Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a judge change a divorce ruling after it was upheld on appeal? Mintz v. Mintz

2026 UT App 170No. 20240056-CADecided Nov 5, 2026Family LawAffirmed/Reversed in part

Holding

Because Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, affirmed the district court’s ruling that awarding the former wife post-trial appreciation would amend the decree, the mandate rule barred the district court from granting that relief on remand, and neither the manifest injustice exception nor rule 60(a) applied.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals mostly sided with the former husband, undoing the award of investment gains to his former wife but leaving her alimony increase in place.

  • Once an appeals court decides an issue and sends a case back, the trial court generally cannot revisit that issue.
  • Here, the former wife’s award of the accounts’ growth after trial, and the related fees, were reversed.
  • An alimony argument the former husband never made to the trial court was not considered on appeal.

What happened?

Glen and Rayna Mintz divorced after a lengthy marriage. The Decree split six investment accounts using fixed dollar amounts based on their values at trial. Between trial and the entry of the Decree, the accounts grew by about $1.8 million, and Rayna claimed her share of that growth was nearly $850,000.

In 2020, Rayna filed a motion to enforce the Decree to get that growth. She filed a notice of appeal before the hearing. The district court then denied her motion, saying her request would really amend the Decree, which it could not do while the appeal was pending. In the first appeal, Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, 525 P.3d 534, cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023), the Court of Appeals agreed. It also sent the case back for the district court to recalculate alimony.

What happened when the case went back?

Rayna asked again. The district court rejected her requests under rules 60(b)(5) and 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but let her renew her motion to enforce. This time it granted the motion, explaining that it had always intended Rayna to share in the growth. It entered a judgment for her share, plus interest and fees.

The court also raised Rayna’s alimony. It found the couple had set aside more than $30,000 a month for savings and investments, added more than $15,000 to her monthly expenses, and increased her alimony by nearly $10,000.

Was the district court allowed to award the growth?

No. Under the “mandate rule,” once an appeals court decides an issue and sends the case back, the trial court and the parties must follow that decision. The first appeal had agreed that Rayna’s request would amend the Decree. The district court could not reverse course on remand.

Rayna argued an exception for “manifest injustice,” meaning a prior ruling that was obviously wrong and seriously harmful. The court said the original ruling was not obviously wrong. It pointed out that in the first appeal Rayna herself explained that the Decree’s wording was meant to keep Glen from giving her “bad” stocks. The court also rejected her argument that the Decree had a clerical mistake, meaning a mechanical error that is plain from the record.

Because Rayna did not win on appeal, the court denied her request for attorney fees on appeal.

What about the alimony?

Glen argued that a later case, Dutcher v. Dutcher, 2025 UT App 21, ¶ 20, 566 P.3d 48, required the court to count investment returns as Rayna’s income if it added investments to her expenses. The court did not decide this. Glen never raised it in the district court, so it was not “preserved,” meaning properly raised below. The court noted that nothing stops Glen from raising it with the district court later.

Did all the judges agree?

No. All three agreed on the alimony point. Judge Harris dissented on the investment accounts. He thought the Decree was ambiguous, that the judge who wrote it should be allowed to explain what he meant, and that the first appeal got the law wrong. He would have applied the manifest injustice exception and upheld the award.

What should people take from this?

A ruling upheld on appeal is usually final for the rest of the case, even if the trial judge later thinks it should have ruled differently. Arguments also need to be made to the trial court first.

Bottom line

Reversed in part and affirmed in part (Mortensen, J., joined by Oliver, J.; Harris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (¶ 33). Mintz I, Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, 525 P.3d 534, cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023), affirmed the district court’s ruling that awarding Rayna post-trial appreciation would amend the Decree. On remand the court could not reinterpret its “intent” and grant that relief (¶¶ 11–13, 32).

