Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Does saying “I do want a lawyer” always stop a police interview? State v. Cassidy

2026 UT App 125No. 20240585-CADecided Aug 6, 2026Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

Cassidy’s statement “I do want a lawyer,” made while reading and then signing a Miranda waiver stating he did not want a lawyer, was ambiguous and equivocal, so the detective could clarify and continue questioning, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a linguistics expert under rule 702 or the victim’s juvenile adjudication under rule 403.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals ruled against Donald Cassidy on every issue and upheld his convictions.

  • On these facts, saying “I do want a lawyer” while signing a form that says “I do not want a lawyer at this time” was not a clear request for a lawyer, and the detective could ask what he meant.
  • The trial court acted within its discretion in keeping out a language expert, because jurors could judge the meaning of plain-English statements themselves.
  • An argument for admitting evidence under one rule was not considered on appeal because the defense had relied on a different rule at trial.

What happened?

A jury convicted Donald Cassidy of two counts of rape, one count of forcible sodomy, and one drug distribution count. The victim was his fiancée’s sixteen-year-old daughter. The court calls her “Stephanie,” a pseudonym (a made-up name).

The next year, Stephanie reported the assault. A detective set up and recorded a “pretext” phone call between Stephanie and Cassidy. When she said “it wasn’t consensual,” Cassidy answered, “I know. But you know what? My whole life is ruined.” He also denied the assault several times during the call.

Police then arrested Cassidy. While he was reading a form waiving his Miranda rights (the rights police must explain before questioning someone in custody, including the right to a lawyer), he said, “I’ll answer what questions I can because I don’t know why I’m here. And I will—I do want a lawyer.” He then signed the form, which said, “I do not want a lawyer at this time.”

The detective pointed out the conflict. Cassidy said the detective could ask questions and he would stop and ask for a lawyer if he felt his rights were being violated. He answered “yes” when asked if he was willing to talk now without a lawyer.

What did Cassidy argue on appeal?

He made three arguments. The police should have stopped the interview when he asked for a lawyer. The trial court should have let his linguistics expert explain what his words meant. And the court wrongly kept out evidence about Stephanie that he said went to her believability.

Did his request for a lawyer require police to stop?

No. Police must stop when a suspect asks for a lawyer clearly. If a reasonable officer would understand only that the suspect might be asking for one, questioning may continue.

Cassidy’s words were unclear because he signed a form saying the opposite right away. The detective was allowed, and often encouraged, to ask what he meant. The court rejected the claim that the detective forced Cassidy to choose between talking and having a lawyer. The detective’s words suggested questions could be asked with a lawyer present.

Could his language expert testify?

No. The court held the trial judge acted within the range of reasonable choices in deciding the expert would not help jurors, who can understand plain English using their own common sense. The appeals court also rejected the State’s argument that the record was too incomplete to review this issue.

What about the evidence about Stephanie?

The trial court kept out her juvenile adjudication (a juvenile court’s finding that she committed an offense) for assault with a deadly weapon. It found the record had little value in judging her truthfulness and a high risk of unfair prejudice. Cassidy’s theory, that the case taught her to use the State against enemies, was in the court’s view too speculative.

Other evidence, such as a claimed “hex” on her father and false accusations against her brothers, he argued on appeal under rule 404(b). At trial he had relied on rule 608(a). Because he never raised rule 404(b) in the trial court, the appeals court did not decide that argument.

What happens now?

The convictions stand. Nothing goes back to the trial court.

What should people take from this?

Whether a request for a lawyer is clear depends on everything said and done at the time, not the words alone. And arguments about evidence generally must be raised in the trial court under the right rule to be heard on appeal.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Mortensen, J., joined by Tenney and Luthy, JJ.). A jury convicted Cassidy of two counts of rape, forcible sodomy, and drug distribution (¶¶ 9, 17). His oral request for counsel, made while reading a waiver form he then signed, did not unambiguously invoke the right to counsel (¶ 31). The evidentiary challenges fail (¶¶ 41, 48, 51).

