Utah Supreme Court · Published Opinion

If I say “I don’t know” about talking to police, must they stop? State of Utah v. Leyva

906 P.2d 894No. 960020Decided Aug 19, 1997Criminal AppealsReversed & Remanded

Holding

A defendant’s “I don’t know,” given in answer to whether he wished to talk after Miranda warnings, was an equivocal invocation of the right to silence made before any valid waiver, and United States v. Davis, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994), does not displace Utah’s rule limiting police to clarifying questions in that setting, so the unclarified statement had to be suppressed.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with Leyva, the defendant, reversing his conviction and ordering a new trial.

  • Under Utah law as this court applied it, an unclear request to stay silent, made before any valid waiver, limits officers to questions that clarify what the person wants.
  • Telling a suspect “you don’t have to answer” only repeats the right; it does not clarify the suspect’s wishes.
  • The court read the federal United States v. Davis, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) decision as applying only to unclear requests made after a valid waiver.

What happened?

A Utah Highway Patrol trooper ran the license plate of a yellow car and found the plate belonged to a different car. He turned on his lights and siren, and a high speed chase followed. It ended when Rogelio Leyva crashed at the bottom of a freeway off-ramp.

The trooper handcuffed Leyva and questioned him without reading his Miranda rights (the warnings that a person in custody may stay silent and have a lawyer). The trial court threw out those first statements, and they were not part of the appeal.

What did Leyva say after the warnings?

About thirty minutes later, the trooper read the rights. Leyva said he understood them. Asked if he wanted to talk now, he said, “I don’t know.” The trooper replied, “You don’t have to answer questions if you don’t want to. It is up to you.” Leyva nodded. The trooper asked, “So why did you run?” Leyva answered, “The plates are on the wrong car.”

The trial court refused to suppress (keep out of evidence) that answer, and Leyva was convicted of a third degree felony for failing to stop at an officer’s command.

What did the court decide?

The Court of Appeals reversed. Utah courts had already held that when a person makes an unclear, or “equivocal,” request to use Miranda rights, officers must stop questioning except for simple questions that clarify what the person wants.

Read alongside the trooper’s question, “I don’t know” most likely meant “I don’t know if I want to talk to you now.” That was at least arguably a request to stay silent. The trooper’s reply only restated the right and did not clarify anything. The nod could simply mean Leyva understood he did not have to talk. Because the unclear request came before any valid waiver (a choice to give up the rights), the State could not prove a waiver, and the answer should have been kept out.

Did a U.S. Supreme Court case change that?

The State relied on United States v. Davis, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994), which held that officers may keep questioning after a valid waiver unless the suspect clearly asks for a lawyer. The court held that Davis covers only unclear requests made after a valid waiver. It does not change Utah’s rule for unclear requests made before one, when the State still has to prove the waiver.

Did all the judges agree?

No. Judge Bench dissented. He would have deferred to the trial court’s finding that Leyva waived his rights. He also thought any error was harmless (did not affect the result), because the trooper’s own testimony gave plenty of evidence of the crime.

What happens now?

Leyva’s conviction is reversed, and the case goes back to the trial court for a new trial without his answer about the plates.

What should people take from this?

In this court’s view, an officer who hears an unclear answer to “do you want to talk?” should ask what the person means before going further. Simply repeating the right is not enough.

Bottom line

Reversed and remanded for a new trial (Billings, J., joined by Orme, P.J.; Bench, J., dissenting). The opinion has no paragraph numbers. When a suspect equivocally invokes Miranda rights before a valid waiver, questioning is limited to clarification. United States v. Davis, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) applies only after a valid waiver and leaves Utah law on pre-waiver equivocations unchanged.

Issue 1: Suppression of the post-Miranda statement (mixed): reversed

The trial court erred in refusing to suppress Leyva’s statement, because his equivocal invocation was never clarified and so the State could not show a valid waiver. The standard is correctness for the waiver conclusion, with “a measure of discretion” for varying facts, citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 941 (Utah 1994). In footnote 1 the majority answered the dissent: prior authority fences the trial court’s discretion, the facts were undisputed, and the trial court read the same transcript.

Equivocation. Utah follows the middle approach (State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 85 (Utah 1993)). An “arguably equivocal” statement qualifies as an invocation (State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 901 (Utah App. 1993)). Read with the question, “I don’t know” most plausibly meant “I don’t know [if I want to talk to you now].”

No clarification. The trooper’s “You don’t have to answer questions if you don’t want to” only acknowledged the right, like the response rejected in Gutierrez. The nod could mean Leyva understood he need not talk. The State cannot prove waiver from later answers without first clarifying, see State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1111 (Utah App. 1990) (at 1113), and Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S. Ct. 490, 494, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1984) (per curiam).

Davis. The court distinguished Davis on its own terms (“after a knowing and voluntary waiver”), read it with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), and noted Justice Souter’s concurrence. On policy, the State keeps the burden of proving a clear initial waiver. Footnote 3 adds that after a valid waiver, Davis now requires a clear reinvocation in Utah.

Separate opinion

Judge Bench dissented. Under State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), he would have deferred to the trial court’s totality-of-the-circumstances finding of a knowing, voluntary waiver. He would also have found any error harmless given the trooper’s testimony about the chase, and would have affirmed.

Takeaways

  • Sort the facts first: did the equivocation come before or after a valid waiver? The court treated that as controlling under Davis.
  • An officer’s restatement of the right (“it is up to you”) is not a clarifying question.
  • After a valid waiver, the court read Davis to require a clear reinvocation, including for silence (n.3).
Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State of Utah v. Leyva
Court
Utah Supreme Court
Citation
906 P.2d 894
Case no.
960020
Filed
1996
Decided
August 19, 1997
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Leyva
Disposition
Reversed and Remanded
At stake
A third degree felony conviction for Failure to Stop/Respond to Command of Officer, resting in part on a statement the defendant gave after Miranda warnings

The panel

Judith M. BillingsAuthor
Russell W. BenchDissented
Gregory K. OrmeConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake County · Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Parties & counsel

Leyva — AppellantIndividual(s)Elizabeth HuntRonald S. Fujino
State of Utah — AppelleeState of UtahMarian DeckerJan Graham

Practice Tip

When moving to suppress, show that the equivocal statement came before any valid waiver. The court limited United States v. Davis, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994), to equivocations after a valid waiver and held that a restatement of the right is not a clarifying question (opinion unnumbered; see n.3).

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