Can a Utah divorce court award more than half of dissipated assets as a sanction? Bonham v. Bonham Explained

Background and facts

Emily and Brandon Bonham married in 1998 and separated in 2019 after Brandon admitted to an extramarital affair. Their marital estate included a family home, real property, and RMT Equipment, a business Brandon operated. After a four-day bench trial, the district court entered a divorce decree awarding Emily alimony of $7,181 per month for 21 years, child support, equity in Brandon’s Rolling Brook house as a disclosure sanction, 75% of a $367,599 dissipation finding as an additional sanction, a $2.5 million valuation of RMT, and attorney fees — both an initial award and a post-trial award for defending Brandon’s motion to amend.

Key legal issues

The Court of Appeals confronted four clusters of issues: (1) whether sanctions under rule 26.1(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were properly imposed for Brandon’s alleged late disclosure of real property; (2) whether awarding Emily 75% of dissipated assets — rather than the standard 50% — was a permissible sanction; (3) whether the court’s alimony findings were adequate, particularly its failure to specify Brandon’s reasonable monthly expenses after identifying inflation; and (4) whether the initial and post-trial attorney fees awards rested on adequate findings.

Court’s analysis and holding

The court reversed the Rolling Brook house sanction, holding that because Brandon disclosed his ownership of the Haven Oaks house in his second financial disclosure — filed months before trial — he technically complied with rule 26.1(f). Emily’s own simultaneous disclosure of the Haven Oaks house confirmed she had prior knowledge of Brandon’s interest, negating any prejudice from the alleged tardiness.

On dissipation, the court held that regardless of the sanctioning rule invoked, awarding more than half of dissipated marital assets is improper. Citing Goggin v. Goggin and Ball v. Ball, the court reaffirmed that the credit for dissipation ordinarily equals half of the dissipated funds, because marital property is presumptively divided equally. The court also reversed the dissipation findings themselves for inadequate fact-finding — the district court had failed to apply the five-factor Hillam framework to most expenditures and had not explained how it reached specific dollar figures.

Regarding alimony, the court affirmed the decision not to impute income to Emily but reversed the ability-to-pay analysis. The district court identified numerous inflated expense categories but never reduced them to a net figure — a deficiency the court found indistinguishable from the inadequate findings condemned in Taft v. Taft. The court also directed the district court on remand to clarify whether its 20% tax rate encompassed state, federal, FICA, and Medicare obligations. The initial attorney fees award was affirmed in principle under the court’s inherent equitable power recognized in Dahl v. Dahl, but the amount was vacated for want of adequate findings. The post-trial fees award was reversed entirely for insufficient findings on need, ability to pay, and reasonableness.

Practice implications

Practitioners handling divorce appeals should ensure the trial record contains express, itemized findings for every dissipation claim — vague references to obstructive conduct will not sustain a sanction beyond the standard 50% credit. When seeking attorney fees under rule 102 or the court’s equitable powers, counsel must present and the court must enter detailed findings on financial need, ability to pay, and fee reasonableness; a conclusory statement that fees were reasonable given case complexity is insufficient. Finally, alimony orders must include a specific net monthly expense figure for the payor spouse after all reductions — identifying inflation without quantifying the result is reversible error.