Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can I sue a lender’s officer for fraud over a loan deal? Hammon v. Zoom Inc.

2026 UT App 106No. 20241273-CADecided Jul 16, 2026Contracts & Business DisputesAffirmed/Reversed in part

Holding

The economic loss rule bars fraud claims against both a contracting corporation and its officer or agent acting in a corporate capacity when the tort claims overlap completely with contractual duties and no independent duty is identified, but summary judgment on breach, implied covenant and unconscionability claims is premature before the district court determines the contracts’ terms.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of most of Hammon’s claims but revived her contract and declaratory judgment claims against Zoom and sent them back.

  • When a fraud claim is about the same conduct as a contract claim, the economic loss rule can bar it, including against the company officer who made the deal, unless there is a separate duty outside the contract.
  • Outside insurance coverage disputes, equitable estoppel cannot be used as a stand-alone claim.
  • A court must decide what a contract’s terms are before deciding whether they were breached or are unconscionable.

What happened?

Brandi Hammon, an experienced real estate agent, took out several short-term loans from Zoom Inc. between 2006 and 2009. Each loan came with a deed in lieu of foreclosure, a document that, if Zoom recorded it, would transfer her property to Zoom in “full satisfaction of all obligations” on the loans. The loans were also secured by trust deeds.

Hammon made one $5,000 payment in 2010. In 2012 she repaid the 2009 loan and began paying $500 a month on the rest. In 2022 Zoom sent a notice of default. By then she owed about $10 million. Zoom chose to sell the property securing the loans and did not record the deeds in lieu.

What did Hammon claim?

Hammon sued Zoom and Helen Taylor, who controlled Zoom and dealt with Hammon for it. She claimed breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (a duty, read into every contract, not to undercut the other side’s benefits), fraud, and estoppel. She also asked for a declaratory judgment, a court ruling on the parties’ rights, that the loans were unconscionable, meaning unfairly one-sided. Her central point was that Zoom had to take the properties as full payment. The district court dismissed or ruled against every claim.

What did the Court of Appeals uphold?

The fraud claims failed under the economic loss rule. That rule says that when parties to a contract disagree about the contract’s subject, contract law controls and they cannot sue in tort, unless there is a separate duty outside the contract. Hammon’s fraud claims were about the same conduct as her contract claim, and she identified no separate duty.

The court said Utah courts had not before decided whether this rule also protects a company officer who acted for the company. It adopted a federal court’s reasoning and held that it does when the claims overlap completely. Allowing such suits “would swallow the rule.” Because amending the fraud claims would not fix this, denying her request to amend was proper.

Her estoppel claims also failed. Equitable estoppel works as a defense, not a stand-alone claim, outside insurance cases. Promissory estoppel, a claim based on a promise someone relied on, is not available against Zoom because real contracts cover the dispute. Against Taylor, Hammon showed no evidence that Taylor acted for herself rather than for Zoom. And Hammon did not address the district court’s reason for ruling for Taylor on the implied covenant claim.

What was reversed?

The district court never decided what the contracts actually said before ruling that they were not unconscionable or breached. That was premature. The Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for Zoom on the declaratory judgment, breach of contract and implied covenant claims.

What happens now?

The district court must first decide the contracts’ terms, including whether Zoom had to take the properties as its only remedy. It will then decide breach and unconscionability. The court also told it to consider whether Zoom waived the “first breach rule,” which can bar a party who first materially broke a contract from suing, and if not, whether it bars Hammon’s claims.

What should people take from this?

Fraud claims built on the same promises as a contract usually rise or fall with the contract. Suing the company’s representative personally requires showing that person acted for themselves.

Bottom line

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded (Oliver, J., joined by Christiansen Forster and Harris, JJ.). Hammon’s fraud, estoppel and claims against Taylor fail, but the district court had to determine the contracts’ terms before ruling on breach, the implied covenant and unconscionability (¶¶ 50–51).

Issue 1: Fraud claim against Zoom (correctness, ¶¶ 22–24): affirmed on other grounds

The economic loss rule bars the fraud claim against Zoom. The alleged misrepresentations (that Zoom would not foreclose and would take the deeds in lieu as the remedy) describe the same conduct as the breach of contract claim, citing Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, ¶ 53, 70 P.3d 1, and Hammon’s brief identified no independent duty (¶¶ 23–24). The court treated the claim against Zoom as dismissed because the parties briefed it that way, though Zoom never moved on it (n.5), and affirmed on this alternative ground (¶ 34 & n.8).

