Does a juvenile court commit plain error by omitting a self-incrimination warning before a minor testifies at trial? In re J.H.L. Explained

Background and facts

In In re J.H.L., 2026 UT App 124, the Utah Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile court committed plain error by failing to personally warn a fourteen-year-old that anything he said at trial could be used against him before he took the witness stand. JHL had been placed with a foster family and was accused of sexually abusing three younger children in the home. The State filed a petition in the Second District Juvenile Court alleging three counts of sodomy on a child and one count each of sexual abuse of a child and lewdness involving a child. JHL testified in his own defense, denying all allegations and offering alternative explanations for the children’s accounts. The juvenile court adjudicated him delinquent on the sodomy and sexual abuse allegations, finding the children credible and JHL’s testimony full of “half truths” and “quarter truths.”

Key legal issues

Because JHL failed to preserve the issue below, he sought review under the plain error doctrine, which requires him to show (1) an error existed, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error was harmful. He argued the juvenile court violated Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 26(a)(7), which provides that a minor subject to a delinquency petition “shall be advised” of the right to remain silent and that anything said “can and will be used against the minor in any court proceedings.” JHL contended his decision to testify was not knowing or voluntary because no one told him his testimony could be used against him. He also raised the exceptional circumstances doctrine as an alternative basis to reach the unpreserved issue.

Court’s analysis and holding

The court rejected both alternative routes to review. On the exceptional circumstances doctrine, the court held JHL identified no rare procedural anomaly that prevented preservation — his own failure to object was not the kind of defective procedural circumstance the doctrine addresses. On plain error, the court identified two independent flaws in JHL’s argument. First, JHL provided transcripts of only two of fourteen hearings held below, omitting the arraignment transcript whose minute entry confirmed that “[a]ll rights” — including the right to remain silent — were explained to JHL. Under the presumption of regularity, the missing portions of the record are presumed to support the juvenile court’s actions. Second, the court observed that rule 26(a)(7) is written in the passive voice and does not specify that the court itself must deliver the warning. Defense counsel’s detailed on-the-record representation that he had explained JHL’s self-incrimination rights — including that JHL would have to answer questions from both counsel and the prosecutor — was sufficient to inform the court that no further admonition was required. The court also found no prejudice because the adjudication rested entirely on the children’s independently credible testimony and did not depend on JHL’s testimony in any respect.

Practice implications

This opinion carries two important lessons for juvenile appellate practitioners. First, record completeness is a prerequisite to any appellate claim of error: the absence of hearing transcripts will trigger the presumption of regularity and will almost certainly doom a plain error argument that depends on showing what the court did or did not say. Second, when a juvenile client elects to testify, defense counsel should make an explicit, on-the-record advisement — including the specific language that testimony “can and will be used” against the minor — to both protect the client’s rights and insulate the record against later challenge. Counsel’s thorough colloquy here actually worked against JHL on appeal, as the court found it gave the juvenile court every reason to conclude no additional warning was needed.