thorne Jr.Per curiam
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Kate A. Toomey

Parties & counsel

Glenn — AppellantIndividual(s)Self-represented
Keane — AppelleeOther

Practice Tip

A party who invokes a fee-arbitration clause and agrees to arbitrate may be unable to challenge the arbitration order later. A wrongful lien petition against an attorney's lien authorized by § 38-2-7 fails because the lien is not wrongful (¶ 2).

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