Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Does an old attempted robbery count toward habitual offender status? State of Utah v. Gallegos

941 P.2d 643No. 960454-CADecided Jul 3, 1997Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

Because the robbery statute revised simultaneously with Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5 includes attempted robbery, a 1981 attempted robbery conviction is a predicate violent felony for habitual offender enhancement even though attempted robbery is not separately listed.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld the defendant’s enhanced habitual offender sentence.

  • Utah’s revised robbery statute covers attempting to take property by force or fear, so an attempted robbery conviction counts as “robbery” for the 1995 habitual offender statute.
  • Rewriting and combining statutes did not, in the court’s view, take attempted robbery out of the enhancement scheme.
  • The defendant’s sentence as a habitual offender was upheld.

What happened?

A jury convicted the defendant of burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to six months in jail for the theft.

For the burglary, the court used Utah’s habitual offender statute, a law that increases the punishment for people with certain prior convictions. It raised the burglary to a first degree felony because of his earlier convictions for a 1983 burglary and a 1981 attempted robbery.

Why did the timing of the law matter?

After the crimes but before trial, the Legislature repealed the old habitual offender law and replaced it with Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5. The new law applies when a person convicted of a listed “violent felony” has two earlier convictions for listed violent felonies.

At the same time, the Legislature rewrote the robbery statute so that it covers a person who “takes or attempts to take” property by force or fear.

What did the defendant argue?

He argued that attempted robbery is not specifically named in the new habitual offender statute, so his 1981 conviction could not count as one of the two earlier offenses.

He also relied on a federal appeals case, United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.1992), where an attempted burglary did not count toward a federal enhancement.

What did the court decide?

The Court of Appeals upheld the sentence. It read the statutes in light of their purpose, which is to “make persistent offenders subject to greater sanctions,” quoting State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983).

The new habitual offender statute lists “robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3.” The robbery statute in that part, which took effect the same day, now includes attempts. The definition of “attempt” was the same as it had been in 1981. So the new robbery statute covers attempted robbery as that crime existed in 1981.

The defendant admitted he would have been a habitual offender under the old law. The court said he “cannot escape enhancement” just because the Legislature rewrote the statutes. The Legislature had only folded attempted robbery into the robbery statute.

Why didn’t the federal case help?

In Strahl, the federal law did not list attempted burglary, and earlier drafts that did include it had been dropped. That history showed attempted burglary was left out on purpose. The court found nothing like that here. Instead, the Utah statutes showed attempted robbery still counts.

What happens now?

Nothing more happens in the trial court. The habitual offender sentence stands.

What should people take from this?

When the Legislature rewrites and combines criminal statutes, a court may read the new laws together. A crime that is no longer named on its own may still count if it was folded into another statute that the enhancement law refers to.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Bench, J., joined by Billings and Greenwood, JJ.). The defendant’s burglary conviction was enhanced to a first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5 (Supp.1996), based on a 1983 burglary and a 1981 attempted robbery. The revised habitual offender statute reaches the attempted robbery conviction because the robbery statute enacted with it, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp.1996), includes attempted robbery. The opinion has no numbered paragraphs.

Issue 1: Attempted robbery as a predicate violent felony (correctness): affirmed (no error)

A prior attempted robbery conviction is a predicate “violent felony” under § 76-3-203.5, so the defendant was not wrongly sentenced as a habitual offender. The court read the statute in harmony with its purpose, to “make persistent offenders subject to greater sanctions,” State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983). Section 76-3-203.5(1)(c) lists “aggravated robbery and robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3,” and the revised § 76-6-301, effective the same day (May 1, 1995), covers one who “takes or attempts to take” property by force or fear. The definition of attempt in § 76-4-101(1) is unchanged since 1981, so the revised robbery statute covers attempted robbery as it existed then.

The defendant conceded the conviction would have qualified under the old statute. The court declined to infer a change in the law’s effect from revision and consolidation, cf. Chris & Dick’s Lumber & Hardware v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 791 P.2d 511, 515 (Utah 1990). It distinguished United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.1992): there, attempted burglary was dropped from earlier drafts of the federal statute, showing deliberate omission, and did not fit the catch-all clause. Nothing similar showed that attempted robbery was meant to be excluded here.

In footnote 1, the court noted the statute’s ten-year window and, because neither party raised it, presumed the defendant met it.

Takeaways

  • An enhancement statute that incorporates another statute by reference picks up conduct that statute covers, including attempts folded into the offense definition.
  • Revising and consolidating statutes will not, without more, be read as changing the law’s effect (cf. Chris & Dick’s Lumber & Hardware v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 791 P.2d 511, 515 (Utah 1990)).
  • Arguments from omission are stronger with drafting history like that in United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.1992).
  • The court will presume unraised statutory conditions are met (n.1).
Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State of Utah v. Gallegos
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
941 P.2d 643
Case no.
960454-CA
Filed
1996
Decided
July 3, 1997
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Gallegos
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Enhancement of a second degree felony burglary conviction to a first degree felony under the habitual offender statute, based on prior burglary and attempted robbery convictions.

The panel

Russell W. BenchAuthor
Judith M. BillingsConcurred
Pamela T. GreenwoodConcurred

Parties & counsel

Gallegos — AppellantIndividual(s)
State of Utah — AppelleeState of Utah

Practice Tip

When an enhancement statute lists offenses by reference to another chapter, check how that chapter defines the offense at the time of enactment; here the robbery statute's "attempts to take" language brought attempted robbery within § 76-3-203.5 (the opinion has no numbered paragraphs).

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