Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a divorce court give my spouse 75% of what I spent? Bonham v. Bonham

2026 UT App 141No. 20240597-CADecided Sep 11, 2026Family LawAffirmed/Reversed in part

Holding

A rule 26.1(f) sanction was improper where the husband disclosed the asset in a financial declaration months before trial, and a spouse’s credit for dissipated marital assets should ordinarily be half, so a 75% award was improper.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with the former husband, Brandon, on the two sanctions and several findings but upheld the business valuation and other rulings for Emily.

  • A spouse who disclosed a house in a financial declaration months before trial could not be sanctioned for not disclosing it.
  • When one spouse used up marital assets, the other spouse’s credit should ordinarily be half, so a 75% award was improper.
  • Alimony and fee awards need specific findings, such as a number for the paying spouse’s reasonable monthly expenses.

What happened?

Emily and Brandon Bonham married in 1998 and separated in 2019. Emily filed for divorce. Their estate included a home and a business, RMT Equipment (RMT).

During the divorce, Brandon’s father bought a house (the Haven Oaks house) that Brandon later bought from him. Brandon then sold it and used the equity to buy another house (the Rolling Brook house).

After a four-day trial without a jury, the district court largely adopted Emily’s proposed findings. It valued RMT at $2.5 million and awarded it to Brandon. It ordered alimony of $7,181 a month for 21 years. As sanctions, it gave Emily half the equity in the Rolling Brook house and 75% of at least $367,599 it found Brandon had dissipated, meaning used up from the marital estate. It also awarded Emily attorney fees. Brandon appealed.

Did the sanctions stand?

No. Brandon listed the Haven Oaks house in a financial disclosure filed in May 2022, months before trial. Emily listed the same house in her own disclosure that day. Because Brandon technically complied with the disclosure rule, the court held there was no basis to give Emily Rolling Brook equity as a sanction. The district court must now decide whether that house is Brandon’s separate property.

On dissipation, the court said the findings did not show how the district court weighed the required factors or reached its figures. And because marital property is usually split equally, Emily’s credit should ordinarily be half of what was dissipated, not 75%.

What did Brandon lose?

The court upheld the $2.5 million value for RMT. Brandon had written that he would buy Emily’s interest for $1.5 million, which suggested a $3 million value. The court also upheld the refusal to subtract a claimed $700,000 bank debt that had no documents behind it, and the values of a piano and mountain bikes.

It agreed with the decision not to impute income to Emily (to treat her as earning money she could earn but does not) because she cares for a child with medical needs and is pursuing education.

What else goes back to the district court?

The district court must:

  • fix several errors Emily conceded, including the value of water shares;
  • explain the $2,000 value given to Brandon’s YPO membership;
  • state a number for Brandon’s reasonable monthly expenses and explain the 20% tax rate;
  • recalculate the support owed during the divorce; and
  • make findings on the amount of Emily’s trial fees and on the fee award for the post-trial motion.

The court agreed Emily could pay her fees from marital funds, as Brandon had paid his. Whether Emily gets fees for the appeal will be decided by the district court, since both sides won something.

What should people take from this?

A divorce court must explain its numbers. Sanctions must fit what actually happened, and a spouse who used up marital assets ordinarily owes the other spouse half, not more.

Bottom line

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded (Orme, J., joined by Christiansen Forster and Luthy, JJ.). Both sanctions are reversed (¶¶ 42, 47, 53). Most valuation and need rulings stand, but the court required findings on Brandon’s ability to pay, the arrearage and fees (¶¶ 88–92).

Issue 1: Conceded calculation errors (none stated, ¶¶ 40–41): reversed

On the parties’ agreement, the court remanded for findings on the $55,000 double recovery, Emily’s RMT pay, auto fuel and the water shares (¶ 41, citing Krajeski v. Krajeski, 2025 UT App 19, ¶ 30, 565 P.3d 544).

Issue 2: Rolling Brook equity sanction (correctness, ¶¶ 43–47): reversed

No sanction was warranted because Brandon disclosed his Haven Oaks ownership months before trial (¶¶ 46–47). Emily listed the same house the same day, so she was not harmed (¶ 46). The court assumed the sanction was available and left open whether rule 26.1(f) sanctions require rule 37(b) procedure, urging the Advisory Committee to clarify (¶ 45 & n.7). On remand, classify the house as marital or separate (¶ 47).

