Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Is threatening a judge a crime if you never meant to act on it? State of Utah v. Fixel

873 P.2d 1177No. 960374-CADecided Sep 5, 1997Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316(1) requires that a threat to assault, kidnap or murder a judge be made with intent to impede, intimidate or interfere with, or retaliate against, the judge, but not an intent to carry out the threat, so the prosecutor’s argument to that effect was not misconduct.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld Fixel’s conviction for threatening a judge.

  • Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316(1), the State does not have to prove the person intended to actually carry out a threat against a judge.
  • The State must still prove the threat was made with intent to impede, intimidate or interfere with the judge’s duties, or to retaliate for them.
  • The court read “retaliate” to mean simple “pay back,” not physical violence.

What happened?

Dennis Fixel appeared in court for a bail hearing. After the hearing, he had to be removed from the courtroom for making loud comments about what the judge had said.

While an officer walked him to a patrol car, Fixel said loudly, “When I get out the judge is dead.” The officer took it as a threat and called the judge. Fixel was charged with threatening a judge, a third degree felony.

At trial, only the officer and Fixel testified. Fixel said he was upset but never threatened the judge and never meant to harm him. Three days after the bail hearing, the judge stepped aside from Fixel’s other cases. The jury found Fixel guilty.

What did each side argue?

Fixel’s lawyer told the jury there was no proof Fixel meant to follow through against the judge. In reply, the prosecutor said, “I don’t have to prove to you he intended to kill the judge.” Fixel’s lawyer objected that this misstated the law. The trial judge overruled the objection, saying the jury instructions stated the law correctly.

After the verdict, the trial court denied Fixel’s request to set aside the verdict or grant a new trial. On appeal, Fixel argued the prosecutor’s comment was misconduct, meaning an improper argument that pointed the jury toward something it should not consider.

What did the court decide?

The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. It read the plain words of the statute. A person is guilty if he threatens to assault, kidnap or murder a judge, and does so either to impede, intimidate or interfere with the judge’s work, or to retaliate against the judge for that work.

The court agreed with Fixel that just saying threatening words is not enough; the threat must be made with one of those intents. But nothing in the statute requires an intent to actually carry out the threat. So the prosecutor’s argument and the jury instruction were correct.

The jury could find that Fixel threatened to murder the judge, expected the threat to reach the judge, and meant it to intimidate him. Or it could find he meant to “pay back” the judge for upsetting him. The court said “retaliate” means repaying in kind, not physical violence.

The court also noted that federal courts reading a nearly identical federal law have held the same thing.

What about the prosecutor’s wording?

Fixel pointed out that the prosecutor said “in retaliation” instead of the statute’s “to retaliate.” The court found no real difference. It added that the prosecutor’s wording actually asked more of the State than the law requires, since the law needs only an intent to retaliate, not actual retaliation.

What happens now?

Nothing further. The conviction stands.

What should people take from this?

Under this Utah statute, whether the person “really” planned to harm the judge did not matter. What mattered was whether the threat was made to intimidate the judge or to retaliate for the judge’s official acts.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Orme, J., joined by Billings and Jackson, JJ.). Section 76-8-316(1) requires a threat made with one of two specified intents: to impede, intimidate or interfere with a judge’s official duties, or to retaliate for their performance. It does not require an intent to actually carry out the threat. The prosecutor’s rebuttal (“I don’t have to prove to you he intended to kill the judge”) therefore did not misstate the law, and there was no misconduct.

Issue 1: Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument (mixed): affirmed (no error)

The prosecutor’s comments were “not fundamentally at odds” with the statute, on which the jury was properly instructed, so there was no misconduct. Misconduct occurs when remarks direct the jury to matters it should not consider, citing State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992), and remarks are viewed in light of the totality of the evidence, citing State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Rulings on whether misconduct merits a mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion; the statutory question is reviewed for correctness.

Applying a plain-language reading under State v. Winward, 907 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (n.2), the court found the statute says “[n]othing” about an intent to actually perpetrate the assault, kidnaping or murder. Mere utterance is not enough; the threat must carry a specified intent. The jury could infer Fixel threatened to murder the judge, expected the threat to be relayed, and intended to intimidate him or to retaliate. “Retaliate” means simple “pay back,” per Webster’s, not retributive violence.

Supporting points in footnotes:

  • The prosecutor’s framing (“in retaliation to something the judge had done”) overstated the State’s burden, since the statute requires only intent to retaliate, not actual retaliation (n.3).
  • “In retaliation” versus “to retaliate” is a distinction without a difference (n.6).
  • Though the holding rests on plain meaning, federal courts construing the nearly identical 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) agree, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir.1990), and United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 n. 3 (9th Cir.1990) (n.5).
  • Intent is ordinarily proved by inference, citing State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 55 (Utah 1993) (n.4).

Takeaways

  • Under § 76-8-316(1), the defendant’s subjective intent to carry out the threat is irrelevant; the required intent is to impede, intimidate, interfere or retaliate (n.5 and main text; the opinion has no ¶ numbers).
  • “Retaliate” in the statute means “pay back,” so upsetting the judge in return can satisfy it.
  • A prosecutor’s argument that tracks a correct jury instruction, even with slightly different wording, is unlikely to be treated as misconduct where the variance does not change the law’s meaning (n.6).
Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State of Utah v. Fixel
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
873 P.2d 1177
Case no.
960374-CA
Filed
1996
Decided
September 5, 1997
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Fixel
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
A third degree felony conviction for threatening a judge

The panel

Gregory K. OrmeAuthor
Judith M. BillingsConcurred
Norman H. JacksonConcurred

Parties & counsel

Fixel — AppellantIndividual(s)
State of Utah — AppelleeState of Utah

Practice Tip

In a § 76-8-316(1) prosecution, defense arguments should focus on whether the threat was made with intent to intimidate, interfere or retaliate, because State of Utah v. Fixel holds that intent to carry out the threat is irrelevant (see n.5; the opinion has no ¶ numbers).

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