Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a divorce court give one spouse more of the shared home? PEARSON v. PEARSON

2026 UT App 169No. 20251103-CADecided Nov 5, 2026Family LawAffirmed/Reversed in part

Holding

A district court may not apply the extraordinary-circumstances exception “in reverse” to reclassify commingled marital property as separate property, and an unequal division of marital property must rest on detailed findings addressing the circumstances and needs of both parties.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with Rebecka Pearson on the house and sent that issue back, but upheld the ruling denying her move to Colorado with the children.

  • Once a court finds property is marital, it cannot use the “extraordinary circumstances” exception in reverse to make it separate property again.
  • A court may still divide marital property unequally, but it must make detailed findings that consider the needs and circumstances of both spouses.
  • The custody ruling keeping the children in Utah stands, and Keenan’s request for attorney fees on appeal was denied.

What happened?

Rebecka and Keenan Pearson married in 2013 and divorced in 2025. They have four minor children. In 2016 Keenan was in an accident that left him with permanent physical disabilities, and he received a large personal injury settlement.

The couple bought a house with $400,000 of that settlement. The money first went into a joint account, and the house was titled in a joint revocable trust. The district court found these steps showed Keenan’s “clear intent” that the house become joint property.

What did the district court decide about the house?

The court agreed the house was marital property, meaning property that belongs to both spouses and is normally split equally. But it still gave Keenan the $400,000 purchase price as his own, and split only the $190,000 increase in value equally. It pointed to Keenan’s disability, his ongoing medical needs and changes made to the home for him, and said it was applying the “extraordinary circumstances” exception “in reverse.”

Was that allowed?

No. The Court of Appeals explained that the extraordinary-circumstances idea shows up in two settings. In one, a court may give one spouse’s separate property to the other when that is the only way to be fair. That can only work one way. It cannot turn marital property back into separate property.

In the other setting, a court may divide marital property unequally when the circumstances and needs of the parties call for it. That was the right path here. But the court must make detailed findings and must look at both spouses. The district court looked only at Keenan’s needs and said nothing about Rebecka’s, so its findings were not enough.

The court also rejected Rebecka’s argument that an unequal split is allowed only as a last resort after alimony, which is ongoing support paid by one former spouse to the other.

Could Rebecka move the children to Colorado?

No. The district court gave the parents joint legal and physical custody but denied Rebecka’s request to move to Colorado to be near her boyfriend. It found the children were doing well in local schools, had support plans in place, and were close to their grandmother and other family nearby. It gave Keenan primary custody.

Rebecka challenged several findings, including on her moral character, religion, schooling and Keenan’s fitness. The Court of Appeals found each finding had support in the evidence and that Rebecka misread some of them. The district court did not exceed its discretion, meaning its decision was within the range of reasonable choices.

What about attorney fees?

Keenan asked for fees, saying the appeal was frivolous, meaning it had no real basis. Because Rebecka won on the house issue, the court said the appeal was not frivolous and denied his request.

What happens now?

The order giving Keenan the larger share of the house is undone. The district court must redo the analysis, considering both parties’ needs. It may decide whether to make new findings from the existing record or take more evidence.

Bottom line

Vacated and remanded in part, affirmed in part (Mortensen, J., joined by Harris and Oliver, JJ.). The district court found the house, bought with $400,000 of Keenan’s personal injury settlement, was commingled marital property, yet awarded him that $400,000 as separate property by applying the extraordinary-circumstances exception “in reverse” (¶¶ 4, 10). That approach “has no foundation in our jurisprudence” (¶ 10), and the findings did not address Rebecka’s needs (¶ 18). The relocation and custody ruling is affirmed (¶ 28).

Issue 1: Unequal division of the marital house (abuse of discretion, ¶ 7): reversed and remanded

The court vacated the unequal division of the house and remanded for a proper analysis, because the findings were insufficient (¶ 19). The court separated two uses of extraordinary circumstances. First, separate property may be made marital when that is the only way to achieve equity, following Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 46, 392 P.3d 968 and Thorup v. Thorup, 2024 UT App 93, 554 P.3d 329; this works in one direction only (¶ 12). Second, marital property may be divided unequally “when the circumstances and needs of the parties dictate,” under Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ¶ 26, 993 P.2d 887 (¶ 13). Once the court found commingling, only the second route was open (¶¶ 14, 17).

That route requires detailed findings on all pertinent circumstances, citing Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147–48 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and Clark v. Clark, 2023 UT App 111, ¶ 40, 537 P.3d 633 (¶¶ 15–16). The findings covered Keenan’s health and medical needs but not Rebecka’s, which “marks only half the work” (¶ 18). Footnote 3 rejects Rebecka’s reading of Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, 271 P.3d 837: it does not make unequal division a last resort available only after alimony (¶ 15 n.3). On remand the court may make findings on the existing record or take more evidence (¶ 19 n.4).

Issue 2: Custody and relocation (mixed, ¶¶ 8, 22): affirmed (no error)

The district court did not exceed its discretion in denying relocation to Colorado and awarding Keenan primary custody (¶ 28). Custody is reviewed for abuse of discretion and findings for clear error, and an appellant must deal with the supporting evidence (¶¶ 8, 22). The unchallenged finding that both parents were “quite engaged” in parenting defeated the primary-caregiver argument (¶ 23). The moral-character finding rested on the quick pace of introducing a new relationship to the children, not the relationship itself (¶ 24). The religious-compatibility finding did not rely on that relationship (¶ 25). The court made findings on educational needs (¶ 26) and addressed opioid use, emotional stability and parenting concerns (¶ 27).

Issue 3: Attorney fees on appeal (none stated, ¶ 29): Keenan’s request for attorney fees on appeal denied

Keenan’s request for fees under Utah R. App. P. 33 was denied because Rebecka prevailed on one issue, so the appeal was not frivolous (¶ 29).

Takeaways

  • The extraordinary-circumstances exception cannot convert marital property back into separate property (¶¶ 10, 12).
  • An unequal division of marital property needs detailed findings on both parties’ circumstances and needs, not one spouse’s alone (¶ 18).
  • A relocation challenge that does not engage the supporting evidence for unchallenged custody findings will not succeed (¶¶ 22–23, 28).
  • Winning one issue on appeal defeats a rule 33 frivolousness fee request (¶ 29).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
PEARSON v. PEARSON
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 169
Case no.
20251103-CA
Filed
2025
Decided
November 5, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Disposition
Affirmed in part and Reversed in part
At stake
Whether $400,000 of the marital house's value could be awarded to Keenan as separate property, and whether Rebecka could relocate to Colorado with the four children.

The panel

David N. MortensenAuthor
Ryan M. HarrisConcurred
Amy J. OliverConcurred
Trial court
Sixth District Court, Manti Department · Judge Robert Van Dyke

Parties & counsel

Appellant — AppellantIndividual(s)Sierra D. Hansen
Appellee — AppelleeIndividual(s)Douglas L. NeeleyCraig L. Pankratz

Practice Tip

When a party seeks an unequal division of marital property based on one spouse's needs, ask the court to make detailed findings on the other spouse's circumstances and needs as well (Pearson v. Pearson, 2026 UT App 169, ¶ 18).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

About these Decision Summaries

Lotus Appellate Law publishes these summaries to keep practitioners informed — not as legal advice. Each case turns on its own facts. If a decision here is relevant to your matter, we’re happy to discuss it.