Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a prenup stop me from asking for divorce attorney fees? Paulson v. Paulson

2026 UT App 108No. 20220914-CADecided Jul 16, 2026Family LawAffirmed/Reversed in part

Holding

Excluding a retained expert for a deficient rule 26 disclosure exceeded the trial court’s discretion where the expert report and deposition offer cured any harm before trial, and a premarital agreement defining property rights did not waive a spouse’s right to seek need-based attorney fees under Utah Code section 81-1-203(1).

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals partly sided with the former husband, reviving his alimony claim and fee request but upholding the property rulings and the judge’s refusal to step aside.

  • A flawed expert disclosure did not justify excluding the expert here, because the husband quickly gave a full report, offered a deposition, and no trial date was set.
  • This premarital agreement, which dealt with property rights, did not stop the husband from asking the court to order fees so he could defend the divorce.
  • The rulings that various properties were the wife’s separate property stand.

What happened?

Christopher and Trishna Paulson married in 1992 after signing a premarital agreement (a contract made before marriage) to be read under California law. It made almost everything each of them owned or acquired their “separate property,” meaning property that belongs only to that person. Separate property could become shared only through a written instrument signed by the owner, a change the agreement called “transmutation.”

Trishna filed for divorce in 2018 after twenty-six years of marriage. During the marriage she had put money from her own accounts into the couple’s joint account, which was used for household costs and some purchases.

What did the trial court decide?

On summary judgment (a ruling without a trial because the key facts are not in dispute), the court ruled many properties were Trishna’s separate property. It excluded Christopher’s financial expert because his expert disclosure, the required notice of what the expert would say, was too vague. Without the expert, it ruled he had no evidence of financial need and denied alimony (ongoing support payments).

After a trial in June 2022, the court denied Christopher’s request that Trishna pay his attorney fees. A separate judge, the presiding judge, denied his motion to disqualify the trial judge.

Did Christopher get his expert back?

Yes. The appeals court agreed the disclosure did not meet the rule, because it listed only general topics, not the expert’s actual opinions. But it held the flaw was harmless. Christopher sent a full expert report weeks before Trishna asked for sanctions and offered to let her question the expert. No trial date had been set, and trial was not held until June 2022. So the exclusion was reversed, and so was the ruling denying alimony.

What about the attorney fees?

The court reversed. The premarital agreement dealt with property rights. A fee award under Utah’s divorce fee statute would not change who owns any property, so the agreement could not be read to block it.

The trial court also counted money that was not really available to Christopher: bills Trishna paid for him, the value of living rent-free in the family home, and money he had been ordered to pay back to Trishna. The trial court must look at his request again without counting those amounts.

Did Christopher win on the property rulings?

No. On his argument about mixing funds in the joint account, he did not explain why the trial court was wrong, so the court did not consider it further. On transmutation, he did not show that ordinary purchase and title papers were enough. His challenge to the court’s tracing method (following money back to its source) was not raised in the trial court, so it was not considered.

What about the judge?

The trial judge had once hired a lawyer from the same firm as Trishna’s attorney, about a 2018 newspaper column. Because that relationship appeared to have ended before the firm joined this case, the court found no appearance of bias.

What happens now?

The case returns to the trial court to address alimony and attorney fees again.

Bottom line

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded (Christiansen Forster, J., joined by Orme and Luthy, JJ.). The court reversed the exclusion of Christopher’s financial expert, the resulting alimony summary judgment, and the denial of his section 81-1-203(1) fee request, and affirmed the separate-property rulings and the denial of his motion to disqualify (¶¶ 71–72).

Issue 1: Rule 26 compliance (abuse of discretion, ¶ 31): affirmed (no error)

The disclosure did not satisfy rule 26(a)(4)(A). It listed general topics with no identification of the expert’s opinions, and its sources were “very general” (¶ 38). The court rejected the argument that RJW Media Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, 392 P.3d 956, applies only to non-retained experts: the rule’s language is essentially the same for both, and any difference makes the non-retained standard the more flexible one (¶ 40). Whether Trishna had enough notice goes to harmlessness, not compliance (¶ 41).

