Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Under Utah’s 2021 law, when was choking aggravated assault? State v. Pontiff

2026 UT App 117No. 20240854-CADecided Aug 6, 2026Criminal AppealsAffirmed/Reversed in part

Holding

Under the 2021 aggravated assault statute, evidence that the defendant applied pressure that briefly impeded breathing, without any evidence that the force was likely to produce a loss of consciousness, was insufficient, so the directed verdict denial was reversed and the conviction vacated.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals threw out Pontiff’s aggravated assault conviction but upheld his convictions for forcible sexual abuse and object rape.

  • Under the aggravated assault statute in effect in 2021, proof of choking that briefly stopped breathing was not enough without evidence the force was likely to cause a loss of consciousness.
  • A lawyer is not ineffective for skipping a motion or objection that would have failed under the law at the time.
  • Utah case law allows a “blind expert,” who does not know the facts of the case, to explain general principles to a jury.

What happened?

Hunter Pontiff and a woman the court calls Amanda (a made-up name) met on a dating app and went to his bedroom, where they began kissing with her consent. Amanda testified that Pontiff then choked her, rubbed her genitals, put his fingers in her vagina, forced oral sex, and pressed his penis into her vagina, all without her consent. Pontiff testified that she agreed to everything that happened, and he denied some of the acts.

The State charged five crimes. The jury convicted Pontiff of aggravated assault, forcible sexual abuse, and object rape, and acquitted him of forcible sodomy and rape. Pontiff appealed.

Why was the aggravated assault conviction thrown out?

The law in effect in 2021 required proof that the choking blocked breathing or blood flow with force “likely to produce a loss of consciousness.” There was evidence Pontiff put pressure on Amanda’s neck and that her breathing stopped for a couple of seconds. But Amanda testified that she did not lose consciousness, that she could breathe, and that she never felt her life was in danger.

The State pointed to later bruising and throat pain. The court said that was not enough. No witness said Amanda felt she might pass out, and no expert explained how much force would likely cause that, so a jury could only guess. The court vacated (cancelled) that conviction. The statute has since been changed to remove this requirement.

Why did the other convictions stand?

Pontiff argued his trial lawyer was ineffective, meaning his work fell below a reasonable standard and that hurt the outcome. The court disagreed on each point.

  • Merger: Pontiff said the forcible sexual abuse count should have been folded into the object rape count. Both he and Amanda described two separate acts, first touching her clitoris and then putting his fingers in her vagina. So a motion to merge would have failed.
  • Deputy’s testimony: A deputy said Amanda never told him she was not raped. That repeated no statement by Amanda, so it was not hearsay (a secondhand statement offered to prove it is true).
  • Ex-boyfriend’s testimony: He said Amanda told him she was raped. Even if the lawyer should have objected, Pontiff was acquitted of rape and other evidence covered the same ground, so it did not change the result.
  • The expert: Utah Supreme Court cases allow experts who do not know the case facts to explain how trauma victims often react, as long as they do not vouch for a particular witness. Objections would have failed.

The court also held there were no multiple errors to add together.

What happens now?

The aggravated assault conviction is vacated. The convictions for forcible sexual abuse and object rape stand.

What should people take from this?

When a law lists a specific element, like force likely to cause a loss of consciousness, the State needs evidence of that element, not just evidence of choking. And a claim that a lawyer was ineffective fails when the motion or objection the lawyer skipped would not have worked under the law at the time.

Bottom line

Aggravated assault conviction vacated; remaining convictions affirmed (Tenney, J., joined by Orme and Luthy, JJ.). The State presented no evidence from which a jury could find, without speculating, that the force used was “likely to produce a loss of consciousness” under Utah Code § 76-5-103(1)(b)(ii) (2021) (¶¶ 51–56). All four ineffective-assistance claims failed (¶ 97).

Issue 1: Sufficiency on aggravated assault (sufficiency of the evidence, ¶ 43): reversed

The district court erred in denying the directed verdict motion on aggravated assault. There was evidence of force and of breathing briefly impeded “for a couple seconds”; the jury could resolve Amanda’s conflicting testimony on that point (¶¶ 48–50, n.5, citing State v. Black, 2015 UT App 30, ¶ 19, 344 P.3d 644). But Amanda said she did not lose consciousness, could breathe, and never felt in danger (¶¶ 52–53). Inferring the required degree of force from bruising and later pain crossed from inference into speculation, absent testimony that she felt she might pass out or expert testimony on force (¶¶ 54–55, citing State v. Patterson, 2017 UT App 194, ¶ 14, 407 P.3d 1002). The element has since been removed from the statute (n.4).

