Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a town refuse to review my second building application? Potter v. Town of Leeds

2026 UT App 140No. 20230232-CADecided Sep 11, 2026Real Property & Land UseAffirmed/Reversed in part

Holding

A district court had jurisdiction over a challenge to a second land use application that was materially different from an earlier one, issue preclusion did not apply because no tribunal had decided the pre-1999 subdivision question, and an uncurable failure to exhaust warrants dismissal with prejudice.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with the landowners on their second lawsuit and the fee award, and with the Town on the first lawsuit, which is now dismissed with prejudice.

  • The landowners’ second lawsuit goes back to the district court, including the question whether the land was subdivided before 1999.
  • The first lawsuit is over for good, because the landowners missed their chance to appeal within the Town and could not fix that.
  • Under the version of the fee statute at issue, a court could choose not to award fees even when the statute’s conditions were met.

What happened?

Lynn Potter and Dianna Powell (the landowners) bought an 11.94-acre parcel in Leeds in 2017. They want to build a road, a house, and a commercial building. The Town’s Hillside Ordinance bars development on land with a slope of 30% or more, but it does not apply to subdivisions approved before January 1, 1999. The landowners say their land was subdivided before then.

At a June 2021 meeting, the Town Council allowed building on one site but not on the parts with steeper slopes. The landowners did not appeal within 30 days. In 2022 they got a sworn statement from a former council member saying the land had been approved as a minor lot subdivision in 1997. The Planning Commission agreed with them, but the Town refused to take up the matter again. The landowners then filed a second application with a new grading plan and a new road route, which the Town also refused to consider.

Why were there three lawsuits?

The landowners filed three separate cases, heard by different judges, and all three were dismissed. The first was dismissed because the landowners had not “exhausted their administrative remedies,” meaning they had not used the Town’s own appeal process in time. The second was dismissed as a repeat of the first, and that judge ordered the landowners to pay the Town $48,618.84 in fees. The third was dismissed too. Both sides appealed.

What happened to the first lawsuit?

It stays dismissed. On appeal, the landowners argued the Town made a new, separate decision in its June 2022 letter. The court said they never made that argument to the district court, so it would not consider it.

The court agreed with the Town that the dismissal should have been “with prejudice,” meaning the case cannot be filed again. Because the time to appeal had passed, the landowners could not go back and fix the problem.

What happened to the second lawsuit?

The landowners won here. The court held that the second application was materially different from the first: it had a new grading plan and road route, and it came with new evidence about the 1999 question. So the district court did have power to hear the case.

The court also rejected “issue preclusion,” a rule that stops people from relitigating an issue already decided. No court or council had ever actually decided whether the land was subdivided before 1999, so the landowners may litigate that question.

What about attorney fees?

The fee award against the landowners was thrown out, because no one yet knows who will win the second lawsuit. The Town lost its argument that the courts in the first and third cases had to award it fees: the statute’s word “may” gave courts a choice. The Town’s request for fees on appeal was denied.

What happens now?

The first case goes back only so the court can enter a dismissal with prejudice. The second case goes back for the district court to decide it on its merits, with fees to be decided at the end.

What should people take from this?

A deadline to appeal a town’s decision matters, and missing it can end a case for good. But a new application that really changes the plan, or brings new evidence, may get its own review.

Bottom line

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded (Harris, J., joined by Christiansen Forster and Luthy, JJ.). Three consolidated appeals from three dismissed petitions over the Town’s Hillside Ordinance, which does not apply to subdivisions approved before January 1, 1999. The First Lawsuit’s dismissal stands but must be with prejudice (¶ 58); the Second Lawsuit is reinstated (¶ 85); fee rulings in the First and Third Lawsuits are affirmed and the Second Lawsuit fee award is vacated (¶¶ 94, 96).

Issue 1: Dismissal of the First Lawsuit (correctness, ¶ 33): not reached

Landowners’ appellate theory, that the June 2022 Letter was a separate, new appealable land use decision, was not preserved, so the court did not reach it (¶ 46). Below, Landowners framed a binary question: that the June 2021 Meeting produced no final decision at all (¶¶ 42–43). Raising the “overarching issue” of exhaustion is not enough when the distinct theory was not raised, following True v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2018 UT App 86, ¶ 22, 427 P.3d 338 (¶ 44). The court therefore discerned no error in the dismissal (¶ 46).