Issue 1: Invocation of the right to counsel (mixed, ¶ 18): affirmed (no error)

Cassidy did not invoke his right to counsel unambiguously and unequivocally, so the interview was properly admitted (¶ 31). If a reasonable officer “would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,” questioning may continue, State v. Qayum, 2025 UT App 178, ¶ 65, 582 P.3d 1245, cert. denied, 585 P.3d 47 (Utah 2026) (¶ 24). Cassidy said “I do want a lawyer” and then signed a form stating “I do not want a lawyer at this time”; the conflict justified clarification, which Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994), calls good police practice (¶¶ 25–28). The detective’s response did not present a false choice between talking and counsel; it implied questioning with a lawyer present (¶ 29). Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), did not help because there was no clear invocation (¶¶ 23–24). The court skipped the State’s preservation argument and resolved the issue on the merits (¶ 21 n.3), and found it unlikely Cassidy’s hand obscured the waiver language (¶ 30 n.4).

Issue 2: Linguistics expert (abuse of discretion, ¶ 19): affirmed (no error)

The court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert’s testimony unhelpful under rule 702 (¶ 41). First, the record was adequate: the court ruled on the briefing and a proffer, which are in the record, not the expert’s reports (¶ 35). On the merits, jurors can assess plain-English statements with common sense (¶ 39, citing State v. Draper, 2024 UT App 152, ¶ 66, 560 P.3d 122). State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, 356 P.3d 1258, concerned corpus linguistics in statutory interpretation, not experts explaining a witness’s meaning (¶ 38). The detective’s trial statement that Cassidy “admit[ted]” came after the pretrial ruling, was elicited by defense counsel, and drew no objection (¶ 40). Because the helpfulness ground was enough, the court did not address the trial court’s credibility rationale (¶ 37).

Issue 3: Juvenile assault adjudication (abuse of discretion, ¶ 20): affirmed (no error)

Cassidy did not show the court abused its discretion in excluding the adjudication under rule 403 (¶ 48). He had to engage with the court’s rule 403 reasoning, Cottam v. IHC Health Services Inc., 2024 UT App 19, ¶ 15, 544 P.3d 1051 (¶ 44). His theory that the adjudication taught Stephanie to “weaponize” the State was too speculative to show probative value for truthfulness (¶ 46). The risk of portraying her as violent supported the finding of unfair prejudice and confusion (¶ 47).

Issue 4: Other-acts evidence under rule 404(b) (abuse of discretion, ¶ 20): not reached

The rule 404(b) argument was not preserved, so the court declined to reach it (¶ 51). Cassidy moved below under rule 608(a), pointed to nothing showing he raised rule 404(b), and did not respond to the State’s preservation argument, citing Orem City v. Jakeman, 2025 UT App 187, ¶ 8, 583 P.3d 1090, cert. denied, 588 P.3d 308 (Utah 2026) (¶¶ 50–51).

Takeaways

  • A request for counsel is judged in context; an oral request paired with a contemporaneous signed waiver may be ambiguous, permitting clarification (¶¶ 28, 31).
  • Record adequacy turns on what the trial court considered when ruling (¶ 35).
  • To challenge a rule 403 ruling, engage with the court’s balancing, not just the rule’s factors (¶¶ 44–45).
  • Arguing rule 608(a) below did not preserve a rule 404(b) theory (¶ 51).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Cassidy
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 125
Case no.
20240585-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
August 6, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Who appealed
Cassidy
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Jury convictions for two counts of rape and one count of forcible sodomy of the defendant's fiancée's sixteen-year-old daughter, and one drug distribution count.

The panel

David N. MortensenAuthor
John D. LuthyConcurred
Ryan D. TenneyConcurred
Trial court
Fourth District Court, Provo Department · Judge Robert C. Lunnen

Parties & counsel

Cassidy — AppellantIndividual(s)Douglas J. Thompson · argued
State — AppelleeState of UtahDerek E. BrownJonathan S. Bauer

Practice Tip

Raise each theory of admissibility in the trial court by its rule; the court declined to reach a rule 404(b) argument because the defense had moved only under rule 608(a) below (¶ 51).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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