Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can a parent get more time before losing parental rights? In re C.J. (S.H. v. State)

2013 UT App 284No. 20130885-CADecided Nov 29, 2013Juvenile & Child WelfareAffirmed

Holding

The evidence supported terminating Mother’s parental rights under Utah Code section 78A-6-507(1)(d) and (e) and the best-interests determination, and the juvenile court did not err in ending reunification services when Mother had made no effort to comply.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the juvenile court’s decision ending the mother’s parental rights to C.J.

  • The court upheld the termination because the evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings, and it would not reweigh that evidence.
  • A drug and alcohol evaluation obtained the morning of trial, and a new promise to comply, did not outweigh months of not taking part in services.
  • Under the statute the court quoted, a juvenile court “may terminate” reunification services “at any time.”

What happened?

After an April 2013 hearing, the juvenile court found that C.J. was neglected by his mother, S.H., based on her admission to the State’s allegations. The court ordered the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) to provide reunification services, which are services meant to help a parent get a child back. Those services depended on the mother entering residential drug treatment.

Her plan required a substance abuse evaluation, a domestic violence assessment, random drug tests, a psychological evaluation, drug court screening, and residential drug treatment.

At a June 2013 hearing, the court found she had not cooperated with drug testing, had not entered treatment or attended drug court, and had visited C.J. only once. In July 2013 the court ended reunification services and changed the goal to adoption.

What did the mother argue?

At the September 2013 trial, the mother asked for more time. She brought a drug and alcohol evaluation she got that morning and said she was now willing to start treatment and drug testing.

On appeal, she argued the evidence did not support ending her rights. She said she was drug free, had stable housing, and could support C.J. She also argued she could not finish treatment only because the court ended her services too soon.

What did the court decide?

The Court of Appeals affirmed. It would overturn the decision only if it was against the clear weight of the evidence, and it would not reweigh the evidence.

The court held the evidence “amply supports” two grounds for termination: the mother had not fixed the problems that led to C.J.’s removal despite DCFS’s efforts, and she showed a “failure of parental adjustment,” meaning she had not corrected those problems within a reasonable time.

The mother’s claims rested almost entirely on her own testimony. Her testimony showed she was still unemployed, had trouble supporting herself, and was still living with a relative. She had not finished any drug treatment she had tried.

On the services question, the court noted the mother had taken no steps at all in the two months after the first hearing, did not dispute the DCFS report, and did not ask for more time then. A parent is not entitled to any set period of services.

What about the child’s best interests?

The juvenile court found that the foster family had made C.J. part of their family, given him a safe and caring home, gotten him medical care and physical therapy, and wanted to adopt him. The mother argued only that she needed more time. Because she did not challenge those findings, the court held her best-interests argument had no merit.

What happens now?

The termination stands. Nothing was sent back to the juvenile court.

What should people take from this?

In this case, a late start on required services did not outweigh a record of not taking part. The court looked at the whole record, not just the parent’s own account of her progress.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; Orme, McHugh, and Roth, JJ.). Because “a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the evidence,” the court would not reweigh it and upheld the termination of S.H.’s (Mother’s) parental rights to C.J. (¶¶ 2, 9).

Issue 1: Termination of parental rights (clearly erroneous, ¶ 4): affirmed (no error)

The court held that the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights stood because “a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the evidence,” both on the grounds for termination and on best interests (¶¶ 8–9).

Part 1: Grounds for termination (¶¶ 4–7)

The evidence amply supported termination under Utah Code section 78A-6-507(1)(d) (failure to remedy despite DCFS’s diligent efforts) and (1)(e) (failure of parental adjustment, defined in section 78A-6-502(2)) (¶ 4). Mother’s claims that she was drug free with stable housing and income rested almost entirely on her own testimony and ignored the totality of the evidence (¶ 5). Applying In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 13, 171 P.3d 435, the court held her evidence of present parenting ability was “so insubstantial and speculative” that the juvenile court did not err in weighing it against her past conduct: she remained unemployed, lived with a relative, had finished no drug treatment, and got a new evaluation only the morning of trial (¶ 6).

Her argument that she could not complete treatment because services were cut off failed too. She had taken no steps in the two months between adjudication and the permanency hearing, did not dispute the DCFS report, and did not request an extension. She was not entitled to any particular period of services; under section 78A-6-312(14)(a) the court “may terminate those services at any time,” and section 78A-6-314(4) requires termination of services if the child is not returned at the permanency hearing (¶ 7).

Part 2: Best interests and strict necessity (¶ 8)

The best-interests challenge was without merit. Mother argued only that termination was not “strictly necessary” because she planned future treatment and needed more time. That argument did not address the findings that the foster family had integrated C.J., provided a safe and nurturing home, obtained medical care and physical therapy for him, and wished to adopt (¶ 8).

Takeaways

  • A parent’s own testimony about recovery, set against an undisputed record of non-participation, will not show the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence (¶¶ 5–6).
  • Failing to dispute a DCFS report or request an extension at the permanency hearing undercut the later claim that services ended too soon (¶ 7).
  • A best-interests challenge that does not engage the juvenile court’s specific findings about the child’s placement fails (¶ 8).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
In re C.J. (S.H. v. State)
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2013 UT App 284
Case no.
20130885-CA
Filed
2013
Decided
November 29, 2013
Opinion type
Per curiam
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Termination of a mother's parental rights to her child, C.J.

The panel

Carolyn B. McHughPer curiam
Gregory K. OrmePer curiam
Stephen L. RothPer curiam
Trial court
Third Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Andrew A. Valdez

Parties & counsel

Appellant — AppellantIndividual(s)Sophia Moore
Appellee — AppelleeGovernment agencyJohn E. SwallowCarol L.C. Verdoia
Guardian ad litemOtherMartha Pierce

Practice Tip

If a parent needs more time for services, the request and any dispute of the DCFS report should be made at the permanency hearing; here the absence of both weighed against the parent's later claim that services ended too soon (¶ 7).

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