Issue 1: Post-trial appreciation of investment accounts (correctness, ¶¶ 5, 7–25): reversed

The judgment awarding Rayna a proportionate share of post-trial appreciation, and the related fees and costs, violated the mandate rule and is reversed (¶¶ 13, 25). The mandate rule binds the district court, the parties and the appellate court, and where a remand does “not direct the court to take any action” on an issue, the court may not award additional affirmative relief (¶¶ 9–10, quoting Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2021 UT App 38, ¶ 24, 491 P.3d 110). Mintz I gave no remand instruction on this issue; reading language into the Decree was “a patent violation of the mandate rule” (¶¶ 8, 11–12).

Manifest injustice: Rayna invoked the exception in IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 34, 196 P.3d 588. The court applied the plain-error-type test of State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998) and found no obvious error (¶ 22). Paragraph 171(b)’s plain language splits “each component” of each account by percentage, which matches Rayna’s own Mintz I explanation that the language guarded against Glen transferring “bad” stocks (¶ 20). The district court’s pre-appeal ruling read 171(b) as requiring transfer of the “exact amounts” (¶ 21). The ruling was not purely jurisdictional (¶ 15).

Clerical mistake: Rayna’s rule 60(a) alternative ground failed because 171(b) had no mechanical error apparent on the record (¶ 24, citing State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ¶ 29, 218 P.3d 610).

Issue 2: Rayna’s request for attorney fees on appeal (none stated, ¶ 25 n.17): the appellee’s request for attorney fees on appeal denied

Rayna is not entitled to fees because she did not prevail on appeal (¶ 25 n.17).

Issue 3: Investment returns in alimony under Dutcher (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 26–31): not reached

The court declined to consider whether the district court erred by adding an investment line item to Rayna’s expenses without imputing investment returns as income. Glen conceded he never raised the theory of Dutcher v. Dutcher, 2025 UT App 21, ¶ 20, 566 P.3d 48, below (¶ 27). New authority may support a preserved issue, but a party may not raise “a legal theory entirely distinct” from the one argued below (¶ 31, quoting Reyos v. State, 2026 UT 18, ¶ 31, 594 P.3d 532). Glen may raise the issue with the district court later (¶ 31 n.18).

Separate opinion

Judge Harris joined Part II but dissented from Part I (¶¶ 34–35). He would review a district court’s interpretation of a decree it drafted after trial with considerable deference, citing Uintah Basin Med. Center v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 786 (¶¶ 40–49). In his view 171(b) is ambiguous and the court’s interpretation was reasonable (¶¶ 50–56), and Mintz I wrongly treated clarifying an ambiguity as amending the Decree (¶¶ 57–65). He agreed the mandate rule applies generally (¶ 69) but would apply the manifest injustice exception and affirm (¶¶ 70–75).

Takeaways

  • An affirmed ruling with no remand instruction on that issue leaves the district court no authority to grant further relief on it (¶¶ 8–9, 12).
  • A district court’s later account of its “intent” cannot displace a ruling affirmed on appeal (¶¶ 11, 13).
  • The court applied a plain-error-type test to manifest injustice; if an order needs clarification, the prior ruling was not obvious error (¶ 22, ¶ 23 n.16).
  • Relying on new case law does not preserve a legal theory that was never argued below (¶¶ 27, 31).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Mintz v. Mintz
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 170
Case no.
20240056-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
November 5, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Disposition
Affirmed in part and Reversed in part
At stake
A judgment awarding the former wife a share of post-trial appreciation in six investment accounts, plus fees, and an alimony increase for regular investment

The panel

David N. MortensenAuthor
Ryan M. HarrisConcurring in part, dissenting in part
Amy J. OliverConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Silver Summit Department · Judge Kent R. Holmberg

Parties & counsel

Appellant — AppellantIndividual(s)Thomas J. Burns
Appellee — AppelleeIndividual(s)Julie J. NelsonMichael J. Teter

Practice Tip

If a party disagrees with a ruling affirmed on appeal, the time to seek further review is a certiorari petition, which the court noted Rayna did not file; on remand the mandate rule binds the court and the parties (¶ 9, ¶ 14 n.8).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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