Can a police department claim governmental immunity just because an officer's emergency lights were on? Ayala v. Unified Police Department Explained

Background and facts

On August 4, 2020, Officer Ethan Andrus of the Unified Police Department of Greater Salt Lake entered a West Jordan intersection against a red light while responding to an emergency call and struck a vehicle occupied by Armando Ayala and Ashlie Mauger. Two other UPD officers had cleared the same intersection moments before without incident. Andrus had his emergency lights activated and later claimed his siren was on as well, though witnesses—including the officer traveling directly ahead of Andrus—could not confirm hearing it. A gas station security camera captured the collision on video.

Ayala and Mauger sued UPD and Andrus for negligence. Months before trial, UPD moved for summary judgment, invoking the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code § 63G-7-201(4)(r), and arguing that Andrus had driven in accordance with Utah Code § 41-6a-212. The district court granted the motion in a single-sentence ruling. Ayala and Mauger appealed.

Key legal issues

The Utah Court of Appeals addressed two core questions: (1) whether UPD established, as a matter of law, that Andrus’s emergency signals satisfied the statutory adequacy requirements of sections 41-6a-1601 and 41-6a-1625; and (2) whether UPD established that Andrus fulfilled his duty to act as a reasonably prudent emergency vehicle operator under section 41-6a-212(7)(a).

Court’s analysis and holding

The court reversed, identifying multiple genuine disputes of material fact that precluded summary judgment. On the signal-adequacy issue, the court applied Clegg v. Wasatch County, 2010 UT 5, which holds that it is insufficient to simply show that lights or a siren were activated—the moving party must also prove those signals met governing regulatory standards. UPD produced no evidence that Andrus’s emergency lights complied with DPS standards under section 41-6a-1601, and no evidence that his siren met the 500-foot audibility requirement of section 41-6a-1625. Either failure independently defeated summary judgment.

On the reasonableness question, the court found additional disputed facts: Andrus and Ayala both faced obstructed sightlines due to surrounding traffic, raising a triable question about whether Andrus slowed sufficiently for safe operation. Critically, UPD’s own disciplinary investigation found that Andrus violated two provisions of the UPD Policy Manual requiring officers to reduce speed at intersections and stop if necessary before proceeding against a red light. Relying again on Clegg, the court held that internal policy violations are relevant to negligence and precluded any conclusion that Andrus acted reasonably as a matter of law. The court also addressed a subsidiary evidentiary issue, holding that the investigative conclusions in the disciplinary report were not barred as subsequent remedial measures under Utah Rule of Evidence 407, though the written warning and disciplinary sanctions could be redacted.

Practice implications

This decision is a critical reminder for practitioners on both sides of governmental immunity litigation. A governmental entity must do more than show an officer flipped on emergency equipment—it must affirmatively prove compliance with the specific DPS standards governing signal design, construction, and audibility. For plaintiffs, internal agency policy manuals and disciplinary reports are potent tools: policy violations are relevant to the reasonableness analysis and can themselves defeat a summary judgment motion. Defense counsel should audit the evidentiary record well before filing for summary judgment to confirm that signal-adequacy evidence and reasonableness evidence are both present and admissible.