Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a judge dismiss my lawsuit because my brief was single-spaced? Taylor v. Lawlor

2026 UT App 118No. 20251097-CADecided Aug 6, 2026otherReversed

Holding

Neither rule 37 nor rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorized the district court to strike or refuse a party’s opposition memoranda for being single-spaced, so the court exceeded its authority and its follow-on dismissal of the complaint as unopposed was reversed.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with Samuel Taylor, the plaintiff who appealed, and reversed the dismissal of his lawsuit.

  • Rule 37 sanctions apply to discovery orders and require a motion, so they did not support rejecting Taylor’s memoranda.
  • Rule 10 requires the clerk to accept papers that break formatting rules and does not let a court reject a memorandum just for being single-spaced.
  • Taylor’s constitutional arguments were not decided because he never raised them in the district court.

What happened?

Samuel Taylor sued Anne and Kevin Lawlor, bringing fifteen claims. The Lawlors asked the court to dismiss the case. Taylor filed a memorandum opposing their motion, but it was single-spaced, while rule 10(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires double spacing.

The Lawlors pointed out the spacing problem in their reply, but they never asked the court to strike Taylor’s paper. The next day, on its own, the district court struck it, saying only that it “failed to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.” It gave Taylor six days to file a new one.

What did Taylor do next?

Taylor filed an amended memorandum with several changes, but it was still single-spaced. He asked the court to name the specific rule it believed he had broken. The court rejected the amended memorandum, again without naming a rule, and found he had willfully disregarded its order.

Taylor then filed a motion asking for clarification. Four days later, without ruling on that motion, the court dismissed his lawsuit because the Lawlors’ motion was now “unopposed.”

What did the Court of Appeals decide?

It reversed. The district court seemed to rely on rule 37, which lets a court punish a party for breaking its orders. But that rule covers only discovery, the stage where parties exchange evidence, and it requires a motion asking for a sanction. Discovery had not started, and the Lawlors never filed such a motion.

Rule 10, the formatting rule, also did not help. It says the clerk “must accept” papers that break its formatting requirements, though the clerk may require corrected papers. Its only provision for striking papers covers “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” which no one claimed here.

The court also rejected the Lawlors’ suggestion that Taylor’s requests to amend his complaint, made inside his memorandum, justified the ruling. The fix for that is simply to ignore the improper request.

The court added that rules about the form of papers should not cost a party its case unless the other side was harmed. The Lawlors were able to answer all of Taylor’s arguments and did not claim otherwise.

What about Taylor’s constitutional arguments?

Taylor also argued that the rulings violated his rights to procedural due process (fair procedures before losing a right) and to access the courts. The court did not decide these because he never raised them in the district court and did not ask for an exception.

What happens now?

The orders rejecting Taylor’s memoranda and the order dismissing his lawsuit are reversed. The case goes back to the district court for further proceedings.

What should people take from this?

The court noted that courts have other tools to deal with litigants who break rules, such as contempt power, but the district court did not use them. The court also said lawyers should not face sanctions that end a case over a formatting problem unless they know what the problem is and willfully refuse to fix it.

Bottom line

Reversed and remanded (Harris, J., joined by Luthy and Oliver, JJ.). The district court struck Taylor’s opposition to a motion to dismiss and rejected his amended opposition for failing to “comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,” without naming a rule, then dismissed the complaint as unopposed (¶¶ 6–11). The parties understood the defect to be single spacing under rule 10(d) (¶ 14). No rule the court invoked authorized rejecting the memoranda, so the court exceeded its authority (¶¶ 21, 24).

Issue 1: Constitutional challenges to the orders rejecting Taylor’s memoranda (none stated, ¶ 12): not reached

The court declined to reach the due process and access-to-courts claims because they were unpreserved and Taylor did not argue any exception to preservation.

Part 1: Procedural due process (¶ 12 n.3) The court agreed with the Lawlors that this claim was unpreserved because it was never brought to the district court’s attention, and it declined to address it further.