Issue 2: Harmlessness (abuse of discretion, ¶ 31): reversed

The trial court exceeded its discretion in finding harm. Christopher served a full report weeks before the sanctions motion and offered a deposition, giving Trishna both rule 26 options (¶ 44). Quoting Al-Imari v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2026 UT App 15, ¶ 44, 586 P.3d 965, petition for cert. granted, June 11, 2026 (No. 20260261), harm “completely ameliorated” before the hearing is no harm. With no trial date set during COVID-19 restrictions, any extension was harmless (¶¶ 44–45).

Issue 3: Alimony summary judgment (correctness, ¶ 32): reversed

The no-evidence-of-need ruling depended on the exclusion, so it is reversed and alimony remanded (¶ 46).

Issue 5: Transmutation (correctness, ¶ 32): affirmed (no error)

The issue was preserved because the trial court ruled on it, citing Fort Pierce Indus. Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass’n v. Shakespeare, 2016 UT 28, ¶ 13, 379 P.3d 1218 (¶ 53). On the merits, the agreement is silent on what a transmutation writing must contain, and Christopher did not show error in using Cal. Fam. Code § 852(a)’s express-declaration rule (¶¶ 55–56). His reply-brief authority concerns third-party acquisitions that are not interspousal transmutations at all (¶ 56 n.7).

Issue 7: Fee waiver by premarital agreement (abuse of discretion, ¶ 33): reversed

The agreement cannot be read to bar a fee award under section 81-1-203(1). An award would not change the character of separate property and rests on the court’s equitable power, not community property law (¶ 61). The award “has nothing to do with whether the assets in dispute are marital,” per Krajeski v. Krajeski, 2025 UT App 19, ¶ 54, 565 P.3d 544, cert. denied, 574 P.3d 519 (Utah 2025) (¶ 60).

Issue 8: Financial need (abuse of discretion, ¶ 33): reversed

The court exceeded its discretion by counting Trishna’s payments of Christopher’s expenses while also finding he had “no living expenses to speak of,” the rent-free value of the home, and funds he was ordered to repay to Trishna (¶ 63). On remand it must reconsider need without those amounts (¶ 64).

Issue 9: Disqualification (correctness, ¶ 34): affirmed (no error)

Assuming without deciding the motion was timely, there was no appearance of bias (¶ 67). The court adopted the reasoning of Utah Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Informal Opinion 99-9: once the attorney-client relationship ends, no reasonable appearance of bias arises when a member of the former attorney’s firm appears (¶ 68). Christopher did not show the relationship continued when the firm entered the case in May 2019, and the opinion’s reasoning is not limited to justice courts (¶¶ 69–70). Prejudice was not examined (¶ 67).

Not reached

  • Issue 4, intermingling of funds: Christopher did not engage with the trial court’s reasoning that the separate-account clause had no penalty or waiver provision, so the court did not consider it further (¶¶ 50–51).
  • Issue 6, exhaustion tracing: arguments about the years used and the cumulative approach were not preserved, citing State v. Flora, 2020 UT 2, ¶ 9, 459 P.3d 975 (¶¶ 57–58).

Takeaways

  • A defective retained-expert disclosure can become harmless when the report and a deposition offer follow before the sanctions hearing and no trial date is set (¶¶ 44–45).
  • RJW Media applies to retained experts; listing topics is not a summary of opinions (¶¶ 38–40).
  • A premarital agreement defining property rights was not read to waive need-based fees under section 81-1-203(1) (¶ 61).
  • In a need analysis, money that already paid the requesting spouse’s expenses or must be repaid is not available for fees (¶ 63).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Paulson v. Paulson
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 108
Case no.
20220914-CA
Filed
2022
Decided
July 16, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Paulson
Disposition
Affirmed in part and Reversed in part
At stake
Classification of property under a premarital agreement, the husband's alimony claim, and his request for attorney fees in a divorce after twenty-six years of marriage

The panel

Michele M. Christiansen ForsterAuthor
John D. LuthyConcurred
Gregory K. OrmeConcurred
Trial court
Fourth District Court, Provo Department · Judge Christine S. Johnson

Parties & counsel

Paulson — AppellantIndividual(s)Rodney R. Parker
Paulson — AppelleeIndividual(s)Julie J. NelsonAaron Harris

Practice Tip

When an expert disclosure is challenged as deficient, serve the full report and offer a deposition promptly; the Court of Appeals treated harm cured before the hearing as no harm where no trial date was set (¶ 44).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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