Can a deficient expert disclosure in a Utah divorce be harmless even after the opposing party forgoes discovery? Paulson v. Paulson Explained

Background and facts

Christopher and Trishna Paulson married in 1992 after signing a premarital agreement governed by California law that classified virtually all property acquired during the marriage as the acquiring spouse’s separate property, with cash salary as the sole community asset. After twenty-six years of marriage and a 2018 divorce petition, extensive litigation followed over sixteen parcels of property, Christopher’s alimony claim, attorney fees, and a motion to disqualify the trial judge. The trial court excluded Christopher’s financial expert under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26 for a deficient disclosure, then granted summary judgment against his alimony claim for lack of evidence of financial need. It also denied attorney fees, reasoning that Christopher had access to over $1.2 million in funds and that the premarital agreement barred any claim against Trishna’s separate property.

Key legal issues

The court addressed four distinct issues: (1) whether the expert disclosure was deficient under rule 26 and, if so, whether the deficiency was harmless; (2) whether Trishna’s commingling of separate funds in the joint account, the joint titling of assets, or the exhaustion tracing methodology warranted reversal of the property classifications; (3) whether the premarital agreement barred a statutory attorney fees award under Utah Code section 81-1-203(1); and (4) whether the trial judge’s prior attorney-client relationship with a lawyer at opposing counsel’s firm created an appearance of bias requiring disqualification.

Court’s analysis and holding

The court affirmed that Christopher’s expert disclosure was deficient—listing only broad topic categories rather than a summary of opinions and case-specific data as required by rule 26—and rejected his attempt to distinguish RJWMedia Inc. v. Heath on the ground that it addressed non-retained experts. However, the court reversed the exclusion as an abuse of discretion on harmlessness: Christopher had provided a complete expert report three weeks after his disclosure and offered to allow deposition, and no trial date had been set given COVID-19 restrictions. The resulting summary judgment on alimony was also reversed. On property issues, the court affirmed all sixteen partial summary judgments, holding that Christopher failed to meaningfully engage with the trial court’s reasoning on commingling, transmutation under California Family Code section 852(a), and exhaustion tracing—each argument was either inadequately briefed or unpreserved. The court also held that the premarital agreement could not be read to bar attorney fees under section 81-1-203(1), which rests on the court’s equitable power rather than community property law, and that the trial court abused its discretion by counting funds already applied to Christopher’s living expenses, the rental value of the marital home, and amounts ordered repaid to Trishna as available to pay attorney fees. The denial of the disqualification motion was affirmed because, once the prior attorney-client relationship had ended, no reasonable person would perceive an appearance of bias from a co-firm attorney’s later representation of the opposing party.

Practice implications

Practitioners should serve complete rule 26 expert disclosures from the outset, but this decision confirms that prompt remediation—delivering a full report and offering deposition access before a trial date is set—can defeat a sanctions motion. Counsel opposing a deficient disclosure should carefully weigh whether forgoing discovery options creates a strategic risk that a court will later find the violation harmless. On attorney fees, Paulson reinforces Krajeski v. Krajeski‘s holding that the separate or marital character of disputed assets is irrelevant to a section 81-1-203(1) award, and clarifies that only funds genuinely available—not those earmarked for expenses or ordered repaid—may be counted against a claimed need. Finally, practitioners pursuing transmutation arguments under a California-law premarital agreement must cite authority explaining why standard transaction documents satisfy the express declaration requirement of California Family Code section 852(a); conclusory assertions will not suffice.