Issue 2: Failure to seek merger (ineffective assistance, ¶ 44): affirmed (no error)

A lesser-included-offense merger motion would have been futile, so counsel did not perform deficiently. Under State v. Heath, 2019 UT App 186, 453 P.3d 955, and State v. Black, 2026 UT App 114, ¶ 36, — P.3d —, forcible sexual abuse of a female victim is limited to non-penetrative touching, so the clitoral touching here likely supported object rape rather than forcible sexual abuse (¶¶ 70–71). But both witnesses described two deliberate, separate acts, and merger fails “if the convictions rely on materially different acts” (¶¶ 72–75, quoting State v. Rodriguez, 2025 UT App 84, ¶ 58, 572 P.3d 436). At most, the first act could have been charged as a second object rape (¶ 75).

Issue 3: Deputy’s testimony (ineffective assistance, ¶ 44): affirmed (no error)

Testimony that Amanda never said she “wasn’t raped” repeated no “statement” under rule 801, and Pontiff cited no authority extending hearsay to the absence of a statement, so an objection would have been futile (¶¶ 78–79).

Issue 4: Ex-boyfriend’s testimony (ineffective assistance, ¶ 44): affirmed (no error)

No prejudice: Pontiff was acquitted of rape, and other evidence showed Amanda was claiming nonconsensual penetration (¶¶ 81–85).

Issue 5: Counsel’s failure to move to exclude the blind expert (ineffective assistance, ¶ 44): affirmed (no error)

The court held that counsel did not perform deficiently by not moving to exclude the blind expert’s testimony, on either ground Pontiff raised, because each motion would have been futile (¶ 86).

Part 1: Blind expert under rule 702(b)

The court acknowledged the “textualist appeal” of reading rule 702(b)(3) to bar blind experts (¶ 88). But deficiency is judged by the law at the time (¶ 89). State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103, and State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, 322 P.3d 624, approved such testimony, so the motion would have been futile (¶¶ 90–93; n.11).

Part 2: Bolstering

Rule 608(a) does not bar expert testimony from which a jury could infer a witness’s veracity; it bars direct opinion on truthfulness (¶ 95, quoting State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, ¶ 14, 5 P.3d 642). The expert spoke generally about trauma and did not opine on Amanda’s credibility, so the motion would have been futile (¶ 96).

Issue 6: Cumulative error (none stated, ¶ 96 n.12): affirmed (no error)

With no multiple errors shown on the hearsay and expert claims, the doctrine was inapplicable (n.12, quoting State v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54, ¶ 83, 582 P.3d 772).

Takeaways

  • Where a statute requires force “likely to produce a loss of consciousness,” injury evidence alone may not bridge the gap without victim or expert testimony on that element (¶ 55).
  • Lesser-included merger fails when the record shows deliberate, separate acts, even if the first act could itself have been charged as the greater offense (¶¶ 74–75).
  • A rule 702(b)(3) challenge to blind experts runs into State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103, which this court treats as controlling until the supreme court or the rule changes (n.11).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Pontiff
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 117
Case no.
20240854-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
August 6, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Pontiff
Disposition
Affirmed in part and Reversed in part
At stake
Jury convictions for aggravated assault, forcible sexual abuse, and object rape

The panel

Ryan D. TenneyAuthor
John D. LuthyConcurred
Gregory K. OrmeConcurred
Trial court
Fourth District Court, American Fork Department · Judge Roger W. Griffin

Parties & counsel

Pontiff — AppellantIndividual(s)Dallas B. YoungJennifer Foresta
State — AppelleeState of UtahDerek E. BrownDaniel L. Day

Practice Tip

When a strangulation charge arises under the pre-amendment version of Utah Code § 76-5-103, press the "likely to produce a loss of consciousness" element at directed verdict; injury evidence alone left the jury to speculate here (¶¶ 55–56).

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