Issue 3: Dissipation findings (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 48–52): reversed

The findings did not address the factors from Hillam v. Hillam, 2024 UT App 102, ¶ 46, 554 P.3d 1137, beyond obstruction, or explain figures like the $60,000 Airstream and Exhibit 37 amounts (¶ 50). The court would not imply findings (¶ 51). Conceded figures must be accounted for (¶ 54 n.8).

Issue 4: 75% dissipation sanction (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 52–54): reversed

The credit should ordinarily be half “no matter the rule on which the award was premised” (¶ 53, citing Ball v. Ball, 2025 UT App 200, ¶ 16, 584 P.3d 330, and Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 49, 299 P.3d 1079).

Issue 5: RMT valuation (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 55–59): affirmed (no error)

The $2.5 million value was within the range of evidence, given Brandon’s inconsistent valuations and Emily’s expert’s $3,444,000 figure (¶ 57). Excluding the undocumented $700,000 debt was reasonable (¶ 58).

Issue 6: Piano and bikes (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 60–62): affirmed (no error)

Temporary orders do not bar valuing items in the decree, and evidence supported both values (¶¶ 61–62).

Issue 7: YPO membership (abuse of discretion, ¶ 63): reversed

No record evidence supported the $2,000 value; whether it is an expense may be addressed on remand (¶ 63 & n.10).

Issue 8: Imputed income (abuse of discretion, ¶ 66): affirmed (no error)

Declining to impute income to a caregiver pursuing education was within discretion (¶ 66).

Issue 9: Extracurricular costs (abuse of discretion, ¶ 67): affirmed (no error)

Counsel’s unsupported $2,400 figure did not undercut the $490 need (¶ 67).

Issue 10: Brandon’s reasonable expenses (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 68–70): reversed

The court must give a numeric global finding and specific reductions, following Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 28, 379 P.3d 890 (¶ 70).

Issue 11: RMT-paid expenses (abuse of discretion, ¶ 71): affirmed (no error)

Vacation money RMT paid was properly counted as income (¶ 71).

Issue 12: Tax rate (abuse of discretion, ¶ 72): reversed

The court must clarify why it chose 20% and what it covers (¶ 72).

Issue 13: Arrearage credits (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 73–76): reversed

Recalculate for health insurance, fuel and RMT income, as Emily conceded (¶ 76).

Issue 14: Other arrearage challenges (abuse of discretion, ¶ 77): affirmed (no error)

No evidence showed Brandon paid auto maintenance or extracurriculars, and support was not calculated interdependently (¶ 77).

Issue 15: Equitable fee entitlement (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 79–81): affirmed (no error)

Letting Emily pay fees from marital funds, as Brandon did, was within discretion under Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276 (¶ 81).

Issue 16: Initial fee amount (abuse of discretion, ¶ 82): reversed

The reasonableness finding “glosses over” the amount; vacated for detailed findings (¶ 82).

Issue 17: Post-trial fees (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 83–87): reversed

Rule 102 findings on need, ability to pay and reasonableness were inadequate (¶ 87).

Issue 18: Emily’s request for fees on appeal (none stated, ¶ 87 n.13): remand guidance

With mixed success, the district court decides the prevailing party (¶ 87 n.13).

Takeaways

  • Technical disclosure before trial defeats a rule 26.1(f) nondisclosure sanction absent harm (¶¶ 46–47).
  • Dissipation credit is ordinarily half (¶ 53).
  • Findings that expenses are “inflated” need numbers (¶¶ 69–70).
  • Equity supports fees from marital funds when the other spouse used them (¶ 81).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Bonham v. Bonham
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 141
Case no.
20240597-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
September 11, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Who appealed
Bonham
Disposition
Affirmed in part and Reversed in part
At stake
Division of a large marital estate including a business, RMT Equipment, valued at $2.5 million, sanctions for dissipation and nondisclosure, alimony of $7,181 per month, a support arrearage and attorney fee awards

The panel

Gregory K. OrmeAuthor
Michele M. Christiansen ForsterConcurred
John D. LuthyConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Richard D. McKelvie

Parties & counsel

Bonham — AppellantIndividual(s)Troy L. BooherTaylor P. Webb
Bonham — AppelleeIndividual(s)Julie J. NelsonMichael J. TeterBryant J. McConkie

Practice Tip

When seeking a dissipation credit, ask for findings that address each dissipation factor and explain each figure, and expect the credit to be half of the dissipated amount rather than a punitive share (¶¶ 50–53).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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