Issue 2: With or without prejudice (abuse of discretion, ¶ 34): reversed

The district court exceeded its discretion by dismissing without prejudice (¶ 58). The Town preserved the point by arguing Landowners had waived their right “forever” (¶ 50). MLUDMA’s exhaustion requirement is enforced strictly (¶ 52), and once the 30-day window passed, Landowners could not cure the failure (¶ 55). Relying on Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2004), the court held a dismissal without prejudice fits only when refiling is practically possible (¶¶ 54, 56). It distinguished Natalie R. v. State, 2025 UT 5, ¶ 58, 567 P.3d 550, where jurisdictional defects could be cured (¶ 57). The with-prejudice status bars only refiling the First Lawsuit (n.5).

Issue 3: Subject-matter jurisdiction over the Second Lawsuit (correctness, ¶ 35): reversed

The district court erred in finding no jurisdiction because the Second Application was not materially identical to the First (¶ 71). MLUDMA does not forbid successive applications, and Leeds Land Use Ordinance § 26.4.2.4 contemplates repeated redesigns (¶¶ 62–63). The Second Application had a new cover page, grading plan, and road path, with a difference of tens of thousands of cubic yards and a net fill rather than a net cut, and it came with the Affidavit (¶¶ 66–70). The Town’s failure-to-state-a-claim ground depended on identity and fell with it (n.6). In n.3 the court rejected the Town’s prejudice and mootness arguments (¶ 36 n.3).

Issue 5: Issue preclusion (correctness, ¶ 35): reversed

Issue preclusion did not bar the Second Lawsuit (¶ 85). The six issues the court identified were not the issues in the Second Lawsuit, applying Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 2006 UT App 326, ¶ 10, 142 P.3d 594 (¶¶ 75–76). And no court or the Council ever decided whether the Property was subdivided before 1999, so the “completely, fully, and fairly litigated” element of Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d 842 fails (¶¶ 77–84). Courts do not give preclusive effect to attorney opinion letters (¶ 83).

Issue 6: Fees in the First and Third Lawsuits (mixed, ¶ 36): affirmed (no error)

Utah Code § 13-43-206(12) (2021) gave courts discretion to decline fees even when its prerequisites were met (¶ 94). “May” is permissive under Utah Code § 68-3-12(1)(g) (¶ 92). The court called the statute “not entirely clear” but found this the better reading (¶ 93). The Town did not argue abuse of discretion (¶ 94). The later amendment did not materially help the analysis (n.9).

Issue 7: Fees in the Second Lawsuit (mixed, ¶ 36): reversed

The award is vacated because the substantially prevailing party is no longer known; the district court will reassess at the end of the case (¶ 96).

Issue 8: Appellate attorney fees (none stated, ¶ 96 n.10): the Town’s request for attorney fees on appeal denied

The Town did not prevail on the Second Lawsuit portion of the appeal, citing Fadel v. Deseret First Credit Union, 2017 UT App 165, ¶ 38, 405 P.3d 807 (n.10).

Not reached

Issue 4: whether successive identical land use applications create a subject-matter-jurisdiction problem; unnecessary because the applications differed (¶¶ 61, 65).

Takeaways

  • Arguing the same result below is not enough; the specific legal theory must be preserved (¶¶ 44–45).
  • Where an exhaustion failure cannot be cured, dismissal should be with prejudice (¶¶ 56–57).
  • New design changes plus new evidence can make a successive land use application materially different (¶¶ 66–70).
  • Under the 2021 version of § 13-43-206(12), fees were discretionary (¶¶ 93–94).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Potter v. Town of Leeds
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 140
Case no.
20230232-CA
Filed
2023
Decided
September 11, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Who appealed
Potter · cross-appeal by Town of Leeds
Disposition
Affirmed in part and Reversed in part
At stake
Whether landowners could get review of their applications to build a road, a house, and a commercial building on a Leeds parcel with slopes over 30%, and a $48,618.84 attorney fee award against them

The panel

Ryan M. HarrisAuthor
Michele M. Christiansen ForsterConcurred
John D. LuthyConcurred
Trial court
Fifth District Court, St. George Department · Judge Ryan E. Christensen

Parties & counsel

Potter — Appellant / Cross-appelleeIndividual(s)Freyja JohnsonRachel Phillips AinscoughMikayla Irvin
Town of Leeds — Appellee / Cross-appellantGovernment agencyH. Craig HallJames C. DunkelbergerHyrum J. BossermanKC Hooker

Practice Tip

When opposing a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust, raise every theory of when the appealable land use decision occurred, including alternatives, because a distinct theory first raised on appeal will not be reached (¶¶ 44–46).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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