Issue 2: Fraud claim against Taylor (correctness, ¶¶ 25–33): affirmed on other grounds

The economic loss rule bars fraud claims against a corporate officer or agent when the tort claims overlap completely with contractual duties. Hammon alleged Taylor acted “on behalf of Lender” and pleaded no facts showing she acted personally (¶ 25). Noting Utah courts had not addressed the question, the court adopted Healthcare Co. v. MPI Group LLC, No. 25-cv-00031, 2025 WL 2733548 (D. Utah Sep. 25, 2025), and followed Former TCHR, LLC v. First Hand Management LLC, 2012 COA 129, ¶ 25, 317 P.3d 1226 (¶¶ 26–31). Otherwise “such an exception would swallow the rule,” cf. HealthBanc Int’l, LLC v. Synergy Worldwide, Inc., 2018 UT 61, ¶¶ 19, 23, 435 P.3d 193 (¶ 32). No independent duty was identified (¶ 33).

Issue 3: Leave to amend fraud claims (abuse of discretion, ¶ 34): affirmed (no error)

Denial of leave was within the court’s discretion because amendment would be futile given the economic loss bar (¶ 34).

Issue 4: Equitable estoppel (correctness, ¶¶ 37–38): affirmed on other grounds

Equitable estoppel cannot be brought as an affirmative claim. Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ¶ 12, 158 P.3d 1088, relaxed the equitable/promissory distinction only for insurance coverage disputes, and the court declined to extend it (¶ 37). It offered no opinion on equitable estoppel as a defense in Zoom’s deficiency action (n.9).

Issue 5: Promissory estoppel against Zoom (correctness, ¶¶ 39–40): affirmed on other grounds

Enforceable contracts govern the loans, so promissory estoppel is unavailable; their contents are disputed, but not their existence (¶ 40), citing Ward v. McGarry, 2022 UT App 62, ¶ 15, 511 P.3d 1213.

Issue 6: Promissory estoppel against Taylor (correctness, ¶¶ 41–42): affirmed on other grounds

Rather than reach reliance, the court affirmed because Hammon presented no competent evidence that Taylor acted other than as Zoom’s representative, following Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 40, 190 P.3d 1269 (¶ 42).

Issue 7: Declaratory judgment and unconscionability against Zoom (correctness, ¶¶ 43–45): reversed

The unconscionability ruling was premature because the court never determined the contracts’ terms. The four requirements in Bleazard v. City of Erda, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 40, 552 P.3d 183, were met, so Hammon is entitled to a determination of the terms, including whether the deeds in lieu were Zoom’s exclusive remedy (¶ 44). Hammon did not appeal as to Taylor (n.10).

Issue 8: Breach of contract and implied covenant against Zoom (correctness, ¶ 46): reversed

Summary judgment on these claims was likewise premature pending determination of the terms (¶ 46).

Issue 9: Implied covenant against Taylor (correctness, ¶ 49): affirmed (no error)

Hammon did not carry her burden of persuasion. She never addressed the veil-piercing ground under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8), following Big Game Forever v. Peterson, 2024 UT App 78, ¶ 19, 551 P.3d 411 (¶ 49).

Disposition

On remand the court must determine the terms, then breach and unconscionability. It must also assess whether Zoom waived the first breach rule from Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, ¶ 25, 303 P.3d 1030, and if not, whether a material breach bars Hammon’s claims, a question of fact; see Cook Martin Poulson PC v. Smith, 2026 UT App 54, ¶¶ 64–65 (¶¶ 47–48, 51).

Takeaways

  • A fraud claim against the officer who negotiated for a company is barred where it overlaps completely with the contract claim and no independent duty is shown (¶¶ 31–33).
  • Claims against an agent personally need facts showing the agent acted for herself (¶¶ 25, 42).
  • Outside insurance coverage cases, plead equitable estoppel as a defense (¶ 37).
  • Engage with every ground the district court gave, or the ruling stands (¶ 49).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Hammon v. Zoom Inc.
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 106
Case no.
20241273-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
July 16, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Hammon
Disposition
Affirmed in part and Reversed in part
At stake
Whether Zoom had to take Hammon's properties under deeds in lieu of foreclosure in full satisfaction of loans on which she owed approximately $10 million, rather than foreclose

The panel

Amy J. OliverAuthor
Michele M. Christiansen ForsterConcurred
Ryan M. HarrisConcurred
Trial court
Second District Court, Ogden Department · Judge Jason C. Nelson

Parties & counsel

Hammon — AppellantIndividual(s)Matthew M. BoleyBradley M. StrassbergJoshua D. Jewkes
Zoom Inc. — AppelleeOtherThor RoundyCory B. Mattson

Practice Tip

To sue a company's representative personally for fraud or promissory estoppel, plead and prove facts showing the representative acted for herself, and identify a duty independent of the contract (¶¶ 25, 33, 42).

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