Part 2: Access to the courts (¶ 12 n.3) The court treated this claim the same way: it was unpreserved, Taylor did not argue an exception to the preservation rule, and the court did not address it.

Issue 2: Authority to reject the memoranda and dismiss (mixed, ¶ 13): reversed

The court exceeded its authority in refusing to accept Taylor’s memoranda, so those orders and the follow-on dismissal are reversed (¶ 24). Rule interpretation is reviewed for correctness and the choice of sanction for abuse of discretion (¶ 13).

Rule 37. By its terms it applies only to discovery orders, and discovery had not opened (¶ 15, following Cook Martin Poulson PC v. Smith, 2026 UT App 54, ¶ 36). It also requires a sanction “upon motion,” and the Lawlors never moved to strike or sought any sanction (¶ 16).

Rule 10. Rule 10(f) says the clerk “must accept the filing” but may require substitute papers, and the court has held it “expressly precludes [any] fatal effect on nonconforming papers” (¶ 19, quoting Willowbrook Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Greco, 2004 UT App 390U, para. 4). Rule 10(h) allows striking only “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” which no one alleged (¶ 20).

Rule 7(n). The Lawlors’ suggestion that Taylor’s embedded requests to amend justified the orders fails: the remedy is to ignore the improper request, not strike the memorandum (¶ 21 n.6, citing Compagni v. Klemesrud, 2025 UT App 71, ¶ 16 n.6, 571 P.3d 803).

Other sources. Contempt power, inherent authority under Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 43, 123 P.3d 416, and rule 83 exist, but the court did not invoke them or make findings (¶ 22). Under Bunting Tractor Co. v. Emmett D. Ford Contractors, 272 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1954), deviation from form should not forfeit substantive rights absent prejudice, and the Lawlors fully responded and did not claim prejudice (¶ 23).

The court did not decide the challenge to the willfulness finding, which Taylor did not directly attack, but observed his conduct looked “a lot more like ignorance than willfulness” (¶ 17 n.5).

Not reached

Issues 1 and 2: Taylor’s procedural due process and access-to-courts claims were unpreserved, and he did not argue an exception to the preservation rule (¶ 12 n.3, citing State v. Repsher, 2025 UT App 50, ¶ 34, 568 P.3d 1095).

Takeaways

  • Rule 37 sanctions require a discovery order and a motion; they do not reach a pre-discovery formatting defect (¶¶ 15–17).
  • Rule 10(f) requires acceptance of nonconforming papers; only rule 10(h) content supports striking (¶¶ 19–20).
  • A rule 7(n) violation calls for ignoring the improper request, not striking the memorandum (¶ 21 n.6).
  • Terminating-type sanctions for form defects require a showing of prejudice (¶ 23).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Taylor v. Lawlor
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 118
Case no.
20251097-CA
Filed
2025
Decided
August 6, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Taylor
Disposition
Reversed
At stake
Dismissal of Taylor's fifteen-count complaint after the district court struck his single-spaced opposition memoranda and treated the motion to dismiss as unopposed

The panel

Ryan M. HarrisAuthor
John D. LuthyConcurred
Amy J. OliverConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Linda M. Jones

Parties & counsel

Taylor — AppellantIndividual(s)Fabiana Wells
Lawlor — AppelleeIndividual(s)Steven H. BergmanAlexis T. Palmer

Practice Tip

When a court rejects a filing for a formatting defect, point out that rule 10(f) requires the clerk to accept nonconforming papers and that rule 37 sanctions require a discovery order and a motion (¶¶ 15–19). Raise any constitutional objection in the district court, or it may not be reviewed (¶ 12 n.3).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

About these Decision Summaries

Lotus Appellate Law publishes these summaries to keep practitioners informed — not as legal advice. Each case turns on its own facts. If a decision here is relevant to your matter, we’re happy to discuss it.